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ABSTRACT 
 Since the mid- to late 1990s, the scientific and medical research 
community has sought to increase its access to healthy children for 
research protocols that involve harm or a risk of harm. This move 
reverses longstanding policy within that community generally to 
exclude healthy children from such protocols on the grounds that the 
research as to them is nontherapeutic, that they are particularly 
vulnerable to research-related abuses, and that they are unable 
themselves to give informed consent to their participation. The 
research community’s new posture has been supported by prominent 
pediatric bioethicists who have argued that unless healthy children are 
included as research subjects in harmful or risky research, the 
pediatric population will continue to suffer relative to the adult 
population in the extent to which it benefits from modern advances in 
science and medicine. In their view, it is possible for the research 
community to self-administer a rule that strikes a balance between 
protecting healthy children from research-related abuses and allowing 
their inclusion in cutting-edge pediatric research. In this scheme, 
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parental consent is central to the research community’s claims about 
child protection. 
 This Article explores the flaws inherent in this ethics of pediatric 
research. Specifically, it challenges the view from ethics that the law 
permits parents to consent to their children’s inclusion in harmful or 
risky research to the extent that related invasions would meet legal 
maltreatment standards. More broadly, it challenges the movement to 
increase access to healthy children for harmful and risky research on 
the ground that it risks two important regressions: First, in its 
willingness to risk harm to individual children in the interests of the 
group, it threatens the progress the law has made in its development of 
the concept of the child as an individual worthy of respect in his or 
her own right, a concept that imagines parents as fiduciaries and that 
includes strong protections against invasions of bodily integrity. 
Second, in its failure to assure that the burdens of nontherapeutic 
research are not placed disproportionately on children of lower 
socioeconomic and minority status, it violates the antidiscrimination 
principle, which has only begun to make good on its promise of equal 
treatment for all children. Ultimately, this Article argues that 
harmonization of the rules governing pediatric research with the law 
of child protection and parents’ consent authority is the best way to 
assure that children are protected in the research setting in these 
respects and to the same extent they are otherwise in the society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  A preeminent research institution enrolls a group of infants and 
young children in a study designed to measure the effects of varying 
degrees of lead abatement on lead levels in the blood, including by 
encouraging particular landlords to rent their properties only to 
families with young children and by encouraging the tenants in those 
properties to consent to their children’s use as research subjects. The 
study is designed to determine whether the government can reduce 
current lead abatement requirements and still protect children from 
neurological injury. If a different standard can be developed, it will 
increase the availability of low-income housing in the city and help to 
restore blighted communities. At some point, researchers learn of, but 
do not warn parents about, risky lead levels in their children’s blood; 
any warning would compromise the study midcourse.1 
Ethicists have long debated whether and in what circumstances 
healthy children ought to be used as research subjects. Ethical codes 
and principles have emerged from those debates (and the history and 
developments that tend to spawn them) to govern the practices of 
clinicians, investigators, and the institutions of which they are a part. 
Central to these codes and statements of principles is the requirement 
that informed consent be obtained from subjects if they are legally 
competent to give it or from their legal representatives or “legal 
proxies” if they are not. Regardless of the value and propriety of the 
intervention otherwise, it cannot be undertaken unless this 
requirement is met.2 
 
 1. This scenario is derived from the facts of Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, 782 A.2d 
807, 811–13 (Md. 2001). 
 2. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES 
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1978), available at 
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Despite the provision for a proxy decisionmaker when the 
proposed subject is incapable of consent, the prevailing view among 
bioethicists and regulators from the late 1970s through the mid- to 
late 1990s favored excluding healthy children from pediatric research 
protocols. This view was largely driven by lingering concerns about 
the morality of subjecting nonautonomous individuals to research-
related harm and risk, and about children’s particular vulnerability to 
exploitation in the research setting.3 Beginning in the late 1990s, 
however, the central commitment of this community began to shift 
from protection to access, so that the prevailing view favors including 
healthy children in nontherapeutic research, including in protocols 
that involve higher than minimal risk.4 Both beneficence and 
distributive justice are believed to be better served by allowing, rather 
than disallowing, such interventions. Specifically, the prevailing view 
holds that including healthy children in higher-risk research will 
maximize the gains that can be obtained from the research, and that it 
is otherwise fair and just to distribute the burdens of this research 
across the population of children (both ill and healthy) who would 
potentially benefit from its results.5 This view was ensconced in 
 
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/belmont.html; World Med. Ass’n, World Medical Association 
Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects 
(2004) (originally drafted in 1964), available at http://www.wma.net/e/policy/pdf/17c.pdf; 2 
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER 
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 181–84 (William S. Hein & Co. 1997) (1949), available at 
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html [hereinafter NUREMBERG CODE]. Although 
the Nuremberg Code’s informed consent requirement does not sanction proxy consents, later 
codes do. See infra note 56. 
 3. See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 90–110 and accompanying text. “Minimal risk” is a term of art defined 
in the federal regulations governing pediatric research. For a recitation of this definition and a 
description of the controversy over its interpretation, see infra notes 75–78 and accompanying 
text. The use of healthy children as subjects is “nontherapeutic” because the research “does not 
normally benefit the research subject directly, but is done to provide information about future 
treatments to others.” Beth Newbury Whitstone, Medical Decision Making: Informed Consent 
in Pediatric Research, Congenital Heart Information Network, Mar. 26, 2004, 
http://www.tchin.org/resource_room/c_art_18.htm. Ill children may also be used as controls in 
nontherapeutic research. See MEDICAL RESEARCH WITH CHILDREN: ETHICS, LAW, AND 
PRACTICE 26–33 (Richard H. Nicholson ed., 1986) (discussing the history and the distinction 
between therapeutic and nontherapeutic research). 
 5. The book, Beyond Consent, provides an especially thorough treatment of this research 
ethics, which its authors apply not only to the pediatric context, but also to other contexts 
involving vulnerable subpopulations, including women, minorities, and subjects in the 
international context. BEYOND CONSENT: SEEKING JUSTICE IN RESEARCH (Jeffrey P. Kahn, 
Anna C. Mastroianni & Jeremy Sugarman eds., 1998). Notably, the prevailing view may not 
necessarily reflect the majority or consensus position. See Seema Shah et al., How Do 
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national legislation that provides incentives for those who would 
engage in pediatric research and encourages the inclusion of children 
especially in trials of new and existing pharmaceuticals.6 Most 
important, this view is influential in the interpretation of the federal 
regulations that govern the conduct of pediatric research on a day-to-
day basis.7 
As a result of these developments and a burgeoning investment 
in pediatric research, parents are increasingly being asked to allow 
their healthy children to be participants in experiments that may 
involve harm or more than minimal risk. According to the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM), “the number of industry-sponsored pediatric 
clinical trials and the number of child participants in such trials 
[between 1997 and 2001] increased by an estimated three-fold.”8 
Correspondingly, the pediatric research budget of the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) reflected “a growth rate of 82.4 percent in 
nominal terms.”9 
The widely held assumption among researchers who want to 
include children in their protocols is that satisfaction of their ethical 
and regulatory obligations—including the requirement that they 
afford parents “the consent process” and obtain their signatures on 
consent forms—fully assures the lawfulness of their work. 
Specifically, these researchers assume either that the law is not 
otherwise implicated in the transaction, or if it is, that it does not 
 
Institutional Review Boards Apply the Federal Risk and Benefit Standards for Pediatric 
Research?, 291 JAMA 476, 478 (2004) (describing the failure of polled IRB chairs to classify 
certain risks according to the authors’ interpretation of the applicable regulatory standards). 
 6. For a description of this legislation, see infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. 
 7. For further discussion, see infra notes 68–111 and accompanying text, which set out the 
relevant terms of these regulations, describe both the federal government’s prior position with 
respect to the use of children as research subjects and these new inclusive policies, and note the 
policies’ influence on the research community’s interpretation of the regulations. 
 8. COMM. ON CLINICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L 
ACADS., ETHICAL CONDUCT OF CLINICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN 246 (Marilyn J. 
Field & Richard E. Behrman eds., 2004) [hereinafter IOM]; see Telephone Interview with 
Jennifer Li, Professor, Duke Univ. Sch. of Med. (Mar. 1, 2007) (explaining that both healthy and 
ill children are included in these protocols, and that because there are not always enough ill 
children to conduct a proper study, it is useful to be able also to access healthy children as 
subjects). 
 9. Daniel P. Gitterman et al., Did a Rising Tide Lift All Boats? The NIH Budget and 
Pediatric Research Portfolio, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 113, 116 (noting also that 
“[a]lthough funding for pediatric research increased from FY 1998 to FY 2003, its proportion of 
total NIH spending went down . . . from 12.3 to 11.3 percent”). For further description of the 
increased use of children in research, see infra notes 102–11 and accompanying text. 
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circumscribe parents’ authority to give legally valid consent to 
nontherapeutic interventions involving their children any more than it 
circumscribes the right of competent adults to consent to such 
interventions on their own behalf.10 From the standpoint of the 
research community, this assumption makes perfect sense. Its 
informed consent process was established to assure that physicians 
and scientists show appropriate respect for their patients and subjects, 
particularly for the latter’s right to autonomous decisionmaking. (A 
more comprehensive perspective on the concept of respect for the 
person—and correspondingly, on the goals of the informed consent 
process—that would also include protection of an individual’s right to 
bodily integrity is not prominent in the prevailing ethics of pediatric 
research.)11 Thus, when individuals or their legal proxies are 
“consented” through this process, a signature on the consent form is 
proof that due respect was shown.12 
The legality of parental consent in these circumstances is not so 
easily settled, however. And as a result, so long as valid parental 
consent remains a prerequisite for ethical and lawful research, the 
legality of some harmful and higher-risk uses of healthy children—
and thus the viability of the movement to increase access to healthy 
children for such research—is also in doubt. Specifically, the federal 
 
 10. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 852 (Md. 2001) (“Most of the 
relatively few cases in the area of ethics of protocols of various research projects involving 
children have merely assumed that a parent can give informed consent for the participation of 
their [sic] children in nontherapeutic research.”); GEORGE J. ANNAS, LEONARD H. GLANTZ & 
BARBARA F. KATZ, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE SUBJECT’S 
DILEMMA 54 (1977) (noting that “[i]nformed consent is a process” and that “[t]he signing of a 
consent form can be evidence that this process took place”). Early writings in the bioethical 
literature reflected an understanding of the law of parents’ consent authority as a relevant 
boundary; at the same time, however, their authors—who were ultimately advocates for using 
healthy children as research subjects—generally argued in favor of a permissive interpretation 
of that law. See, e.g., ANGELA RODDEY HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND 
ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 146–60 (2d ed. 1985) (analyzing the legal boundaries of parents’ 
consent authority and arguing that this authority is sufficient to permit research interventions 
that risk less harm “than that to which [the child] is reasonably likely to be exposed in normal 
daily life”). When modern commentators and researchers assume the lawfulness of parental 
consent to harmful and risky nontherapeutic research, it is likely because they (want to) believe 
in these older analyses, and/or because prior to Grimes, the courts did not have occasion to 
review a related issue. 
 11. For a description of the Belmont Report’s view of respect for the person, see infra text 
accompanying note 64. 
 12. For a description of this position, see infra notes 64, 84–86, and accompanying text. 
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scheme that primarily governs pediatric research does not preempt13 
state laws that otherwise define informed consent doctrine. As 
applied to parents as proxy decisionmakers, this doctrine—which has 
its origins in battery law and is thus motivated mainly by a 
commitment to respecting the individual’s physical integrity—does 
not contemplate medical or scientific interventions involving healthy 
children. Rather, it assumes that the proposed intervention is in the 
best interests of an ill child.14 Nor do the federal pediatric research 
rules supercede federal and state child protection laws or the 
boundaries inherent in the constitutional doctrine of parental 
autonomy. Established child protection law prohibits parents from 
acting intentionally to cause or to risk causing physical harm to their 
children unless it is to obtain a direct offsetting benefit; indeed, when 
they take such action, the traditional response is that they are guilty 
of child abuse.15 Notably, although the definitions of “harm” and 
“risk” common to child protection law appear to overlap somewhat 
with definitions used by the research community, the two are not 
coterminous. The U.S. Supreme Court has generally accepted that the 
standards set out in child protection law also establish the 
constitutional boundaries of parents’ decisional authority.16 Thus, 
contrary to assumptions prevalent among bioethicists and the 
research community,17 there will be procedures that are appropriate 
according to the standards of that community, but that cannot be 
authorized legally by a child’s parents.18 
Despite the apparent surprise and clear consternation of many 
bioethicists and researchers,19 this integrated doctrine appropriately 
 
 13. Preemption has special meaning in the law. In this context, it signifies the absence of an 
express or implied intention of the federal government to have its law supercede otherwise 
relevant state law. For a more detailed discussion of preemption doctrine, see ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 390–419 (3d ed. 2006). 
 14. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 54–62, 654 (2000) (outlining elements of the 
battery claim and discussing the informed consent doctrine as it concerns operations). 
 15. For a description of these rules, see infra notes 127–47 and accompanying text. 
 16. For a discussion of this doctrine, see infra notes 116–26 and accompanying text. 
 17. See, e.g., HOLDER, supra note 10, at 152 (reflecting this misimpression); Loretta M. 
Kopelman, What Conditions Justify Risky Nontherapeutic or “No Benefit” Pediatric Studies: A 
Sliding Scale Analysis, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 749, 754–56 (2004) (identifying the 
misimpression). 
 18. For an analysis of parents’ consent authority in the research setting, see infra Part II.C. 
 19. See, e.g., Anna C. Mastroianni & Jeffrey P. Kahn, Risk and Responsibility: Ethics, 
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger, and Public Health Research Involving Children, 92 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1073, 1073 (2002) (noting the fear of researchers in the wake of Grimes “that valuable 
public health research that complied with long-standing federal standards . . . would be halted 
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governed the outcome in Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute,20 the 
case from which the introductory illustration is derived and one of 
only two judicial decisions squarely to address the boundaries of 
parents’ consent authority in the context of pediatric research.21 In 
Grimes, the Maryland Court of Appeals—the state’s highest court—
concluded that parents cannot lawfully authorize researchers to use 
their healthy children in experiments that risk more than a minimal 
amount of harm.22 In doing so, it flatly rejected the notion, based on 
modern ethical interpretations of the federal pediatric research 
regulations, that the harms associated with the lead abatement study 
were “minimal” or otherwise legally inflicted.23 Focusing on the 
interests of the individual research subjects, the court also flatly 
rejected the more general view that these harms were worth risking 
because the research could eventually yield important benefits for the 
 
altogether”). Part II.C.5 discusses Grimes and the reactions of the bioethics and research 
communities. 
 20. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001). 
 21. Id. at 852. The only other case to have addressed this issue was T.D. v. New York State 
Office of Mental Health, 626 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1018 (Sup. Ct. 1995), aff’d, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (App. 
Div. 1996). The T.D. decision invalidated state regulations that allowed “more than minimal 
risk” research on children and others incapable of giving consent, because they did not 
adequately protect the children’s common law personal autonomy and constitutional due 
process rights. T.D. v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173, 176 (App. Div. 
1996). In the words of the appellate court when affirming the district court’s decision, “a parent 
or guardian, let alone another adult who may be a member of the child’s family, may not 
consent to have a child submit to painful and/or potentially life-threatening research procedures 
that hold no prospect of benefit for the child . . . .” Id. at 192; see also Lainie Friedman Ross, 
Children in Medical Research: Balancing Protection and Access: Has the Pendulum Swung Too 
Far?, 47 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 519, 526 (2004) (describing Complaint, Nielsen v. Regents of 
the University of California, No. 665-049 Civ. 8–9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 1973), which sought a 
declaration that “parents and guardians ha[ve] no legal authority to consent to the participation 
of a child or a ward in nontherapeutic research irrespective of the degree of risk”). The Nielsen 
case was filed but never decided; nevertheless, according to Duane Alexander, director of the 
National Institute of Child and Health Development, merely addressing this issue in a judicial 
forum “‘left investigators and research regulators shivering in their boots, and the shock waves 
it sent through the research community and the reaction and response it engendered in terms of 
regulations for protecting children in research cannot be overestimated.’” Ross, supra, at 526 
(quoting Duane Alexander, Regulation of Research with Children: The Evolution from 
Exclusion to Inclusion, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2002)). 
 22. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 848. The court also held that researchers have a tort law–based 
special relationship with their subjects, which imposes a duty to warn of known risks and 
dangers. Id. at 846. Like the court’s analysis of parents’ consent authority, its analysis in this 
respect is also strictly consistent with “black letter” law. See DOBBS, supra note 14, at 875–76 
(describing the special relationships–based duty to aid). 
 23. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 848. 
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larger community of which they were a part.24 Although there is no 
reason to believe that the particular research at issue in Grimes is 
typical of the sorts of interventions contemplated by the movement to 
increase access to healthy children for higher-risk experiments, it is 
nevertheless difficult to overstate the significance of this decision for 
the research community. Not only is the decision consistent with the 
law across the states on the boundaries of parents’ consent authority, 
but there is also no question about the applicability of this law to 
research conducted in the state of Maryland. Among other things, it 
implicates both ongoing and contemplated research at such premier 
institutions as the NIH and Johns Hopkins University.25 More 
generally, the decision puts the research community on notice that an 
ethics of pediatric research and an interpretation of the 
corresponding federal regulations that permit the use of healthy 
children in potentially harmful and higher-risk experiments will find 
itself on a collision course with the law of child protection and 
parents’ decisional authority. 
The research community could seek to avoid this collision by 
soliciting legal reforms that would exempt harmful and higher-risk 
 
 24. See id. at 851 (quoting the National Bioethics Advisory Commission saying that “no 
matter how important the research questions, it is not ethical to use human participants without 
appropriate protections”). 
 25. See, e.g., Appellee’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Modification of Opinion at 
2, Grimes, 782 A.2d 807 (No. 128), available at http://www.aau.edu/research/Paint9.17.01.pdf 
(warning among other things of the dire implications of the decision for the “hundreds of fully 
accredited medical research projects now conducted in Maryland” and “the damage done to the 
institutions as a result of terminating these projects”). These implications were so important that 
the defendants and others allied with their interests lobbied Maryland state lawmakers to 
develop legislation that would abrogate the court’s holdings. Tom Pelton, Groups Target Study 
Limits, BALT. SUN, Sept. 30, 2001, at 1B. The reforms that were ultimately enacted represent a 
compromise between the research community, which initially sought state adoption of the 
federal regulations, and those seeking greater or more definitive protections for research 
subjects. See Tom Pelton, Draft Focuses on Subjects in Experiments, BALT. SUN, Jan. 26, 2002, at 
1B (describing the attempt to abrogate the court’s holding); Tom Pelton, Tests Bill Toned 
Down, BALT. SUN, Jan. 31, 2002, at 1B (reporting on the compromise); H.B. 917, 2002 Gen. 
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2002), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2002rs/billfile/hb0917.htm; 
MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. §§ 13-2001 to -2004 (West 2006) (providing for limited public 
access to IRB minutes; subjecting all human subjects research to the federal regulations, even 
that to which the regulations are not otherwise applicable; and providing authority to the state’s 
attorney general to seek injunctions to stop unethical studies). Although the legislation is 
certainly helpful to the research community in the sense that its work is now primarily subject to 
one set of essentially favorable rules—that is, the federal regulations—it did not abrogate either 
of Grimes’s holdings. That is, the common-law special relationships duty to warn is still on the 
books, as is the rule that parents may not consent to subject their healthy children to anything 
more than minimal risk as defined by the court. 
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pediatric research from the limitations inherent in this law. Given 
how entrenched its terms are in American society, and also the 
skepticism that still exists outside of the research community about its 
ability adequately to protect human subjects in light of its sometimes 
conflicting progress goals, it is questionable whether such reforms 
would be feasible. Nevertheless, if such reforms could be adopted, 
they would secure researchers’ ability to use healthy children for at 
least some problematic interventions. 
This Article advocates the opposite approach: reform of the 
federal pediatric research regulations, and in particular of their rules 
on harm and risk, according to the terms of the law of child protection 
and parents’ decisional authority. The nontherapeutic research setting 
is fraught with conflicts of interest, including between the prospect of 
developments in science and medicine (for the good of mankind and 
the private sponsors and administrators of research), and the 
protection of healthy human research subjects (for the good of the 
particular individuals enrolled in experiments). Although advocates 
of the prevailing ethics of pediatric research often describe their 
project as developing an acceptable balance between protection and 
access, they have not managed to arrive at an interpretation of the 
rules on harm and risk that would accomplish this goal.26 On the other 
hand, a central aim of the law of child protection and parents’ 
decisional authority is precisely to protect individual children from 
unnecessary harms caused by adult caretakers with conflicting 
interests.27 
Moreover, although the movement to increase access to healthy 
children for higher-risk research and to provide consistent 
interpretations of the federal rules purports to be progressive, in fact 
for children, it is regressive in two important respects. 
First, the theoretical foundations underlying the law of child 
protection and parents’ decisional authority imagine the parent as 
fiduciary of his or her child, who is deserving of respect as a person in 
the liberal tradition. The fact that children are pre-autonomous 
 
 26. See Jeffrey P. Khan et al., Changing Claims About Justice in Research: An Introduction 
and Overview, in BEYOND CONSENT: SEEKING JUSTICE IN RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 5; see 
also infra Part III.A. 
 27. Thus, for example, this law restricts parents’ ability to require their children to work to 
contribute economically to their own and/or their family’s welfare because doing so would cause 
them educational and potentially also physical harm. See SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN 
IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 16–17, 32 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2004). 
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persons has reduced but not eliminated the benefits that inure to 
individuals within that tradition. This account, which only recently 
has replaced the historical concept of the child as property, allows for 
parental rights not as payment for bearing the burdens of parenthood, 
but rather as the best way to ensure that decisions affecting the child 
are made consistent with his or her interests.28 This law is also firmly 
grounded in a commitment to individuals’ physical integrity and a 
concomitant aversion to intentional invasions of that integrity, both of 
which permeate modern American jurisprudence, but which have 
only recently begun to be viewed as fully applicable to children.29 
Finally, this law reflects continued fealty to the harm principle, which 
provides the basis for the government to regulate conduct (and thus 
to curtail liberty) when that conduct threatens the individual’s right to 
be free from harm.30 The central aims of the movement to increase 
access to healthy children for higher-risk research—elimination of the 
presumption that children need the strongest possible protection from 
exploitation in the research setting, advancement beyond a singular 
concern for the protection of the individual to a more broad-based 
concern for the welfare of the group, and an interpretation of the 
federal regulations that allows for increasingly harmful and risky 
nontherapeutic interventions—threaten the progress represented by 
the application of these principles to individual children. 
Second, the movement to increase access to healthy children for 
higher-risk research violates the antidiscrimination principle, which 
has only begun to have a real influence on the law’s approach to the 
treatment of underprivileged children.31 Although the risk of 
exploitation in the research setting exists for all children, it is most 
immediate for low-income and minority children. These children are 
the best source of large numbers of pediatric research subjects 
because, among other reasons, their parents are most likely to be 
lured by the ancillary benefits of participation (generally money and 
sometimes also free medical services) and (where socioeconomic 
 
 28. See infra notes 382–402 and accompanying text for a description of the modern legal 
theory of parental rights. 
 29. The most obvious examples of this aversion reside in the tort law of battery and in 
Fourth Amendment law. For further discussion of this aversion in the law of child protection 
and parents’ decisional authority, see infra notes 132–39, 386–90 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra note 390 and accompanying text for further discussion of the harm principle. 
 31. Cf. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997) (holding that the North Carolina 
Constitution requires the state to provide every child, including those from poorer communities, 
with “an opportunity to receive a sound basic education”). 
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status tracks education) least likely to understand the risks and 
burdens involved.32 This group is also a principal source of otherwise 
healthy subjects who might be involved in research that poses more 
than a minimal risk of harm because unlike their more privileged 
counterparts, low-income and minority children are often perceived 
to be already at risk from, if not damaged by, their existing 
circumstances.33 Consistent with these assumptions, research shows 
that poor African-American children are disproportionately 
represented among the population of healthy pediatric research 
subjects.34 The irony that the new ethics of pediatric research is 
creating distributive justice problems for poor and minority children 
to advance the different distributive justice goal that is assuring all 
children—but primarily children whose parents can afford top-of-the-
line health care—access to better medicines and conditions should 
not be lost on those who evaluate its merits. 
There is an abundance of writing on the boundaries of 
permissible pediatric research in the ethical and bioethical literatures. 
On the other hand, there is precious little on the subject in the legal 
literature, and that which does exist was written primarily in the wake 
of Grimes and from an ethical rather than legal perspective.35 It is safe 
 
 32. See infra notes 357–60 and accompanying text. Of course, depending on its contents, 
one could be well educated and still not understand an informed consent form. 
 33. Part II.A discusses and examines the argument that healthy children who are at risk of 
harm or illness in the future might be characterized as having a “condition” justifying their 
inclusion in higher-risk research under the corresponding federal regulations. 
 34. LAINIE FRIEDMAN ROSS, CHILDREN IN MEDICAL RESEARCH: ACCESS VERSUS 
PROTECTION 44 (2006); see also infra note 358 (discussing this problem and contrasting it with 
the problem that these children are underincluded in research involving ill children). 
 35. See Randall Baldwin Clark, Speed, Safety, and Dignity: Pediatric Pharmaceutical 
Development in an Age of Optimism, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1 (2002); Rupali Gandhi, 
Research Involving Children: Regulations, Review Boards and Reform, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & 
POL’Y 264 (2005); Anna Gercas, The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights: 
Promoting International Discussion on the Morality of Non-Therapeutic Research on Children, 
27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 629 (2006); Clifton R. Gray, The “Greater Good” . . . At What Cost?: How 
Nontherapeutic Scientific Studies Can Now Create Viable Negligence Claims in Maryland After 
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 73 (2002); William G. Kelly, 
Ericka and Myron: Canaries in the Mines, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 173 (2002); Loretta M. 
Kopelman, Children as Research Subjects: Moral Disputes, Regulatory Guidance, and Recent 
Court Decisions, 73 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 596, 599 (2006) [hereinafter Kopelman, Children as 
Research Subjects]; Loretta M. Kopelman, Minimal Risk as an International Ethical Standard in 
Research, 29 J. MED. & PHIL. 351 (2004) [hereinafter Kopelman, Minimal Risk]; Loretta M. 
Kopelman, Pediatric Research Regulations Under Legal Scrutiny: Grimes Narrows Their 
Interpretation, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 38 (2002) [hereinafter Kopelman, Pediatric Research 
Regulations Under Legal Scrutiny]; Kopelman, supra note 17, at 754–56; Symposium, Research 
with Children: The New Legal and Policy Landscape, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1 (2002); 
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to assume that the absence of relevant legal analysis has played a 
major role in creating the disjunction in language, doctrine, and 
theory that is the subject of this Article. Indeed, as Dr. William J. 
Wenner has already noted, 
[t]he dearth of [relevant] judicial opinions, the findings of the court 
in Grimes, the response of the research and regulatory community 
to Grimes, the ambiguities of current regulations, and the continuing 
evidence of adverse effects on children in scientific experiments[,] all 
suggest a need to re-evaluate the legal protections offered to 
children involved in human experimentation.36 
This Article intends exactly that. 
It proceeds as follows: Part I describes the evolving ethics of 
pediatric research involving healthy children, focusing on the shift in 
national policy from the presumption that healthy children normally 
would be excluded from research designs to the presumption that 
they normally will be included in such designs, even when 
participation involves harm or more than minimal risk. Part II 
explores the legal boundaries of parents’ consent authority, and it 
examines the degree of overlap and disjunction between those 
boundaries and prevailing assumptions, language, and practice in the 
research community. The Maryland Court of Appeals decision in 
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute is examined in this context. Part 
III develops a normative argument in favor of an ethics of pediatric 
research—and a corresponding reform of the federal pediatric 
research rules—that tracks the law of child protection and parents’ 
decisional authority. The leading proposals to balance protection and 
access are critiqued in this discussion. The Article concludes that the 
suggested reforms ought to be undertaken despite the likelihood that 
they would preclude some potentially useful interventions. Although 
scientific and medical progress are often privileged in American 
society, absent more, such progress is an insufficient basis upon which 
 
Jennifer Rosato, The Ethics of Clinical Trials: A Child’s View, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 362 
(2000); Lainie Friedman Ross, In Defense of the Hopkins Lead Abatement Studies, 30 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 50 (2002); Efi Rubinstein, Going Beyond Parents and Institutional Review Boards in 
Protecting Children Involved in Nontherapeutic Research, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 251 
(2003); David M. Smolin, Address, Nontherapeutic Research with Children: The Virtues and 
Vices of Legal Uncertainty, 33 CUMB. L. REV. 621 (2002); William J. Wenner, Does the Legal 
System Provide Adequate Protection for Children in Scientific Experiments? The Unanswered 
Question of Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 243 (2004). 
 36. Wenner, supra note 35, at 245. 
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to claim the right to subject healthy children to otherwise 
inappropriate harm and risk. 
I.  THE EVOLVING ETHICS OF  
PEDIATRIC RESEARCH USING HEALTHY CHILDREN 
The history of pediatric experimentation begins well before the 
twentieth century, at a time when there was little apparent concern 
for the moral, ethical, or legal implications of this practice.37 In this 
earlier period—from approximately the 1700s through the mid-
1900s—healthy children were injected (sometimes by a curious 
physician parent) with, among other things, the measles, cowpox, and 
“crude extract of endocrine glands,” in efforts to understand aspects 
of human biology and to develop vaccines against diseases.38 They 
were subjected to lumbar punctures (spinal taps) to determine the 
safety of that procedure.39 And their diets were altered to gauge the 
effects on the etiology of such diseases as scurvy and rickets.40 
According to Dr. Lainie Friedman Ross, 
[C]hildren [at that time] were frequently subjects in research 
because they were convenient: researchers would often experiment 
on their children, servants, or slaves. Children could also be 
recruited from institutions. In 1914, Alfred Hess, the medical 
director of the Hebrew Infant Asylum in New York City, explained 
the scientific advantage of enrolling institutionalized children: it 
permitted “conditions which are insisted on in considering the 
course of experimental infection among laboratory animals, but 
which can rarely be controlled in a study of infection in man.” 
Children were also “cheap” in the sense of non-valued; in fact, one 
researcher explained that he used child subjects because they were 
“cheaper than calves.”41 
 
 37. See Ross G. Mitchell, The Child and Experimental Medicine, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 721, 721–
22 (1964) (providing a “[h]istorical [b]ackground to [e]xperimental [r]esearch in [c]hildren”). 
 38. Id. at 722. See generally Susan E. Lederer & Michael A. Grodin, Historical Overview: 
Pediatric Experimentation, in CHILDREN AS RESEARCH SUBJECTS: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND LAW 
4 (Michael A. Grodin & Leonard H. Glantz eds., 1994) (setting out the history of pediatrics and 
pediatric experimentation). 
 39. Lederer & Grodin, supra note 38, at 4, 11. 
 40. Id. at 13. 
 41. Ross, supra note 21, at 520 (citations omitted). Dr. Ross’s article is an extremely useful 
and concise primer on the history and evolution of ethical views on pediatric experimentation. It 
is reprinted in updated form in ROSS, supra note 34, at 12; see also ADVISORY COMM. ON 
HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
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Although this view has become anathema, at the time “infant 
and child mortality was still very high[,] . . . methods of therapy were 
often drastic,” and there was otherwise little “doubt about the 
morality of the work.”42 Indeed, researchers in this era were often 
successful, developing procedures and medicines that continue to 
benefit mankind.43 
A series of controversial nontherapeutic experiments involving 
healthy children, beginning in the United States after World War I44 
and in Nazi Germany,45 generated the first substantial ethical debate 
on the subject. Of particular relevance to this Article were 
experiments conducted from 1956 through 1971 at the Willowbrook 
State School, an institutional facility for mentally retarded children on 
Staten Island, New York.46 The Willowbrook experiments, involving 
the feeding of hepatitis-infected feces to healthy children specifically 
recruited by the school to serve as subjects, were designed to permit 
researchers to study the course of the disease in the hope of 
developing an effective vaccine.47 
The Willowbrook researchers, including the pediatricians on 
staff, defended the propriety of these experiments on the bases that 
 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS 196–226 (1996), available at 
http://hss.energy.gov/healthsafety/ohre/roadmap/achre/chap7.html (discussing nontherapeutic 
research on children and noting that institutionalized and “hospitalized patients were often 
viewed by physician-investigators as a convenient source of research subjects”). 
 42. Mitchell, supra note 37, at 722. 
 43. See Gandhi, supra note 35, at 264 (describing aspects of this history using the example 
of the development of the smallpox vaccine). 
 44. E.g., Ross, supra note 21, at 519–24 (describing some of the controversial studies 
conducted in this period); see Robert M. Nelson, Children as Research Subjects, in BEYOND 
CONSENT: SEEKING JUSTICE IN RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 47, 51–52 (describing experiments 
at the Walter E. Fernald School, an institutional facility for children in Massachusetts, involving 
the deliberate exposure of healthy children to radioactive iron and radioactive calcium as part of 
a federally funded experiment to determine safe and acceptable levels of radiation). 
 45. See Eva Mozes-Kor, The Mengele Twins and Human Experimentations: A Personal 
Account, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 53, 55–56 (George J. Annas & 
Michael A. Grodin eds., 1995) (describing the Mengele twin studies in which one twin was 
injected with a deadly germ and monitored until death, and the other twin was killed for an 
autopsy comparison); Christian Pross, Nazi Doctors, German Medicine, and Historical Truth, in 
THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra, at 32, 36 (describing German 
scientists who intentionally infected healthy Jewish children with serum from hepatitis patients 
and then performed liver punctures on them). 
 46. Nelson, supra note 44, at 49–50. See generally DAVID J. ROTHMAN & SHEILA M. 
ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS (1984) (reviewing the history of the Willowbrook State 
School and the push to close it down). 
 47. See ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 46, at 263. 
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(1) all the children would eventually contract hepatitis, (2) hepatitis 
was mild in this age group, (3) the deliberate infection may have 
induced immunity to the endemic strain, (4) the children would be 
isolated from other infections by being admitted to a special ward, 
and (5) only children whose parents consented would be included.48 
Willowbrook researchers also emphasized that their work had been 
“sanctioned by the authorities of the New York State Department of 
Mental Hygiene, and by the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board, 
Office of the Surgeon General.”49 
Critics of the Willowbrook experiments, and of nontherapeutic 
pediatric research more generally, took the strong position that using 
healthy children as research subjects is wrong. Among other things, 
they argued that pediatricians have a duty to protect the welfare of 
children in their charge and that to subject healthy children to risky 
and harmful research primarily in the interests of science or in the 
interests of children more generally is a violation of that duty.50 They 
argued that nontherapeutic research cannot be justified on the 
ground that healthy children are already at risk of harm from an 
unhealthy environment when it is possible for responsible adults to 
remedy the conditions that pose the harm; thus, at Willowbrook, the 
lead researcher, Dr. Saul Krugman, “could have insisted that hygienic 
measures be introduced to decrease the spread of the virus,” and in 
any event, he “had at hand an antidote of some efficacy” as “[h]is 
own [earlier] findings demonstrated that gamma globulin provided 
some protection” against infection.51 Ultimately, however, the debate 
 
 48. Nelson, supra note 44, at 50; see also ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 46, at 265 
(explaining that the lead researcher at Willowbrook, Saul Krugman, rationalized his feeding of 
hepatitis-laden feces to the children on the grounds that even “if he had not infected the 
children, they still would have contracted hepatitis . . . . Thus . . . feeding them the virus did not 
really change anything and was an experiment in nature”). The original debate among 
Krugman, his associates, and their critics is found at Stephen Goldby, Letter to the Editor, 
Experiments at the Willowbrook School, THE LANCET, Apr. 10, 1971, at 749; Saul Krugman, 
Letter to the Editor, Experiments at the Willowbrook State School, THE LANCET, May 8, 1971, 
at 966; Edward N. Willey, Letter to the Editor, Experiments at Willowbrook, THE LANCET, May 
22, 1971, at 1078; Benjamin Posamanick, Letter to the Editor, Experiments at Willowbrook, THE 
LANCET, May 22, 1971, at 1078–79; Geoffrey Edsall, Letter to the Editor, Experiments at 
Willowbrook, THE LANCET, July 10, 1971, at 95. 
 49. Robert Ward et al., Infectious Hepatitis: Studies of Its Natural History and Prevention, 
258 NEW ENG. J. MED. 407, 412 (1958). 
 50. See Goldby, supra note 48, at 749 (“The duty of a pædiatrician in a situation such as 
exists at Willowbrook . . . is to attempt to improve that situation, not turn it to his advantage for 
experimental purposes.”). 
 51. ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 46, at 266. 
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about the propriety of nontherapeutic research centered on the issue 
of consent, specifically whether it is ethical for parents to authorize 
the use of their children in such research.52 
Those who argued that healthy children should not be used as 
research subjects because they lack the capacity to give informed 
consent to participate believed that informed consent is required not 
merely out of a respect for individual autonomy—which can be 
substituted for by a legal representative if the subject lacks capacity—
but also out of a broader respect for the person.53 One of the most 
forceful and widely cited proponents of this view was the theologian 
and ethicist Paul Ramsey, who wrote that 
[t]o experiment on children in ways that are not related to them as 
patients is already a sanitized form of barbarism; it already removes 
them from view and pays no attention to the faithfulness-claims 
which a child, simply by being a normal or sick or dying child, places 
upon us and upon medical care. We should expect no morally 
significant exceptions to this canon of faithfulness to the child.54 
For these reasons, Professor Ramsey concluded that “no parent 
is morally competent to consent that his child shall be submitted to 
hazardous or other experiments having no diagnostic or therapeutic 
significance for the child himself.”55 In other words, “[p]roxy approval 
 
 52. See id. at 265–66 (explaining the critique of the consent process at Willowbrook, which 
was premised on the fact that parents of children who had previously been accepted into 
Willowbrook but were still awaiting placement could either “[s]ign the [consent] form or forgo 
the placement”). 
 53. E.g., Robert M. Nelson & William W. Reynolds, We Should Reject Passive Resignation 
in Favor of Requiring the Assent of Younger Children for Participation in Nonbeneficial 
Research, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Fall 2003, at 11, 12 (“[T]he analysis of assent should begin with the 
principle of respect for children (i.e., persons) and not respect for subject autonomy.”). 
 54. PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON: EXPLORATIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS 12–13 
(2d ed. 2002). The first edition of this book is dated 1970, and it is based on a series of lectures 
Professor Ramsey gave in 1969. Later in the same essay, Ramsey writes that “[t]o attempt to 
consent for a child to be made an experimental subject is to treat a child as not a child. It is to 
treat him . . . as if he were an adult person who has consented to become a joint adventurer in 
the common cause of medical research.” Id. at 14; see also Ross, supra note 21, at 524 
(describing a letter of protest published in The Lancet in which the author criticized studies 
using “normal children (or children suffering from some irrelevant disease) as controls in 
clinical research,” because the author felt that “children should not be exposed to any risk in 
medical research ‘unless there is a reasonable chance, or at least a hope, that the child may 
benefit [directly] thereby’”). 
 55. RAMSEY, supra note 54, at 13. See generally Angela R. Holder, Constraints on 
Experimentation: Protecting Children to Death, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 140–41 (1988) 
(describing this view in general). 
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for [nontherapeutic] research is not permissible because it constitutes 
a breach of [the parent’s] fiduciary duty.”56 
The opposing view—that healthy children can be included in 
otherwise ethical nontherapeutic research—was and continues to be 
rationalized on the basis that the informed consent requirement exists 
to protect individual autonomy, and presumably no more, and thus 
that adequately informed consent can be provided by a child’s legal 
representative.57 Catholic theologian Richard McCormick famously 
opposed Professor Ramsey on this basis, arguing that “parental 
consent is . . . morally valid precisely insofar as it is a reasonable 
presumption of the child’s wishes.”58 Professor McCormick’s view was 
that it is reasonable for a parent to presume that a child would want 
to participate in experimental procedures “not because they are of 
benefit to himself, but because at little or no cost to himself he could 
contribute benefit to others.”59 Nevertheless, even within this camp 
significant questions remained concerning the morality of 
nontherapeutic research involving more than a minimal risk of harm 
and whether parents can consent to enroll their healthy children in 
such research.60 
 
 56. Patricia Keith-Spiegel, Children and Consent to Participate in Research, in CHILDREN’S 
COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 179, 188 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983) (discussing Professor 
Ramsey’s position); see also RAMSEY, supra note 54, at 14 (“No child or adult incompetent can 
choose to become a participating member of medical undertakings, and no one else on earth 
should decide to subject these people to investigations having no relation to their own 
treatment. That is a canon of loyalty to them.”). Whereas later codes clearly envisioned the 
possibility of substituted consent by parents or guardians, the Nuremberg Code itself appeared 
to take this most absolute position. Jeffrey R. Botkin explains that “[o]n its face, [the 
Nuremberg Code’s first] principle precludes . . . research with children or anyone else without 
full decision-making capacities. While subsequent codes of research ethics permitted 
nontherapeutic research with young children, some scholars thought this original principle had 
it right.” Jeffrey R. Botkin, Preventing Exploitation in Pediatric Research, AM. J. BIOETHICS, 
Fall 2003, at 31, 31; see also Keith-Spiegel, supra, at 183 (“Most commentators agree that a strict 
application of the Code would have resulted in a complete moratorium on research utilizing 
minor participants since they fail to meet the various tests and no provision for proxy consent is 
provided.”). 
 57. See Nelson & Reynolds, supra note 53, at 11–12 (describing this alternative position). 
 58. Richard A. McCormick, Experimentation in Children: Sharing in Sociality, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP., Dec. 1976, at 41, 42. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See, e.g., Richard A. McCormick, Proxy Consent in the Experimentation Situation, 
PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED., Autumn 1974, at 2, 14–15; Mitchell, supra note 37, at 724 (noting this 
debate in 1964, and describing his own view that “an experiment on a [healthy] child is 
permissible provided that the risk does not exceed the ordinary risks of daily living”). The 
definition of “minimal risk” that governs agencies and their benefactors in the United States is 
set out infra notes 75–83 and accompanying text. 
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This debate, set in the larger context of human subjects research 
generally, resulted in a series of codes, beginning in 1949 with the 
Nuremberg Code61 and culminating in the United States in 1978 with 
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Science Research’s Belmont Report,62 
which established the parameters of ethical experimentation.63 As 
finally described in the Belmont Report, human subjects research 
must reflect (1) a respect for persons, which translates into the 
practical requirement that before research can begin, the investigator 
must assure that informed consent is provided by participants;64  
(2) beneficence, which translates into the requirement that research 
be justified on the basis of a favorable risk-benefit assessment;65 and 
(3) justice, which translates into the requirement that “the benefits 
and burdens of the research be fairly distributed across the 
population.”66 With respect to pediatric experimentation in particular, 
the Belmont Report concluded that children deserve special 
protections because they are unable to give informed consent and are 
thus a particularly vulnerable population at risk of exploitation.67 
 
 61. NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 2. 
 62. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 2. 
 63. This debate predates the exchanges between Professor Ramsey and Professor 
McCormick that I have just described. Nevertheless, their exchanges are representative of those 
that took place in the context of human subjects research in the aftermath of the Holocaust and 
in connection with the proceedings at Nuremberg. I use them here in lieu of the earlier 
iterations because they speak specifically to the problem of including healthy children (as a 
subset of the human subjects population) in human subjects research. 
 64. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 4, 10. 
 65. Id. at 6–8, 14–18. 
 66. Id. at 8–10, 18–20. 
 67. Specifically, the Belmont Report urges that the “respect for persons incorporates . . . 
[the] ethical conviction[] . . . that persons with diminished autonomy [including the immature] 
are entitled to protection.” Id. at 4. Although it does not specifically define what “protection” 
means in this context, it does suggest that there might be “an order of preference in the 
selection of classes of subjects (e.g., adults before children).” Id. at 18. More generally, though, 
it finds that the degree of protection required in any given research setting “depend[s] upon the 
risk of harm and the likelihood of benefit.” Id. at 5. And it cautions that although “[e]ffective 
ways of treating childhood diseases and fostering healthy development are benefits that serve to 
justify research involving children—even when individual research subjects are not direct 
beneficiaries,” id. at 7–8 (discussing the principle of beneficence), a “difficult ethical problem 
remains . . . about research that presents more than minimal risk without immediate prospect of 
direct benefit to the children involved,” id. at 8. Cf. IOM, supra note 8, at 2 (explaining that 
children are vulnerable and in need of special protection because “[u]nlike most adults, children 
usually lack the legal right and intellectual and emotional maturity to consent to research 
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On its face, the federal regulatory scheme promulgated in 1983, 
and based on the Belmont Report and an earlier published report 
Research Involving Children,68 resolved the debate about the 
propriety of using healthy children in nontherapeutic research by 
adopting a restrictive but nevertheless compromise position.69 
Specifically, the regulations permit the use of healthy children in 
research when the study design involves no more than “minimal 
risk”70 and informed consent is obtained “from each prospective 
subject or the subjects’ legally authorized representative.”71 Typically, 
research “involving greater than minimal risk and no prospect of 
direct benefit to individual subjects” is permitted, inter alia, only if it 
is “likely to yield generalizable knowledge about the subject’s 
disorder or condition”;72 in other words, the plain language of the 
regulations suggests that such research can be conducted only using 
children with relevant illnesses. There is an exception to this 
presumption for “research involving children that entails more than a 
minor increase over minimal risk and offers no prospect of direct 
therapeutic benefit, if the research is designed to promote 
generalizable knowledge, and if it is reviewed and approved by a 
 
participation on their own behalf”). At least one commentator has added that children are also 
vulnerable because “[t]he parent, guardian, or the person conducting the experiment may be 
motivated by rewards rather than the child’s best interest.” Wenner, supra note 35, at 244. 
 68. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN: REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, at xvii–xix (1977). This report was 
published by the National Commission in 1977, one year prior to the publication of the Belmont 
Report. IOM, supra note 8, at 52–53. 
 69. Additional Protections for Children Involved as Subjects in Research, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 
subpt. D (2007); see also Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, id. pt. 
46 subpt. A (“This policy applies to all research involving human subjects conducted, supported 
or otherwise subject to regulation by any federal department or agency which takes appropriate 
administrative action to make the policy applicable to such research.”); Ross, supra note 21, at 
528 (explaining that “Subpart A of these regulations . . . [is] known as the Common Rule 
because it has been adopted by 16 federal agencies and departments of the U.S. government”). 
Ross explains that “[a]lthough [Professor Ramsey’s particular] position did not receive wide 
support, it stimulated and stirred debate in the ethics community that brought the issue of 
children in research to the forefront.” Ross, supra note 21, at 526 (quoting Alexander, supra 
note 21, at 2). 
 70. 45 C.F.R. § 46.404. 
 71. Id. § 46.111(a)(4) (setting out informed consent as a precondition to approval of 
research by designated institutional review boards). 
 72. Id. § 46.406. Some proposals, however, suggest including in this category healthy 
children who, because of their environment or genetic background, for example, are at risk of 
serious harm in the future. See infra notes 313, 320–24, 335–37, 344 and accompanying text. 
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panel of experts.”73 Yet, consistent with the notion that protecting 
children generally means excluding them from involvement in risky 
research, this provision has tended to be “invoked quite 
infrequently.”74 
As defined in the regulations, minimal risk “means that the 
probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the 
research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily 
encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine 
physical or psychological examinations or tests.”75 There is an 
important ongoing debate about whether this standard is absolute 
(pegged to the harms and discomforts ordinarily encountered in the 
“daily life of healthy children in the general population”) or relative 
(pegged to the harms and discomforts ordinarily encountered in the 
daily life of children in the circumstances pertaining to the research).76 
For example, are the risks of experimental lead exposure the same for 
healthy children who live in middle-class neighborhoods with newer, 
lead-free homes as they are for healthy children who live in poor 
communities with some newer but many more variably abated 
homes?77 As the influential Committee on Clinical Research 
Involving Children of the IOM has explained, 
  A relative interpretation theoretically allows high-risk studies to 
be approved as “minimal-risk” studies if members of target research 
 
 73. Ross, supra note 21, at 531 (summarizing the terms of 45 C.F.R. § 46.407). For a 
discussion of the varied interpretations of these standards, see infra notes 77–78 and 
accompanying text. 
 74. Ross, supra note 21, at 531; see also Holder, supra note 55, at 147 (“HHS did not renew 
the charter or funding of the panel of experts in related fields, known as the Ethics Advisory 
Board, when they expired in 1980. As a result, no mechanism exist[ed] [still in 1988] for 
approval of federal funding for studies involving more than minimal risk, and no such studies 
[were at that time being] funded.”). But see infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 75. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2007); There are inherent ambiguities in this definition, resulting 
in malleability of the standard. See infra notes 76–83 and accompanying text. 
 76. See OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., OFFICE OF THE U.S. SEC’Y OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., PROTECTIONS FOR CHILDREN IN RESEARCH: A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN 
ACCORD WITH SECTION 1003 OF P.L. 106-310, CHILDREN’S HEALTH ACT OF 2000, at 7 (2001), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/reports/ohrp502.pdf. 
 77. See Kopelman, Pediatric Research Regulations Under Legal Scrutiny, supra note 35, at 
42 (critiquing the “relativistic interpretation” of the minimal risk rules in the context of her 
examination of the Grimes lead abatement study); see also Holder, supra note 55, at 146 (setting 
out this dilemma in the context of bone marrow aspirations and spinal taps, and noting that, in 
the period around 1988, Yale’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) would approve these 
diagnostic interventions in the context of pediatric research when the subjects had previously 
undergone similar interventions because of their conditions, but not when the subjects were 
healthy). 
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populations experience high risks in their daily lives, including in 
their homes, schools, sports activities, or neighborhoods. In addition 
to such environmental risks, some potential target research 
populations may, by virtue of their medical condition or its 
treatment, experience substantial everyday risks, distress, and 
uncomfortable medical examinations that are, for them, routine but 
not minimal in burden or discomfort. A relative interpretation of 
minimal risk would permit comparably high risks in research for 
these already high-risk children. In contrast, more fortunate 
research populations that experience low levels of risk in daily life 
would have a correspondingly low risk threshold for assessing 
whether a study presented minimal risk.78 
Despite congressional demands for clarification of this standard,79 
and despite an apparent consensus among commentators (including 
the IOM) that it ought to be absolute to protect particularly 
vulnerable subgroups within the pediatric population from 
exploitation,80 NIH’s Office of Human Research Protection (OHRP) 
has declined to act on that consensus, describing as “premature” any 
resolution of this issue.81 As a result, the interpretation of minimal 
risk (including its variants, “a minor increase over minimal risk” and 
“more than a minor increase over minimal risk”) is generally left to 
 
 78. IOM, supra note 8, at 121. 
 79. See Wenner, supra note 35, at 261–62 (describing this mandate in the Children’s Health 
Act of 2000). The response is discussed infra note 106. 
 80. See, e.g., IOM, supra note 8, at 17 (Recommendation 4.1, rejecting relative 
interpretation of the harms and risks children experience in their daily lives); NAT’L HUMAN 
RESEARCH PROTS. ADVISORY COMM., CLARIFYING SPECIFIC PORTION OF 45 C.F.R. § 46 
SUBPART D THAT GOVERNS CHILDREN’S RESEARCH 1 (n.d.) (interpreting “the definition of 
minimal risk to be that level of risk associated with the daily activities of normal, healthy 
children”); Nelson, supra note 44, at 60 (“It is unacceptable to place dependent persons in 
situations where the risk to them is increased and then use that increased risk as reason for 
redefining what constitutes a minimal risk to them.” (quoting Loretta M. Kopelman, When Is 
the Risk Minimal Enough for Children to Be Research Subjects?, in CHILDREN AND HEALTH 
CARE: MORAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES 89, 91 (Loretta M. Kopelman & John C. Moskop eds., 
1989))); id. at 58–60 (challenging the conclusion by Professor Kopelman and others that some 
subjectivity in defining minimal risk is acceptable); Shah et al., supra note 5, at 481 (noting, inter 
alia, that any relative interpretation of risk “conflicts with the general consensus that, to 
minimize potential for exploitation, the ‘minimal’ risk standard should be interpreted as 
referring to the risks in the daily lives of ‘typical’ children”). 
 81. OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., supra note 76, at iv. The effect of this ongoing 
impasse is that individual institutions and their IRBs continue to be permitted to interpret 
“minimal risk” according to an absolute or relative standard as they wish. 
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local Institutional Review Boards (IRBs),82 which have tended to 
differ, in some cases substantially, in their related classifications.83 
Under the federal regulations, research involving children also 
requires that “adequate provisions are made for soliciting the assent 
of the children” and “the permission of each child’s parents or 
guardian.”84 Both must be obtained “in accordance with and to the 
extent that consent is required” of adult research subjects.85 The 
relevant regulation in this respect provides that “no investigator may 
involve a human being as a subject in research covered by this policy 
unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective informed 
consent of the subject or the subject’s legally authorized 
representative.”86 
As a result of these qualifications, especially because of a 
consensus within the bioethics and regulatory communities that the 
minimal risk rules were to be interpreted conservatively, most 
nontherapeutic research conducted from the late 1970s through the 
early 1990s involved the use of adult subjects, even when the research 
 
 82. An IRB is “any board, committee, or other group formally designated by an institution 
to review, to approve the initiation of, and to conduct periodic review of . . . research involving 
human subjects. The primary purpose of such review is to assure the protection of the rights and 
welfare of the human subjects.” 21 C.F.R. § 56.103(g) (2007). 
 83. See Shah et al., supra note 5, at 479 (finding “substantial variability in IRB 
chairpersons’ assessments of the risks of research procedures in children”). The implications of 
this arguably standardless rule and Professor Loretta Kopelman’s particularly incisive critique 
in this respect are discussed infra notes 318, 353 and accompanying text. In this regard, Rupali 
Gandhi has noted that “[t]he definitional ambiguities leave an incredible amount of power in 
the hands of the IRBs.” Gandhi, supra note 35, at 298. 
 84. 45 C.F.R. § 46.408 (2007). “Permission” and “assent” were designed “[t]o avoid the 
confusion associated with using the term ‘informed consent’ to mean two things,” that is, the 
consent of the parent and the consent of the child. Robert J. Katerberg, Institutional Review 
Boards, Research on Children, and Informed Consent of Parents: Walking the Tightrope Between 
Encouraging Vital Experimentation and Protecting Subjects’ Rights, 24 J.C. & U.L. 545, 551 
(1998). Ethicists and child psychologists continue to debate whether young children, that is, 
children under fourteen, should be asked to assent in the context of nontherapeutic research. 
See, e.g., Botkin, supra note 56, at 31–32 (arguing that because regulations were promulgated 
with an eye toward protecting children from exploitation in this research context, young 
children should be asked whether they want to participate, and their choice should be 
respected); Nelson & Reynolds, supra note 53, at 12–13 (arguing that assent is unrelated to 
autonomy and that a respect for persons requires that children be asked whether they assent to 
participation in nontherapeutic research); David Wendler & Seema Shah, Should Children 
Decide Whether They Are Enrolled in Nonbeneficial Research?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Fall 2003, at 
1, 1 (arguing that “the threshold for assent should be fixed at 14 years of age, and a dissent 
requirement should be adopted for all children in the context of nonbeneficial research”). 
 85. 45 C.F.R. § 46.408(b). 
 86. Id. § 46.116. 
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implicated pediatric concerns.87 It is noteworthy that the practice of 
using adult subjects in lieu of children whenever possible has its 
source in the Belmont Report itself, specifically in its discussion of the 
practical application of the principle of justice.88 Thus, although 
justice requires that the benefits and burdens of research be 
distributed equitably across the population, the further admonition 
that vulnerable populations including children receive special 
protection means that 
it can be considered a matter of social justice that there is an order 
of preference in the selection of classes of subjects (e.g., adults 
before children) and that some classes of potential subjects (e.g., the 
institutionalized mentally infirm or prisoners) may be involved as 
research subjects, if at all, only on certain conditions.89 
Since the mid- to late 1990s, however, some of “[t]hose who care 
about and for children” have recognized that protecting them from 
exploitation has had the ancillary effect of depriving them of the full 
“benefit [that is to be derived] from the dramatic and accelerating 
rate of progress in medical care that is fueled by scientific research.”90 
This concern, shared by the IOM,91 reflects the sense that the balance 
struck in the Belmont Report between assuring distributive justice and 
protecting vulnerable populations may have been skewed too far in 
favor of protection at the expense of doing justice by these same 
populations. For example, “pediatricians and others have argued that 
infants, children, and adolescents have not shared equally with adults 
in advances in biomedicine.”92 It has also been noted that “the health 
 
 87. Ross, supra note 21, at 528 (observing that the protections established by the 
regulations “effectively served to restrict participation of children in medical research”); 
Whitstone, supra note 4 (noting that “[u]ntil recent years, children were not included in research 
most of the time”). 
 88. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 18. 
 89. Id. Ross characterizes this as the “children last” rule, based on the National 
Commission’s position in its separate report Research Involving Children, that “[w]here 
appropriate, studies have been conducted first on animals and adult humans, then on older 
children, prior to involving infants.” Ross, supra note 21, at 528; see also Rosato, supra note 35, 
at 362 (“Until a few years ago, the prevailing view was that children should not be participants 
in clinical research trials because children were incapable of consenting to such nontherapeutic 
interventions and are particularly vulnerable to abuse.”). 
 90. IOM, supra note 8, at xiii. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1. This concern is not brand new. Indeed, at least as early as 1964, the British 
academic pediatrician Ross Mitchell urged that a proper balance be struck between protecting 
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issues unique to children were underfunded and understudied” as a 
result of the government’s protective stance.93 Some have gone so far 
as to describe children as “therapeutic orphans” in this context.94 Of 
special concern is the fact that 
many drugs with potential pediatric uses have not been tested in 
studies that include children. These drugs may still be prescribed for 
children based on physicians’ judgment about how data from studies 
with adults might be extrapolated to children. Because children 
differ physiologically from adults in myriad ways that can affect how 
drugs work in the body, extrapolation based on adult drug doses and 
children’s weight or age can be dangerous and lead to underdosing, 
overdosing, or specific adverse effects not evident in adults.95 
In other words, the irony and “[t]he danger is that unless [drugs] 
are tested, every child remains an experiment because there are no 
data for safety or efficacy and no guidelines for dosing.”96 According 
to the American Academy of Pediatrics, there is thus “a moral 
imperative to formally study drugs in children so that they can enjoy 
equal access to existing as well as new therapeutic agents.”97 
 
children from exploitation in the research setting and assuring that the benefits of this “era of 
apparently boundless technological advance, in medicine as in other fields,” also inure to the 
children. Mitchell, supra note 37, at 721. And he was most explicit in his warning that the 
tendency to want to protect children from exploitation “may now be doing the advance of 
paediatric knowledge a disservice, since much that is known from clinical investigation of adults 
has not been applied to the child because the differences have been so heavily stressed.” Id.; see 
also Holder, supra note 55, at 138–39 (making this same point in 1988). 
 93. Ross, supra note 21, at 529. 
 94. E.g., Rosato, supra note 35, at 363 (using this expression in this context); Carol Tauer, 
Children as Research Subjects: Guinea Pigs or Therapeutic Orphans?, U. MINN. BIOETHICS 
EXAMINER, Fall 2003, at 1, 1 (describing this controversy). 
 95. IOM, supra note 8, at 1–2. According to Robert Nelson, 
[M]ost drugs used to treat children have never been tested formally in children, 
making off-label use of medications the de facto standard of care in pediatrics. 
Indeed, only 20 percent of drugs approved in the United States have been labeled for 
use in infants and children and only 37 percent of new drugs in 1996, with the 
potential for pediatric use, had some pediatric labeling at the time of approval. 
Nelson, supra note 44, at 47. 
 96. Ross, supra note 21, at 530. Angela Holder made this same point much earlier when 
she noted that despite the de facto ban on using children in trials, “a pediatrician confronted by 
a sick child in a course of ordinary clinical practice is in effect conducting Phase Three drug 
trials if he prescribes such a drug, whether he considers himself a researcher or not.” HOLDER, 
supra note 10, at 162. 
 97. See Rosato, supra note 35, at 367 (quoting American Academy of Pediatrics 
guidelines). 
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There is a more skeptical view of this shift in attitudes about 
protecting children. It is partly based in the enormous amounts of 
money that are available to researchers, particularly in the pediatric 
drug sector, and the corresponding institutional “pressures on 
investigators to quickly produce . . . results.”98 Using the Johns 
Hopkins Medical Center as an example, Vera Hassner Sharav of the 
Alliance for Human Research Protection describes a “climate at 
academic research centers in which considerations for the safety of 
research subjects has given way to commercial interests”:99 
  In 2001, about 50,000 persons participated as research subjects in 
clinical trials [there]; the medical school is consistently at or near the 
top in rankings of federal research support, not to mention the 
hundreds of millions of additional income from collaborations with 
industry. Between 1995 and 2000, Hopkins NIH grants climbed from 
$185 million to $305 million. In 2001, NIH grants rose to $334 
million, while Hopkins expenditures for research and development 
exceed $1 billion. . . . [I]nvestigations . . . [have] found widespread 
noncompliance with multiple federal regulations . . . . The violations 
were so egregious and widespread throughout the university, that 
OHRP suspended “all federally supported research projects at the 
covered institutions.” . . . [A]n external committee [subsequently 
issued] a stinging indictment of the research culture at Hopkins.100 
According to Arthur Caplan, director of the Center for Bioethics 
at the University of Pennsylvania, “[t]he suspension of clinical 
research at Hopkins is [also] a symptom of a much deeper disease—
the collapse of adequate protections for those involved in research at 
every American medical center, clinic, testing facility and hospital.”101 
However rationalized and perceived, and despite continuing 
resistance from some in the bioethical and research communities, 
 
 98. Vera Hassner Sharav, Author Response to Letter Regarding Children in Clinical 
Research: A Conflict of Moral Values, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Summer 2004, at W35, W35 (quoting 
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., ANNUAL REPORT (2001)). 
 99. Vera Hassner Sharav, Children in Clinical Research: A Conflict of Moral Values, AM. J. 
BIOETHICS, Winter 2003, at W12, W16. 
 100. Sharav, supra note 98, at W35. Johns Hopkins was the institution responsible for the 
lead abatement study at issue in Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, 782 A.2d 807, 811 (Md. 
2001), which is described in the introductory illustration. 
 101. Id. (quoting Arthur Caplan, Research Ban at Hopkins a Sign of Ethical Crisis, Bioethics 
on MSNBC, July 20, 2001, http://www.bioethics.net/articles.php?viewCat=2&articleId=43). For 
a description and analysis of the Hopkins situation including the steps the institution took to 
remedy the concerns expressed by the OHRP, see Robert Steinbrook, Protecting Research 
Subjects—The Crisis at Johns Hopkins, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 716, 716–20 (2002). 
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“social forces have shifted the core ethical question from whether 
children should be research subjects to when children should be 
research subjects,”102 and “[o]verall, an approach of protectionism has 
given way to an approach of inclusion and access.”103 Thus, 
congressional legislation has sought to answer that ethical question by 
creating intellectual property–related incentives, such as patent-term 
extensions for drug manufacturers to include children in their 
studies,104 educational and financial incentives for researchers to enter 
the field of pediatric research and to pursue related studies,105 and 
requirements for agency reconsideration of the terms under which 
children were previously protected in the research setting.106 The NIH 
 
 102. Rosato, supra note 35, at 362. 
 103. Id. at 363. 
 104. 21 U.S.C. § 355a(a), (c) (2000) (including a “market exclusivity” provision that” gives 
drug manufacturers in certain cases an additional six months of patent protection when they test 
their products on children); 21 U.S.C. § 355c(a), (b) (Supp. V 2005) (codifying these FDA-
promulgated regulations and thus providing as a matter of federal statutory law that, absent a 
waiver, new drugs cannot be approved and existing drugs cannot continue to be distributed in 
the pediatric population unless studies involving the safety and efficacy of the drugs in that 
population have been conducted); see also 21 C.F.R. § 201.23(a) (2007) (stating that drug 
manufacturers may be required to confirm the safety and efficacy of existing drugs in new 
pediatric studies when those drugs are likely to be used in pediatric medicine and when the 
absence of adequate labeling could pose significant risk to pediatric patients); 21 C.F.R.  
§ 314.55(a) (2007) (supplementing and then replacing incentives in The Food and Drug 
Modernization Act of 1997, which expired in 2002, and requiring that new drug trials include 
pediatric subjects unless a waiver is obtained). 
 105. 42 U.S.C. § 284h(b)(3), (d) (2000) (establishing the Pediatric Research Initiative, the 
purpose of which is “to increase the development of adequate pediatric clinical trials and 
pediatric use information to promote the safer and more effective use of prescription drugs in 
the pediatric population,” and which authorizes an initial fifty million dollars “and such sums as 
may be necessary” through 2005 to accomplish these ends); id. § 285g-10 (establishing an 
“Investment in Tomorrow’s Pediatric Researchers,” the purpose of which is “to ensure the 
future supply of researchers dedicated to the care and research needs of children” by supporting 
“an increase in the number and size of institutional training grants to institutions supporting 
pediatric training” and “an increase in the number of career development awards for health 
professionals who intend to build careers in pediatric basic and clinical research”); id. § 288-6(a) 
(establishing a loan repayment program, the purpose of which is to encourage the NIH to repay 
up to “$35,000 of the principal and interest of the educational loans” of pediatric research 
professionals). 
 106. Children’s Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, § 1003, 114 Stat. 1101 (expiring 
upon submission of required review) (requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
“conduct a review of the regulations under Subpart D of [45 C.F.R. pt. 46]” specifically to 
“consider any modifications necessary to ensure the adequate and appropriate protection of 
children participating in research,” and listing among those terms needing reconsideration “(2) 
the definition of ‘minimal risk’ for a healthy child or for a child with an illness; . . . (4) the 
definitions of ‘direct benefit to the individual subjects’ and ‘generalizable knowledge about the 
subject’s disorder or condition’; . . . [and] (10) the appropriateness of current practices for 
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and its OHRP have also acted “to promote greater participation of 
children in research, despite general concerns regarding human 
subjects protections more generally.”107 Specifically, the NIH now 
requires that “[a]ll NIH-funded research . . . include a plan for the 
inclusion of children, unless there is good justification to exclude 
them,”108 thus apparently reversing the government’s longstanding 
“children last” rule.109 And influential bioethicists continue to propose 
creative interpretations of the minimal risk and consent rules that 
(entirely apart from these initiatives) provide the scientific 
community with the basis to argue for and accept increased access to 
healthy children as research subjects, including in studies that involve 
more than a minimal risk of harm.110 As a result of these efforts, 
 
recruiting children for participation in research”). The required review was submitted to 
Congress in May 2001. OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., supra note 76, at ii. The review 
document agrees with many survey respondents who urged the development of additional 
guidelines in connection with the terms identified for review in the Children’s Health Act, 
including the definitions of “minimal risk” and “minor increase over minimal risk.” Id. at 7; see 
also supra notes 75–83 and accompanying text (setting out the regulatory definition and the 
debate over its interpretation). Nevertheless, it concludes that “[t]he current regulations under 
Subpart D of 45 CFR Part 46 are sound, effective, and well-crafted, and when implemented 
properly by IRBs and investigators, provide adequate and appropriate protections for children 
of all ages and maturity levels participating in research conducted or supported by DHHS.” 
OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., supra note 76, at iii. 
 107. Ross, supra note 21, at 531–32; see supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
 108. Ross, supra note 21, at 531. 
 109. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text for a description of this policy and its 
origins. Consistent with this new mandate, since 2000 OHRP has “received over two dozen 
requests for [45 C.F.R. pt. 46, section] 407 panels . . . 11 panels have been convened since 
February 2001, and public comments were sought for six.” Ross, supra note 21, at 531; see also 
supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (describing the terms of section 407 and the 
infrequency with which it was invoked in the past). Ross uses these data and “disturbing 
evidence . . . that the new policies are encouraging the participation of children in research for 
which there are no plans to do pediatric subset analyses” as the basis for her concern that “the 
pendulum [may have] swung too far” away from the proper balance between protecting 
children and allowing them access to research participation in their best interest. Ross, supra 
note 21, at 519, 532. For an excellent description of this statutory and regulatory history, see 
Rosato, supra note 35, at 364–65. 
 110. See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 34, at 211 (contending that children at higher levels of risk 
for lead poisoning should be considered as having a “disorder or condition” and arguing that the 
Grimes court could have found that researchers permissibly exposed the children to a “minor 
increase over minimal risk”); Kopelman, supra note 17, at 749 (arguing that healthy children at 
high risk of serious harm in the future should be considered as having a “condition” such that 
they would be eligible for “no benefit, higher hazard” research and criticizing the Grimes court 
for its conclusion that the children in that study were healthy and thus ineligible for such 
research); Nelson, supra note 44, at 62 (arguing that “the level of allowable risk” should be tied 
“to the assent of the child” or of a group of parents and older children in the event the child is 
too young to provide assent). 
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commentators predict “a dramatic increase in the number of future 
clinical studies involving children.”111 
II.  THE LEGAL BOUNDARIES OF  
PARENTS’ CONSENT AUTHORITY 
The federal laws and policies described in Part I govern most 
aspects of pediatric research in the United States. Contrary to an 
analysis undertaken on behalf of the Institute of Medicine, this 
federal scheme does not exist in a vacuum.112 In particular, its 
informed consent requirement is circumscribed by well-established 
constitutional doctrine concerning parental authority to risk or cause 
children harm and by related and equally well-established state law 
doctrines of informed consent and child maltreatment. Based on the 
premise that legally valid consent is a precondition to ethical human 
subjects research, this Part discusses the permissibility of pediatric 
research involving healthy children in the context of this broader legal 
landscape. 
A. The Doctrinal Boundaries of Parents’ Consent Authority 
The boundaries of parents’ consent authority are defined in part 
by the constitutional doctrine of parental autonomy and in part by 
 
 111. Whitstone, supra note 4; see Tauer, supra note 94, at 4 (describing the evolution of 
pediatric research ethics and related regulatory and legislative developments, and concluding 
that “[w]e are undoubtedly seeing an increase in research involving children, encouraged both 
by the FDA and Congressional initiatives”); see also supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text 
(describing recent explosion in and spending on pediatric research). 
 112. See Amy T. Campbell, Appendix to IOM, supra note 8, app. B at 337 (“On the basis of 
a review of state law—statutory and case law—on this point (research with children and 
adolescents), there is little to go by in terms of the permissibility of and limits of such 
research.”); id. at 326 (“[S]tate law—as specifically applied in the applied in the research 
setting—is a relative vacuum in terms of the regulation of research with children and 
adolescents.”); id. at 328 (“Unfortunately, there is thus a great deal of uncertainty as to the 
extent of state regulations . . . . Perhaps this should be unsurprising given the particularly recent 
nature of calls to enhance the base of research with populations of this age.”). The flaw inherent 
in this analysis is its assumption that, because the states have not specifically regulated the 
conditions under which researchers may conduct pediatric research, state law is silent on the 
issue. As I note throughout this Article, to the extent that parental and/or children’s consent is a 
requirement of ethical research, well-established doctrine relating to consent and consent 
authority is directly relevant. Much to its credit, however, the IOM analysis—undertaken by 
Amy Campbell—is alone in understanding and then acknowledging the critical significance of 
some state law in this area, in providing fifty-state surveys on the law pertaining to children’s 
capacity to provide lawful consent, and in suggesting the development of “uniform state 
guidelines” to minimize discrepancies in the states’ treatment of pediatric research. See id. at 
320–31, 337–39. 
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state law doctrines of informed consent and child protection. Thus, 
the threshold requirement in the federal pediatric research 
regulations that parents must consent to their children’s involvement 
in related procedures cannot be met—or at least has no legal 
significance—unless parents actually have the right under those 
doctrines to subject their children to the risks or harms involved in 
the particular research.113 Contrary to the assumption made by at least 
one prominent commentator, the federal regulations do not give 
parents this right.114 They merely state that which is doctrinally 
obvious in both ethics and law: children cannot be used as research 
subjects (just as they cannot be treated medically) without their 
parents’ consent.115 
As a matter of federal constitutional law, parents are entitled to 
raise their children as they see fit, including to make most decisions 
for them until they reach the age of majority.116 This doctrine of 
parental autonomy resides principally in the Fourteenth 
Amendment,117 and is rationalized on the grounds of the following 
syllogism: children lack the “maturity, experience, and capacity for 
 
 113. Doctors may not treat, and researchers may not involve a child in research, without 
parental consent. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941); see 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 
(2007). As Dan Dobbs explains, however, “[t]here are limits . . . to the parent’s power to give 
[legally] effective consent.” DOBBS, supra note 14, at 229. In the absence of legally valid 
consent, doctors and researchers may be subject to liability in battery, whether or not the child 
suffers serious damage as a result of the treatment or research. Id. at 54 (explaining that battery 
law “vindicates the plaintiff’s rights of autonomy and self determination, her right to decide for 
herself how her body will be treated by others, and to exclude their invasions as a matter of 
personal preference, whether physical harm is done or not”). 
 114. See Ross, supra note 35, at 53. In this essay, Ross examines “whether parents have the 
moral and legal authority to expose their children to any degree of risk in non-therapeutic 
research.” Id. She disposes of the legal aspect of this issue in this single line: “Legally, the 
federal regulations empower parents to consent to their children’s participation in research that 
entails the risks” at issue in studies like the Hopkins lead abatement study featured in this 
Article’s introductory illustration. Id. Over the course of a few paragraphs, she then proceeds to 
evaluate the moral basis for parental consent in this context, summarizing the historical debate 
and her own excellent work on the ethics of pediatric research. Id. at 53–54. Ross’s selective 
focus on ethics at the expense of legal analysis is emblematic of the literature in this area. 
 115. See Bonner, 126 F.2d at 122 (setting out this rule in its classic context); see also DOBBS, 
supra note 14, at 229 (discussing this rule as a defense to battery). 
 116. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion); see also DOBBS, supra 
note 14, at 227 (describing limited exceptions to this presumption). Although Troxel is a 
plurality opinion, its description of the doctrine of parental autonomy is accurate. That is, to the 
extent the Justices disagreed, it was not about this aspect of the case. The doctrine is also 
described in relevant respects in the earlier case Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600, 602–04 
(1979). 
 117. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64–65. 
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judgment” necessary to make good decisions for themselves.118 Thus, 
 
 118. Id. at 69 (citing Parham, 442 U.S. at 602). As a factual matter, not all children are alike 
in these respects; depending on the issue, adolescents in particular can be highly capable 
decisionmakers. Cf. infra note 306 and accompanying text (exploring risk-related circumstances 
in which this is not necessarily the case). Nevertheless, the law has drawn the line at the age of 
majority and has stuck to it for most purposes, including for medical decisionmaking. See 
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (“[I]t cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning 
the care, custody, and control of their children.”); Parham, 442 U.S. at 605 (“Most children, 
even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions, 
including their need for medical care or treatment. Parents can and must make those 
judgments.”); Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151, 1152–53 (Pa. 2000) (declining to adopt a 
mature minor rule on the grounds, inter alia, that to do so would absolve parents not only of 
their parental rights but also their responsibilities for the care of their older but still minor 
children); IOM, supra note 8, at 156 (“Although decisional capacity develops through childhood 
and even into adulthood, practical and policy considerations have led policymakers to require, 
in most cases, that individuals achieve a specified age (the ‘age of majority’) before they can 
enter into contracts, consent to medical care, and make other crucial decisions in their own 
right.”). There are, of course, notable exceptions to this rule. For example, in Hodgson v. 
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), the Court discusses the constitutional right of adolescent girls to 
bypass their parents and get judicial approval for an abortion. Id. at 435. Furthermore, state 
laws may allow emancipated minors to make decisions for themselves, mature minors to make 
certain medical decisions, or minors to seek treatment without their parents’ knowledge or 
permission for sexually transmitted diseases, pregnancy, or emotional problems. Alexander 
Morgan Capron, The Competence of Children as Self-Deciders in Biomedical Interventions, in 
WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD: THE PROBLEMS OF PROXY CONSENT, at 57, 65–76 (Willard 
Gaylin & Ruth Macklin eds., 1982). For a summary of these exceptions, see IOM, supra note 8, 
at app. B. 
Some prominent commentators have opined that the “mature minor exception” reflected 
in these laws ultimately provides for a general right of adolescents to make medical, and thus 
also research, decisions for themselves. See, e.g., ANNAS, GLANTZ & KATZ, supra note 10, at 
71–73 (suggesting the possibility of a broader mature minor exception); Clark, supra note 35, at 
34 (arguing that the “doctrinal evolution suggests that . . . [the law is] eager to let those over 
fourteen act independently from their parents”); IOM, supra note 8, at app. B (suggesting much 
of the same in its analysis). These analyses are largely incorrect. The most common mature 
minor exceptions were not developed in recognition of the child’s evolving capacity to make 
autonomous decisions; rather, they expressly sacrifice the value of an autonomous 
decisionmaker in limited instances to promote more important public policy goals. See Rosato, 
supra note 35, at 370 (noting that “existing exceptions to parental consent are narrow and based 
on public policy rather than the minors’ competence”). Thus, older adolescents are permitted to 
consent to necessary and usually only limited medical treatment in the absence of their parents 
so that honest physicians can avoid battery claims and be paid for their work; emancipated 
minors are permitted to act in all respects on their own behalf because they no longer have legal 
guardians to act in their stead; adolescent girls are permitted to consent to abortions (generally 
subject to a judicial override) so that their developmental, educational, and other opportunities 
are not risked by unwanted pregnancies; and children can consent to treatment for certain 
diseases and emotional conditions so that, regardless of their parents’ views, their individual and 
society’s general welfare are protected. See generally Walter Wadlington, David C. Baum 
Memorial Lecture, Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions Between Parent, 
State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 321, 323–24 (1994) (discussing emancipation and 
minor medical consent laws). 
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someone needs to make decisions for them. Parents are best suited 
for this purpose (as opposed to the state or another third party) 
because they are most likely to make decisions in their children’s best 
interests.119 Based on this rights and responsibilities framework—the 
Supreme Court most typically speaks of “the right, coupled with the 
high duty”120—the law formally presumes that whatever the parent’s 
decision, it is in the child’s best interests.121 Among the many routine 
day-to-day decisions parents make, this doctrine protects their right 
to decide such fundamental questions as where their children go to 
school,122 with whom they associate,123 what treatment they receive in 
the event they become ill or injured,124 and in general the values 
according to which they are raised.125 
As between parents and third parties, including the state and 
other individuals, the presumption that parents act in their children’s 
best interests is rebuttable only when there is evidence that a parent is 
causing or risking harm to a child.126 State child protection laws 
 
 119. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69; Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. 
 120. See, e.g., Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. 
 121. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69; Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. As the U.S. Supreme Court 
affirmed in Troxel, 
[t]he law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a 
child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making 
life’s difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural 
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. 
530 U.S. at 68 (quoting Parham, 442 U.S. at 602). There are certainly other rationales for or 
theories of parental autonomy beyond this “fiduciary” theory. The most prominent of these is 
the “property” theory—that is, that children are the property of their parents and thus that 
parents are entitled to do with them as they wish. For a description of this evolution, see infra 
notes 382–402 and accompanying text. Contemporary doctrine prefers the fiduciary or best 
interests rationale, however, and thus it is the rationale that is most relevant to modern litigators 
and family law theorists. 
 122. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 529–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
400–01 (1923). 
 123. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 124. Parham, 442 U.S. at 604; see also ANNAS, GLANTZ & KATZ, supra note 10, at 68 
(setting out the parental consent requirement and its basis in law and legal theory). 
 125. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 126. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602; Leonard H. Glantz, The Law of Human Experimentation with 
Children, in CHILDREN AS RESEARCH SUBJECTS: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND LAW, supra note 38, at 
103, 106 (noting that “parents have broad discretion” in medical matters relating to their 
children, but that the state can intervene when parents “cross[] . . . boundaries constitut[ing] 
child abuse . . . .”). This high threshold for intervention is required because the law requires no 
more than adequate parenting; so long as the parent’s decision or conduct does not cross the 
threshold into abuse or neglect, it will be considered adequate. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents . . . does not 
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents . . . .”); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 
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traditionally have defined the sorts of harm that will place a parent’s 
decisions or conduct outside the scope of parental authority.127 
Among other things, these laws proscribe physical abuse,128 emotional 
abuse,129 and neglect.130 Federal constitutional law generally embraces 
these boundaries on the ground that states have a compelling interest 
in protecting children from harm and risk that is intentionally 
inflicted by their parents.131 
Consistent with society’s particular aversion to unwanted and 
harmful invasions of physical integrity,132 physical abuse in particular 
has come to be defined quite broadly. The definition promulgated by 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is typical, 
 
S.E.2d 102, 104 (Va. 1995) (requiring that “a parent’s rights ‘are to be respected if at all 
consonant with the best interests of the child’” (quoting Malpass v. Morgan, 192 S.E.2d 794, 799 
(Va. 1972))). The legal presumption that parents act in their children’s best interests is 
rebuttable on lesser grounds as between parents who may be separated or divorced and who 
have joint physical and legal custody of their children. See, e.g., Hardin v. Hardin, 711 S.W.2d 
863, 865 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that the trial court is authorized “to make a determination” 
on the basis of its own evaluation when feuding parents cannot agree concerning an aspect of 
the care of their children). 
 127. All states have laws proscribing child maltreatment in its many forms. See CHILD 
WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1 (2007), available 
at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/define.pdf. These laws appear 
both in the states’ penal codes and in their CPS provisions. Although some states’ definitions 
are more broadly worded than others, a majority are consistent with one another. The 
definitions provided are representative of a majority of states’ and the federal government’s 
definitions. 
 128. For some typical definitions of physical abuse, see infra text accompanying notes 133–
43. 
 129. Emotional abuse is typically defined as “injury to the psychological capacity or 
emotional stability of the child as evidenced by an observable or substantial change in behavior, 
emotional response, or cognition,” or as evidenced by “anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or 
aggressive behavior.” CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 127, at 3. 
 130. Neglect is typically defined as the 
failure to provide for a child’s basic needs. Neglect may be . . . [p]hysical (e.g., failure 
to provide necessary food or shelter, or lack of appropriate supervision)[,] [m]edical 
(e.g., failure to provide necessary medical or mental health treatment)[,] [e]ducational 
(e.g., failure to educate a child or attend to special education needs)[,] [e]motional 
(e.g., inattention to a child’s emotional needs, failure to provide psychological care, or 
permitting the child to use alcohol or other drugs). 
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, WHAT IS CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT? 2 (2006), available 
at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/whatiscan.pdf. 
 131. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168–69 (1944) (upholding state law 
limits on parental authority under the First and Fourteenth Amendments on the ground that the 
state has an overriding interest in children’s healthy development). 
 132. The society’s aversion to invasions of physical integrity is in contrast to its treatment of 
invasions of emotional integrity, which do not receive nearly the same legal or cultural 
protection—as in, “sticks and stones will break my bones, but words will never hurt me.” See, 
e.g., DOBBS, supra note 14, at 822–24 (discussing this point generally in the context of tort law). 
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as it includes “physical injury (ranging from minor bruises to severe 
fractures or death) as a result of punching, beating, kicking, biting, 
shaking, throwing, stabbing, choking, hitting (with a hand, stick, strap, 
or other object), burning, or otherwise harming a child.”133 HHS 
regulations further provide that an “injury is considered abuse 
regardless of whether the caretaker intended to hurt the child.”134 In 
other words, under these rules parental motivation is irrelevant. It is 
noteworthy that HHS is also the federal agency responsible for the 
development and administration of the regulations governing human 
subjects research, including its pediatric provisions.135 
Although the states obviously are most concerned with 
preventing and addressing the more serious instances of parentally 
inflicted harm, their laws typically also define abuse broadly, so that 
the boundary between permissible and impermissible conduct lies at 
the point at which—again however motivated136—a parent acts 
 
 133. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 130, at 3. 
 134. Id. Compare infra notes 144–65 and accompanying text, discussing doctrinal and de 
facto exceptions to the rules and to their embedded principle that motivation is irrelevant in the 
scheme. The prospects for nontherapeutic pediatric research to be considered among these 
exceptions is discussed infra notes 206–35 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra notes 70–86 for the relevant terms of the Common Rule and of Subpart D, 
including the regulations’ special provisions for research involving children. 
 136. See, e.g., Gregory A. Loken, Gratitude and the Map of Moral Duties Toward Children, 
31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1121, 1133–34 (1999) (“The very definitions of parental ‘abuse’ and ‘neglect’ 
are largely dependent on the results, not the motives, of the parents’ actions . . . .”); Or. Dep’t of 
Human Servs., What is Child Abuse and Neglect?, http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/children/abuse/ 
abuse_neglect.shtml (last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (“Oregon law defines physical abuse as an 
injury to a child that is not accidental. Most parents do not intend to hurt their children, but 
abuse is defined by the effect on the child, not the motivation of the parents.”). It is interesting 
to note that early legal definitions of child maltreatment tended to be centered on parental 
behavior and motivation. See Monrad G. Paulsen, The Law and Abused Children, in THE 
BATTERED CHILD 153, 154 (Ray E. Helfer & C. Henry Kempe eds., 2d ed. 1974) (providing as a 
typical example of this focus states that defined neglect as “subject[ing the child] to cruelty or 
depravity”); Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for 
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1000 (1975) (arguing against broad definitions of 
neglect that focus “primarily in terms of parental conduct or home conditions”). The shift in the 
law—from basing definitions of abuse and neglect on parental motivation to basing definitions 
on harm to the child—occurred when experts began to argue that whether or not children suffer 
harm as a result of intentional parental conduct or neglect often has little to do with whether 
their parents are benevolently or malevolently motivated. Thus, a parent may act intentionally 
with malevolent intent but not cause any real harm to their child, just as they may act 
intentionally with benevolent intent and still cause them serious harm. Because of this, it was 
argued, a child protection scheme (as opposed to a parental rights scheme) more properly 
focuses on the child rather than the parent. See, e.g., Wald, supra, at 1001–12 (making this 
point). Notwithstanding the modern motivation-free legal definitions of maltreatment, it is 
plausible to argue that parental motivation continues to drive much of the states’ administrative 
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intentionally to cause “bodily harm greater than transient pain or 
minor temporary marks.”137 This standard is generally interpreted to 
mean pain, marks, or other adverse effects lasting for more than one 
day.138 Importantly, “seeking unnecessary medical treatment” (for 
whatever reason) is a subcategory of physical abuse, sometimes 
described as medical abuse, which depending upon its severity, can 
result in a range of interventions from the provision of services to 
termination of parental rights.139 
 
practices. For example, it is plausible to consider interventions in the family in cases of physical 
abuse to be based in the view that a parent has no good reason to inflict such injury on a child, 
at least in addition to the view that the child ought to be protected against such harm. For 
additional discussion of the relevance of parental motivation to the definition and substantiation 
of maltreatment, see infra notes 154–65 and accompanying text. 
 137. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.100 (West 2007); see also In re J.M.P., Nos. B184876, 
B185887, 2006 WL 1579562, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 8, 2006) (listing the finding of “ant poison 
spread everywhere including on the children’s toys and clothing and within reach of the girls” as 
one of several conditions endangering their welfare and justifying their removal from their 
mother’s custody); Shay v. Rossi, 749 A.2d 1147, 1152 (Conn. 2000) (listing the ingestion of 
poison and Tylenol by a three-year-old as examples of incidents that would properly trigger 
suspicion of abuse). 
 138. See, e.g., Hildreth v. Iowa Dept. of Human Servs., 550 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Iowa 1996) 
(defining “physical injury” and setting out this standard). This standard is typically used to 
govern the day-to-day practice of social workers involved in the reporting and investigation of 
child abuse cases. A few courts have rejected this standard in cases of alleged excessive corporal 
punishment. See, e.g., id. at 160 (“[R]eddening of the skin lasting for twenty-four hours is [not] a 
physical injury per se. . . . [R]ather, [it is] evidence from which the existence of a physical injury 
can be found. . . . In applying this rule to petitioner’s actions, [the alleged abuser] could not 
reasonably have foreseen that the rather limited striking of [the child’s] buttocks would produce 
a physical injury.”); In re C.B., 636 S.E.2d 336, 336 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that 
notwithstanding child protective services (CPS) practice, bruises lasting for more than a day 
inflicted in a corporal punishment context were insufficient to meet the “serious physical injury” 
standard for physical abuse in North Carolina). 
 139. See, e.g., Canter v. City of Bristol Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 0507–05–3, 2005 WL 
3369350, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (terminating a mother’s parental rights following felony child 
abuse conviction based on a number of abuse charges, including that she had given her three-
year-old daughter Elavil “to calm her”); see also Becker v. Clark, 722 So. 2d 232, 233 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1998) (noting the existence of Florida’s “medical abuse/neglect” registry for parents 
and guardians found to have committed these violations against their children). Medical abuse is 
a term used in both law and medicine generally to connote the unnecessary and inappropriate 
use or provision of medicines or medical services. It has been used in a number of contexts. See, 
e.g., In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3, 4 (Ga. 1992) (describing the aggressive but futile life-preserving 
efforts involving terminally ill patients including children as medical abuse); Shelby L. v. 
Shawna L., 699 N.W.2d 392, 399 (Neb. 2005) (describing as medical abuse the effects of 
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, that is, “the deliberate production or feigning of physical or 
psychological signs or symptoms in another person who is under the individual’s care” (quoting 
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
781 (4th rev. ed. 2000))); Charles O. Jackson, The Amphetamine Inhaler: A Case Study of 
Medical Abuse, J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 187, 187–96 (1971) (describing the misuse of 
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The states also proscribe intentional parental conduct that 
merely risks physical abuse.140 The degree of risk that is necessary to 
constitute actionable endangerment depends on the jurisdiction.141 
Regardless of the state’s formal requirements, however, child 
protective services (CPS) are generally risk averse, especially at the 
intake and investigation stages of the process. Thus, depending upon 
the nature of the allegations, CPS will intervene on much less weighty 
evidence, including temporarily to remove children who are merely 
suspected of being in jeopardy.142 Because many states’ CPS 
departments are locally rather than centrally controlled, there is a 
patchwork of standards for risk-based interventions even within 
individual states; this, in turn, makes it difficult to predict the 
likelihood of such interventions.143 
 
amphetamines as medical abuse); Stephen N. Nelson, “Do Everything!” Encountering “Futility” 
in Medical Practice, 19 ETHICS & MED. 103, 112 (2003) (arguing that “medical abuse of patients 
in the name of science or love, grief or guilt is an indefensible use of patients as means to others’ 
ends”); Therese Powers, Race for Perfection: Children’s Rights and Enhancement Drugs, 13 J.L. 
& HEALTH 141, 146–49 (1999) (questioning the propriety of providing drugs such as human 
growth hormone and Ritalin to otherwise healthy children); John A. Robertson, Reproductive 
Technology in Germany and the United States: An Essay in Comparative Law and Bioethics, 43 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 189, 217 n.141 (2005) (describing the misuse of medicine and medical 
procedures by Nazi doctors as medical abuse); Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: 
Curing the Law’s Failure to Protect Intersex Infants, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 63 
(2006) (arguing that “gender normalizing surgery” is medical abuse). 
 140. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.100 (West 2007). 
 141. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.6 (West 2007) (defining “child abuse” to include 
“willful harming or injur[ing] of a child or the endangering of the person or health of a child”), 
and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D)–(E) (Vernon 2007) (terminating the parent-child 
relationship for “knowingly plac[ing] or knowingly allow[ing] the child to remain in conditions 
or surroundings which [will] endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child . . . [and] 
engag[ing] in conduct or knowingly plac[ing] the child with persons who engage[] in conduct 
which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child”), with N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 7B-101 (West 2007) (defining an “abused juvenile” as a child “whose parent, guardian, 
custodian, or caretaker . . . [i]nflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the juvenile a serious physical 
injury by other than accidental means,” or who “[c]reates or allows to be created a substantial 
risk of serious physical injury to the juvenile by other than accidental means”). 
 142. See generally Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The 
Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
413 (2005) (discussing this tendency and allowance especially in the context of the gateway 
phases of the child protection scheme). 
 143. See id. at 443 n.68 (noting, inter alia, this feature of North Carolina’s child protection 
scheme). 
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B. Exceptions to the Proscriptions against Physical Abuse 
There are both doctrinal and de facto exceptions to the 
proscriptions against maltreatment, and in particular to their 
incorporated rule that parental motivation is irrelevant in establishing 
abuse.144 
The doctrinal exceptions are premised on the view that certain 
intentionally inflicted harms are necessary to secure the best interests 
of the child. Thus, even though it otherwise meets the definition of 
abuse, it is permissible to cut a child in the context of a surgical 
procedure when the intrusion is designed to alleviate the patient’s 
own greater physical harm.145 The cases that support this exception 
show that the nexus between the surgically inflicted injury and the 
benefit must be direct in the sense that the injury itself must be 
therapeutic, that the benefit must outweigh the injury, and that 
psychological or developmental benefit is generally disregarded as a 
sufficient basis to proceed with an injurious physical intervention.146 In 
 
 144. For an elaboration of the relevance of parental motivation in formal maltreatment law, 
see supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text. 
 145. ANNAS, GLANTZ & KATZ, supra note 10, at 75 (“[I]t is generally understood that the 
law allows a parent to consent to the invasion of his child’s body only if such invasion is for the 
child’s benefit or welfare.”); Wadlington, supra note 118, at 331 (“[T]he underlying 
consideration is the child’s welfare and whether his best interests will be served by the medical 
treatment.”). 
 146. These features are all present in the reported cases involving a parent’s decision to 
consent or not to surgery or other medical procedures on her child. The case, In re Sampson, 
317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fam. Ct. 1970), aff’d per curiam, 278 N.E.2d 918 (1972), has been used as 
support for the proposition that courts will permit a parent to consent to a potentially or 
actually harmful physical invasion to obtain a psychological (rather than physical) benefit for 
the child. E.g., ANNAS, GLANTZ & KATZ, supra note 10, at 69–70 (making this point). In 
Sampson, a New York State trial court held that a mother who had consented to plastic surgery 
on her son’s face but who refused to consent to the blood transfusions that were necessary to 
the operation’s success and the child’s survival was guilty of child neglect, and ordered that the 
consent be given by a surrogate if and when the operation was to take place. Sampson, 317 
N.Y.S.2d at 658. The surgery itself was deemed necessary to cure the child’s apparently 
substantial cosmetic deformity so that he would have a chance to lead a more-or-less normal 
life. Id. at 644. A careful reading of the case reveals the flaw in the argument that the state 
intervened to protect the child’s interests in psychological well-being. In fact, the child had been 
excluded by the state from school because he was considered too ugly to attend; and even 
though the school system had promised him at-home tutoring, it apparently did not hold up its 
end of the bargain. Id. As a result, the child entered his adolescent years virtually illiterate and 
still exiled from his peer group. Id. Everyone’s interest at the time of the litigation was to fix his 
face so that this damage could be at least partially undone. Id. at 657. Although the opinion 
expresses an interest in the boy’s psychological state, the court actually found that he was not 
emotionally disturbed. Id. at 645. Its focus was therefore on the fact of his physical deformity 
and its impact on his educational development. Id. at 657; see also Wadlington, supra note 118, 
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any event, it is impermissible to “sell” the right to maltreat a child for 
what might be characterized as an indirect benefit. 
Along with medically indicated procedures, childhood 
vaccinations are most likely to be characterized as falling within this 
exception because they are intended to protect the child against 
particularly difficult diseases: a child vaccinated against polio is 
generally immune from its debilitating effects;147 a child vaccinated 
against the human papillomavirus will, hopefully, be spared the 
possibility of cervical cancer.148 Of course, the states’ mandatory 
vaccination programs are also justified on the ground that they 
benefit the public health and thus society as a whole by containing the 
spread of infectious disease and, where inoculation is sufficiently 
widespread, by promoting the eradication of the disease from the 
human population.149 
The right of a parent to use corporal punishment as a form of 
discipline is not typically considered an exception to the maltreatment 
rules because it is generally delimited by those rules. That is, it is 
generally the case that parents can only physically discipline their 
children so long as they do not inflict or risk serious physical injury.150 
California (among other jurisdictions worldwide) has begun to 
consider even stricter limits on parents wishing to engage in this form 
of discipline, particularly targeting the use of corporal punishment to 
correct the behavior of younger children.151 A minority of states have 
set corporal punishment out as a formal exception to the 
maltreatment rules; even in those jurisdictions, however, parents’ 
 
at 311 (discussing “the complex constitutional issues with which courts are presented when 
parental justification for declining life-saving treatment stems from the tenets of the parents’ 
religion”). 
 147. See Bonnie A. Maybury Okonek & Linda Morganstein, Development of Polio 
Vaccines, ACCESS EXCELLENCE CLASSIC COLLECTION, http://www.accessexcellence.org/AE/ 
AEC/CC/polio.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (describing history of polio as a disease, and the 
development and success of the polio vaccines). 
 148. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HPV VACCINE QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS 1 (2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/std/hpv/hpv-vaccine.pdf. 
 149. See ANGIE A. WELBORN, MANDATORY VACCINATIONS: PRECEDENT AND CURRENT 
LAWS 2–5 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21414.pdf. 
 150. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS 5 (2007), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/ 
systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/defineall.pdf (“In 14 States, the District of Columbia, 
American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands, physical discipline of a child, as long as it 
is reasonable and causes no bodily injury to the child, is an exception to the definition of 
abuse.”). 
 151. See infra note 399 and accompanying text. 
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rights are circumscribed by the abuse standard.152 Notwithstanding 
this general state of affairs, a few appellate courts in states that tend 
to be particularly protective of parents’ rights have suggested (only 
implicitly) that parents will be given some leeway to transgress the 
boundaries of the abuse standard when they can show that they were 
engaged in physical discipline.153 
Perhaps most important for purposes of this Article, there are 
also de facto exceptions to the proscription against physical abuse for 
harms and risks that are either explicitly or tacitly accepted in the 
culture. I characterize them as de facto exceptions because, although 
they are never set out as such in the doctrine and although they 
involve intentionally inflicted serious physical harm or risk that is not 
offset by a direct countervailing physical benefit, the government 
nevertheless routinely declines to intervene in the privacy of the 
relevant families.154 On the harms side, these exceptions include 
relatively common procedures, such as ear piercing and male 
circumcision when these are done for other than medical reasons,155 as 
well as relatively uncommon procedures such as removing an organ 
from a healthy child to give to an ill sibling156 and gender reassignment 
 
 152. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 150, at 5 (emphasizing that even 
though it is set out as an exception in the relevant jurisdictions, corporal punishment is still 
required to be “reasonable” and not to “cause[] [any] bodily injury to the child”). 
 153. See supra note 138 for a description of two of these cases. 
 154. There is no legal commentary directly on this subject, although the small literature on 
the use of culture in defining maltreatment comes somewhat close. See, e.g., Roger J.R. 
Levesque, Cultural Evidence, Child Maltreatment, and the Law, 5 CHILD MALTREATMENT 146, 
146–60 (2000); Alison Dundes Renteln, Is the Cultural Defense Detrimental to the Health of 
Children?, in 7 LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY: INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK FOR LEGAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 27, 27 (René Kuppe & Richard Potz eds., 1994); Todd Taylor, The Cultural 
Defense and its Irrelevancy in Child Protection Law, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 331, 331 (1994). 
Professor Kathy Bradley and I treat these issues most directly in another project that discusses 
the practice of using healthy children as organ donors for their ill siblings as an example of a 
parenting practice that is at the same time formally unlawful and normatively accepted. Kathryn 
W. Bradley & Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Boundaries of Family Privacy (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the author). 
 155. See, e.g., Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Seattle Compromise: Multicultural Sensitivity 
and Americanization, 47 DUKE L.J. 717, 756–62 (1998) (comparing the apparently illegal 
practice of symbolically circumcising girls with the apparently legal practice of circumcising 
boys); J. Steven Svoboda, Robert S. Van Howe & James G. Dwyer, Informed Consent for 
Neonatal Circumcision: An Ethical and Legal Conundrum, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
61, 61–62 (2000) (“Numerous legal scholars have concluded that routine neonatal circumcision 
falls within the legal definition of child abuse and violates children’s civil and human rights 
under national and international law.”). 
 156. The practice of removing an organ from a healthy child to give to an ill sibling began 
with the first pediatric sibling kidney transplants in the late 1950s. See generally William J. 
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surgery.157 On the risks side, the exceptions might be said to include 
any number of common but relatively high risk activities, the playing 
of physically stressful and contact sports being perhaps the most 
 
Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891 (1959) 
(describing this history). Since then, parents have consented to the use of their healthy children 
as bone marrow, kidney, and skin donors for their ill siblings, although other organs may also be 
at issue including “part of the pancreas, part of a lung, part of the liver, or part of the intestine.” 
OrganDonor.Gov, What Can Be Donated, http://www.organdonor.gov/donation/what_ 
donate.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2007). Although there are no good data on the number and 
kinds of sibling transplant surgeries done annually in the United States, the widely held view is 
that bone marrow transplants are done most routinely. Indeed, children are sometimes 
conceived to be marrow donors for their ill siblings. See, e.g., Robin Dawn Clark, John Fletcher 
& Gloria Petersen, Conceiving a Fetus for Bone Marrow Donation: An Ethical Problem in 
Prenatal Diagnosis, 9 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 329, 329 (1989). This family story is the subject of 
the popular novel JODY PICOULT, MY SISTER’S KEEPER (2004). I include sibling transplants 
here among the de facto exceptions to the maltreatment rules because it is a relatively common 
practice that is rarely interfered with by the state, and because none of the publicly available 
decisions authorizing parents to consent to sibling transplant operations were decided on the 
law; all were rendered by courts exercising their equity jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Cowan, Nos. 
180564, 180565, slip op. at 2 (Ala. Jan. 6, 2003) (on file with the author) (authorizing parents and 
children to consent to transplant); Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 378 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) 
(same); Nathan v. Farinelli, No. 74-87, slip op. at 11 (Mass. July 3, 1974) (on file with the author) 
(same); Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674, slip op. at 3–4 (Mass. Nov. 20, 1957) (on file with the 
author) (same); Huskey v. Harrison, No. 68666, slip op. at 2–3 (Mass. Aug. 30, 1957) (on file 
with the author) (same); Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651, slip op. at 4 (Mass. June 12, 1957) (on 
file with the author) (same); Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (same). 
Although this skirting of maltreatment law has always been questionable—at common law, 
equity only attached when there was no adequate remedy at law—it is outright ultra vires in 
modern jurisprudence as the courts’ equity jurisdiction has for the most part been relegated to 
guardianship and probate matters, and as the family and juvenile courts have assumed 
jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to the relationship between parents and their children. 
Jurisdictional and substantive contortions are necessary to fit a parental request for permission 
to consent to a sibling transplant in the modern era. This point is perhaps best illustrated by the 
moves made by the court in the declaratory judgment action, In re Cowan, No. 180564, 180565 
(Ala. Jan. 6, 2003) (on file with the author). In that case, a probate judge, ruling on a petition 
filed by the parents of twin six-year-old girls seeking authorization to transplant skin from their 
healthy daughter to their burned daughter, found that (1) he had jurisdiction under the state’s 
guardianship statute to decide the issue despite the statute’s express inapplicability to children 
with parents because the conflict of interest inherent in the transplant situation meant that the 
girls were effectively parentless; (2) these same parents nevertheless were appropriate 
individuals to name as temporary guardians for the girls; and (3) the parents-as-guardians were 
entitled to distribute their healthy ward’s assets—her skin—to benefit their other ward, her 
burned sibling. Thus, although there is precedent that suggests the lawfulness of parental 
consent in this context, the validity of that precedent is doubtful at best. See Bradley & 
Coleman, supra note 154 (discussing the sibling transplant cases in additional detail, and 
exploring the social norms at play in the view that the practice is acceptable and within the 
bounds of parental authority). 
 157. See generally Tamar-Mattis, supra note 139 (discussing this practice as akin to sibling 
transplants). 
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obvious.158 (Some pediatricians would also include permitting children 
to play on a trampoline, to ride Razor scooters, and to wear shoes 
with wheels, as all three may be described as “serious accidents 
waiting to happen.”) 
Because these are only de facto exceptions, by definition there is 
no formal standard for determining whether other parenting practices 
or choices are or should be excepted from the maltreatment rules. 
Informally, however, one might derive such a standard based on what 
the existing de facto exceptions have in common. Thus, these existing 
exceptions are partly based in tradition and, at least to some extent, 
community acceptance. Beyond this, they appear to be based in a 
strongly held sense in society (or at least in important parts of society) 
that the associated harms and risks are worth suffering because the 
particular goods to be gained, for the child or for the child’s family or 
cultural subgroup, outweigh those harms and risks. In other words, 
the exceptions appear to be based in society privileging certain goods 
in relation to the harms and risks that are necessary to achieve them. 
According to this account, ear piercing, male circumcision, 
sibling transplants, gender reassignment surgery, and the engagement 
of popular but nevertheless high-risk activities may be said to 
contribute to constituting the child as a member of a family and 
cultural group, and to the survival and success of those collectives.159 
These practices and choices may also be said to be in the best 
psychological or developmental interests of the individual child—that 
is, without regard to group membership—although this is sometimes a 
more tenuous proposition. For example, the argument that it is in the 
child’s interests to be a donor sibling has been criticized on several 
grounds, including most importantly because the analyses have 
tended to involve mere speculation by decisionmakers.160 The 
 
 158. See HOLDER, supra note 10, at 152 (positing this analogy in the context of Little League 
football). 
 159. See, e.g., Bradley & Coleman, supra note 154 (describing this argument in the context 
of sibling transplants). 
 160. Since its first application in the sibling transplant setting, the best interests standard has 
been strongly criticized as begging both contrived pleadings and testimony, and mere 
speculation about both the benefits and risks of the transplant for the donor. See, e.g., Charles 
H. Baron, Margot Botsford & Garrick F. Cole, Live Organ and Tissue Transplants from Minor 
Donors in Massachusetts, 55 B.U. L. REV. 159, 171 (1975) (“[T]he lack of genuinely adversary 
proceedings in most of these cases [results in] testimony [that] seems quite contrived. . . . [T]he 
sense of contrivance is strongest when the donor, as in some recent cases, is too young to have 
developed the kind of deep ties with his sibling that the testimony suggests.”); see also Strunk v. 
Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 150 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (Steinfeld, J., dissenting) (“Opinions 
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argument has also been criticized because it is believed in most cases 
to disguise the real motivation underlying the choice to engage and 
ratify the procedure: parents’ overwhelming desire to make the 
decision that is right for themselves and the family as a whole, and 
others’ normative sense that deferring to parents in these unusually 
difficult circumstances is—notwithstanding the law to the contrary—
the right thing to do.161 On the other hand, it seems easier to support 
the view that ear piercing, male circumcision, and contact sports are 
in the child’s best psychological or developmental interests given their 
generally strong positive cultural connotations and the benefits that 
presumably flow to the child who is associated with those 
connotations. 
In any event, what these exceptions suggest is that although 
parental motivation is formally irrelevant in maltreatment analysis, in 
certain circumstances it nevertheless influences the states’ 
administration of the rules.162 In fact, although some of these 
circumstances—sibling transplants being the most obvious example—
tend to generate legal controversy, most involve parenting decisions 
and practices that are simply not thought of as harmful or abusive. As 
a normative matter, the notion that abuse might include ear and 
(more modernly) body piercing and high-level gymnastics, for 
example, would likely surprise most people—including CPS workers, 
who would more likely think of these as beneficial, innocuous, or at 
the very least a good idea on balance.163 (The same would not be true, 
 
concerning psychological trauma are at best most nebulous.”); Farinelli, No. 74-87, slip op. at 7 
(Mass. July 3, 1974) (noting in the context of a request by parents for a declaratory judgment 
allowing them to consent to surgery to transplant bone marrow from their healthy child to their 
ill child that “[t]o require a finding of benefit to the donor, and particularly to accept a 
psychological benefit as sufficient, often seems to invite testimony conjured to satisfy the 
requirement by words but not by substance”); Tamar-Mattis, supra note 139, at 67–70 (making 
the same general point about “genital-normalizing surgeries”); see also Samuel J. Tilden, Ethical 
and Legal Aspects of Using an Identical Twin as a Skin Transplant Donor for a Severely Burned 
Minor, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 87, 99 n.64, 101 n.87 (2005) (providing as evidence, the speculative 
nature of testimony offered to show that the transplant would protect a treasured sibling 
relationship and thus ensure the donor child’s psychological well-being, the fact that the ill 
siblings at issue in Huskey and Foster died despite the transplants, and that the donor child in 
Hart had nightmares throughout her adolescence about having additional body parts removed 
and ultimately left the country and no longer communicates either with her twin or her parents). 
 161. See Bradley & Coleman, supra note 154 (setting out this critique). 
 162. See supra notes 132–49 and accompanying text for a description of the rules in this 
regard and the history of child maltreatment law, particularly as it pertains to the relevance of 
parental motivation to definitions of abuse and neglect. 
 163. The argument that allowing a child to participate in high-level competitive sports 
amounts to abuse has been made in the legal literature. See, e.g., Jenna Merten, Raising a Red 
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for example, of the facial cuts and scarring that are part of traditional 
rites of passage and considered attractive in some other cultures, even 
though from an objective rather than culturally specific perspective 
they are no more harmful than the surgical reconstruction of a nose 
which also satisfies ritualistic and aesthetic goals.)164 Ultimately, this 
reflects the fact that many parenting decisions and practices are 
judged according to majoritarian cultural norms and thus a “know it 
when you see it” test for child maltreatment.165 
C. Parents’ Consent Authority in the Research Setting 
Whereas researchers are bound by ethical standards and the 
federal pediatric research regulations that codify them, parents’ 
consent authority in the research setting depends on otherwise 
unrelated state and federal law. In particular, it depends on whether 
the research involves harm or risk that meets the maltreatment 
standard, and if so, whether the research fits within a doctrinal or de 
facto exception to the maltreatment rules. Although the child abuse 
analogy to pediatric research is anathema to the research community, 
which focuses on the beneficent intent underlying most research 
protocols,166 it is inevitable to the extent that child protection law 
prohibits parents from giving legally valid consent to interventions 
and procedures that would amount to maltreatment. 
Thus, there are four essential inquiries in this context: (1) 
whether there are research-related interventions that cause the sort of 
physical harm that is contemplated by typical abuse standards; (2) 
whether there are research-related interventions that pose a real risk 
of the sort of physical harm that is contemplated by typical abuse 
standards; (3) if there are research-related interventions that cause or 
 
Card: Why Freddy Adu Should Not Be Allowed to Play Professional Soccer, 15 MARQ. SPORTS 
L. REV. 205, 225 (2004). And concerns about the deleterious long-term consequences of athletic-
related physiological stress and injuries led the American Academy of Pediatrics to suggest that 
children under fourteen not be permitted to play high-level competitive sports. Id. at 211. 
Nevertheless, the view that permitting a child to engage in these sports amounts to abuse has 
never caught hold in the law. 
 164. See generally Renteln, supra note 154 (discussing similar analogies). 
 165. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Role of the Law in Relationships Within 
Immigrant Families: Traditional Parenting Practices in Conflict with American Concepts of 
Maltreatment, in IMMIGRANT FAMILIES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 287, 293 (Jennifer E. 
Lansford et al. eds., 2007). 
 166. See, e.g., HOLDER, supra note 10, at 138, 156 (lamenting the equation of modern 
“pediatric research with abuse” and arguing that it has prevented the development of the field 
at the expense of children’s health). 
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pose a real risk of causing the sort of physical harm that is 
contemplated by typical abuse standards, whether the child subject 
will derive a direct countervailing benefit from the research; and (4) 
when the latter is true except that there are no countervailing 
benefits, whether research might fit within the de facto exceptions to 
the maltreatment rules. Although this Article otherwise focuses 
exclusively on healthy children, this analysis holds whether the child 
at issue is healthy or ill. 
1. On Harmful Research.  Although many research-related 
interventions will fall within the category of risky rather than harmful 
research, some may be characterized as harmful from the outset. 
Thus, needle sticks, blood draws, and lumbar punctures can be 
described as harmful, as children tend to experience pain and 
sometimes also longer-term consequences—for example bruising, 
soreness, and severe headaches—in connection with their 
administration. Interventions designed to determine how harmful a 
known harmful condition or substance is, and in particular when it 
becomes toxic, will also fall in this category. Thus, for example, 
intentional exposure to or administration of chemical substances—
including drugs, pesticides, and other environmental contaminants—
may be treated from the outset as harmful rather than merely risky 
interventions. The closest non-research-related analogy in this 
context would be the intentional exposure to or administration of 
poisons, which is both initially harmful and risky as a consequential 
matter. 
The critical question in this analysis is whether the harm caused 
by the procedure or intervention is sufficiently serious so that it meets 
the “serious bodily injury” requirement in typical abuse definitions. 
With respect to routine procedures such as needle sticks and blood 
draws, one might easily conclude that in most instances this 
requirement would not be met—because the harm is generally de 
minimis—so that parents could give legally effective consent to their 
engagement. This appears to be Professor Loretta Kopelman’s 
position based on her reading of the minimal risk rule, and my sense 
is that it is correct.167 On the other hand, procedures and interventions 
 
 167. Kopelman, Children as Research Subjects, supra note 35, at 599 (noting that she has 
“argued in detail . . . that we should drop the ‘everyday risk’ standard and simply understand 
minimal risk as no more than the sort of risks we all encounter in routine medical or 
psychological examinations or testing”); Kopelman, Minimal Risk, supra note 35, at 360–61 
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that are of such concern that a local anesthetic or conscious sedation 
is required are more likely to cross the line—because they are 
indicative of a heightened degree of pain and suffering—as are 
interventions that require children to be exposed to or ingest the 
equivalent of poisons in an effort to determine their toxicity or their 
effectiveness when their toxicity in the pediatric population has not 
been established. 
The ethics of pediatric research and the federal pediatric 
research regulations focus on the risk of adverse events following or 
incidental to research-related interventions and procedures.168 For 
example, they focus on the extent to which a lumbar puncture is likely 
to lead to a severe headache and dehydration. As a result, at least 
formally, they ignore the harms that may be inherent in the 
interventions and procedures themselves. That is, they ignore that the 
lumbar puncture itself may be harmful. The foregoing analysis 
reflects the fact that the law of child protection is formally focused 
both on those initial harms and on the risks inherent in parental 
decisions and conduct that may cause further or greater harm. Thus, 
the lumbar puncture itself, as well as the fact that it may cause a 
severe headache and dehydration, are of concern within this scheme. 
What this means is that researchers can expect the law of child 
protection to parse the facts differently than the federal regulations. 
Whether this difference results in a different classification of the 
propriety of a given intervention or procedure depends ultimately on 
whether the law is prepared to tolerate as much harm as the 
researchers and their IRBs. 
2. On Risky Research.  It is probably the case that most 
pediatric research will pose a risk of harm rather than or in addition 
to being harmful from the outset. The risk may be minuscule or it 
may be significant but, in all cases, there likely will be risk. Thus, to 
determine the extent of any disjunction between the research rules 
and the law of child protection, it is essential to clarify their respective 
treatment of risky interventions and procedures. 
 
(“The ‘Everyday-risks’ standard is . . . very vague, I have argued, because it can be understood 
in so many different ways . . . . Understanding the ‘everyday-risks’ standard as the sort of 
everyday risks all of us ordinarily encounter, means there is one standard for everyone.”). 
 168. For a further discussion of this focus and its application in this context, see supra notes 
75–83 and accompanying text and infra notes 169–90 and accompanying text. 
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As discussed in Part I of this Article, the pediatric research 
community relies on the federal regulations’ minimal risk standard as 
the basis to judge the propriety of research-related interventions and 
procedures. For healthy children, the presumption is that only studies 
posing a minimal risk of harm are permissible; and minimal risk is 
defined as “the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort 
anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than 
those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance 
of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests.”169 This 
presumption can be rebutted—and research posing more than a 
minor increase over minimal risk can include healthy child subjects—
if a panel of experts concludes that, on balance, taking into 
consideration both the risks of harm and the study’s tendency “to 
yield generalizable knowledge,” it makes sense to proceed.170 In 
addition, some healthy children—for example, those who are at an 
increased risk of developing a serious disease like breast cancer in the 
future—might be considered to have a “condition” justifying their 
inclusion in research that poses a minor increase over minimal risk.171 
Studies designed to determine how IRBs classify particular 
interventions and procedures reflect important variability, in part 
because people disagree about what is “minimal,” “minor,” and 
“more than minor,”172 and in part because there is a dearth of data on 
the incidence of adverse effects in the pediatric population from even 
the most routine procedures and interventions.173 As a result, there is 
no standard view within the research community about how these and 
less routine procedures should be classified. This state of affairs is 
further complicated by the fact that some researchers, regulators, and 
bioethicists hold the view that minimum risk is properly viewed 
relatively, according to the harms and discomforts ordinarily 
encountered in the daily life of children in the circumstances 
 
 169. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2007). 
 170. Id. § 46.406–.407. 
 171. For a discussion of this interpretation of the minimal risk rules, see supra note 33 and 
accompanying text, and infra notes 313–14, 320–24, 335–37, 344 and accompanying text. 
 172. See Shah et al., supra note 5, at 478. 
 173. Id. at 479–80 (accepting that “data are needed on the risks of research procedures and 
the risks children face in daily life” so that IRBs can accurately categorize procedures according 
to the federal regulations’ risk criteria); id. (“[V]ariation in IRB chairpersons’ risk assessments 
of pediatric research may be caused by a lack of data, especially for nonphysical risks”); id. (“To 
ensure that the risk assessments made by IRB chairpersons are based on all the risks to 
children, it will be important to conduct research to systematically assess the risks of research 
procedures in children, including any psychological risks or risks of discomfort.”). 
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pertaining to the research; this relative interpretation of the minimal 
risk standard allows for the classification of interventions as involving 
minimal risk in certain populations even if the interventions would 
not meet this standard in others.174 
At bottom, what these circumstances reflect is a generally held 
view within the research community that taking on risk—including in 
some cases a risk of serious injury—is both necessary and acceptable 
given the societal and knowledge-related goods to be gained from the 
enterprise. From the perspective of the research community, there is 
such value in these goods that especially slight risks of serious harm to 
individuals are risks worth taking.175 To the extent there is 
disagreement within the community, it is not so much about this 
proposition as it is about how to classify particular interventions and 
procedures within risk categories, and then about which risk 
categories are acceptable given the particular subject population at 
issue.176 Although there may be different ways to think about this last 
problem, the pediatric research regulations reflect the view that the 
most important distinction is between healthy and ill children,177 the 
latter being potentially subject to more risk than the former. 
In contrast, the law of child protection and parents’ consent 
authority does not contemplate risk according to the standards 
applicable under the federal regulations—that is, minimal risk, a 
minor increase over minimal risk, and more than a minor increase 
over minimal risk. Rather, it speaks in some instances simply of “a 
risk” of serious injury, and in others of “a substantial risk” of serious 
injury.178 (One might consider child protection law to be less 
 
 174. See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text. 
 175. By “serious injury” and “serious harm,” I mean the kind of harm that would qualify as 
abuse according to child protection law. See supra notes 132–43 and accompanying text for a 
definition of the terms in that context, and see supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text for 
suggestions of some research-related interventions that might meet this standard. Almost by 
definition, of course, the research community is also willing to take the slight risk that subjects 
will suffer the ultimate injury, as this is always a possibility, especially when the nature and 
degree of risk of adverse events is not known. When a healthy research subject dies in an 
experimental setting, it is typically required that the death be reported to the regulatory 
authorities and that the circumstances surrounding the death be investigated. Telephone 
Interview with Michael Waitzkin, Partner, FoxKiser (Mar. 22, 2007) (notes on file with the 
Duke Law Journal). The research may or may not be halted, depending upon the outcome of 
the investigation and the nature of the study. Id. 
 176. See supra notes 75–83 and accompanying text; Shah et al., supra note 5, at 479–81; infra 
notes 310–22 and accompanying text; infra notes 335–44 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text. 
 178. See discussion supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text. 
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sophisticated in this respect, and thus that it could benefit from an 
examination of the more nuanced risk classifications in the pediatric 
research setting.) In any event, applications of the risk rules in classic 
child protection contexts reveal the government’s tendency to take 
little to no chances, that is to accept very little risk when the stakes 
are very high, but to require a showing of substantial risk in 
circumstances involving less important stakes.179 Thus, for example, if 
the risk contemplated is of death, serious bodily injury, or sexual 
assault, the state is likely to intervene even when the chances of these 
consequences are slim.180 On the other hand, when the risk 
contemplated is of neglect that could eventually lead to more serious 
consequences, the state is likely to intervene only when the chances 
for a negative outcome are substantial.181 Finally, child protection law 
does not distinguish among healthy and ill children, or dissimilarly 
situated children—privileged and underprivileged children, for 
example—as it applies maltreatment standards.182 
This approach to risk is different from that of the research 
community in two respects that are particularly important to this 
Article. First, although both child protection law and the pediatric 
research rules use a sliding scale characterized by degree of risk, child 
protection law tends to focus more on small risks when the 
consequences would be serious, whereas the pediatric research 
regulations assume the permissibility of small risks even of important 
consequences. (Child protection law’s approach in this respect is not 
unfamiliar in the law more generally; for example, in negligence law a 
person who fails to guard against a small risk of large damages is 
often assumed to be acting unreasonably and imprudently.183) Second, 
 
 179. See Coleman, supra note 142, at 426–58 (describing the states’ approach to child 
maltreatment reports and providing illustrations from the case law). 
 180. See id. at 414–15, 426–58. 
 181. See, e.g., In re Stumbo, 582 S.E.2d 255, 261 (N.C. 2003) (providing that a single instance 
of a naked child apparently unsupervised in a driveway is insufficient to establish neglect). 
 182. Some have argued that the poor and minorities do not have the same legal rights as 
those who are more privileged. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1795, 1824 (1998) (“[P]eople with money enjoy more privacy than people without. They 
live in freestanding houses and own more land; they conduct less of their lives in public places 
like the neighborhood streets. Fourth Amendment law accordingly gives them greater 
protection.”). However true this may be in practice, it does not reflect formal law or the 
legitimate aspirations of poor and minority members of the society to equal treatment under 
that law. 
 183. See, e.g., In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 725 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that 
defendants were responsible for damages that were only slightly foreseeable given their 
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the pediatric research rules are read by many to provide researchers 
with the flexibility to consider the characteristics of the subject 
population in evaluating the level of acceptable risk, whereas the law 
of child protection formally assumes the equality of all children. A cut 
is a cut and a risk of serious bodily injury or death is just that, 
regardless of whether the child who suffers it is healthy or ill, rich or 
poor, black or white. 
These differences are the product of at least somewhat different 
orientations and objectives. Thus, whereas the research community is 
by definition inclined to balance risk against knowledge and then to 
some extent to privilege knowledge, child protection law is inclined to 
balance harm and risk against the privacy of the family and then to 
some extent to privilege protecting the child. What this means in 
general is that although there is bound to be substantial overlap 
between what child protection law and pediatric research ethics and 
rules permit in terms of risk, differences are also likely. 
Not surprisingly, these differences will be situated in the middle, 
between what Professor Angela Holder once described as “harmless 
research” and “clearly dangerous interventions where an effective 
and demonstrably safer therapy exist[s].”184 Thus, there is little doubt 
that research-related interventions and procedures that involve only 
de minimis harm and that pose no real risk of death or very serious 
bodily injury in the healthy child subject are lawful regardless of the 
analysis engaged; again, needle sticks and blood draws likely fall in 
this category.185 There is also little doubt that research-related 
interventions and procedures that pose an important risk of death or 
very serious bodily injury will be prohibited under both schemes. On 
the other hand, it is entirely foreseeable that research posing only a 
slight or unknown but acknowledged risk of death or very serious 
bodily injury would be classified as unlawful by those responsible for 
applying child protection law, even though the same risk might be 
classified as lawful by those responsible for applying the rules 
 
tendency to cause significant harm); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. The Miller Steamship 
Co. Pty. (The Wagon Mound No. 2), 1 A.C. 617, 643 (P.C. 1967) (same). Even though the latter 
is a foreign legal decision, it is very much part of the canon of American tort law. See, e.g., 
GEORGE C. CHRISTIE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 307–33 (4th ed. 
2004) (setting out these cases to illustrate the courts’ analysis of proximate cause). 
 184. HOLDER, supra note 10, at 152, 164 (providing as illustrations of these extremes the 
snipping of a hair sample and the deliberate exposure to hepatitis). 
 185. See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text for a discussion of these examples in an 
analysis of harmful, as opposed to risky, research-related interventions. 
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governing research. (This is most likely to happen when researchers 
and regulators rely on the first part of the minimum risk definition, 
which compares research risks to those “ordinarily encountered in 
daily life,” because unlike child protection law, this standard does not 
distinguish between intentional and incidental risks, or between risks 
that are generally accepted in the culture and those that are not.186) 
Depending upon the particulars, trials that contemplate exposing 
healthy children to environmental toxins and potentially poisonous 
drugs are among those research-related interventions and procedures 
that might well fall within this category of disagreement. 
Given the dearth of data about the degree of risk inherent in 
common and contemplated research-related interventions and 
procedures,187 the related tendency of those in the research 
community to disagree with one another about the acceptability of 
particular procedures and interventions,188 and the flexibility inherent 
in child protection law’s risk rules,189 it is difficult to be more specific 
with respect to the research-related interventions that are likely to fall 
within this middle category of potential disagreement among those 
responsible for administering child protection law and those 
responsible for administering the research rules. Nevertheless, it is 
entirely predictable that child protection law’s risk-averse nature will 
collide with the research rules’ risk-taking nature in this context. This 
equation is not altered by the fact that the regulations may be already 
too constraining for some in the research community, or by the fact 
that much of what researchers want to know relates to risk, and thus 
that it is necessary, if the information is to be acquired, to proceed in 
the face of uncertain or even unknown risk.190 Whereas researchers 
may see in this situation an obligation to make individual sacrifices 
for the greater good, the child protection community may hope that 
there are other ways to solve the problem, but in any event, that 
 
 186. See supra notes 154–65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the de facto 
exceptions to child maltreatment rules, and see the discussion infra Part II.C.4 for analysis of the 
case for including pediatric research among those exceptions. 
 187. See supra note 173. 
 188. Shah et al., supra note 5, at 478–80. 
 189. See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text for a discussion of this point. 
 190. See Karine Morin, The Standard of Disclosure in Human Subject Experimentation, 19 J. 
LEGAL MED. 157, 213 (1998) (“Because experimentation takes place in the realm of the 
unknown, or at least the ‘scientifically unproven,’ several aspects distinguish it from treatment: 
risks may be unforeseeable; assumptions are not supported by scientific evidence and expertise 
is therefore more vulnerable than it is in clinical practice; a subject’s consent cannot be based on 
anticipated benefits; and researchers and subjects may have conflicting interest.”). 
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community’s inclination (based on its mandate to act in the interests 
of the individual child) will be to sacrifice the greater good for the 
protection of that child. 
3. On the Benefit the Child Derives from Research.  To the 
extent that a research-related intervention or procedure falls within 
child protection law’s prohibitions, it may still pass muster within that 
scheme if it can be characterized as providing a benefit to the 
individual child subject that outweighs the harm or risk inherent in 
the research. The issues that arise in this context are much discussed 
in the bioethics literature without regard to their implications for 
child protection law. Specifically, do indirect benefits count, and if 
not, what constitutes a direct benefit? 
Within the bioethics and research communities, there are 
advocates on both sides of the debate about whether indirect benefits 
can be used to offset the risks inherent in research.191 Money, gifts, 
and in-kind services such as free medical care, are discussed in this 
context.192 For those who believe that indirect benefits count or should 
count to offset research-related harms and risks—because, as a policy 
matter, it is wrong to patronize children or because, as a practical 
matter, this is the only way to get the necessary participation—the 
critical questions involve whether it is permissible to pay valuable 
compensation, and if not, how to set the amount of money or the 
nature of the gift or in-kind service so that it does not cause parents to 
act against what they otherwise believe to be their children’s 
interests.193 In the latter instance, the concern is how to set the amount 
 
 191. For a general overview of this debate, see, for example, IOM, supra note 8, at 226; 
ROSS, supra note 34, at 130–53; Robert A. Burt, On Gnats, Camels, and Payment to Research 
Subjects: A Comment, 9 J. MED. & L. 25, 27–29 (2005); Christine Grady, Payment of Clinical 
Research Subjects, 115 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1681, 1683–85 (2005); Michael B. Kimberly 
et al., Variation in Standards of Research Compensation and Child Assent Practices: A 
Comparison of 69 Institutional Review Board-Approved Informed Permission and Assent Forms 
for 3 Multicenter Pediatric Clinical Trials, 117 PEDIATRICS 1706, 1708 (2006); Bonnie W. 
Ramsey, Appropriate Compensation of Pediatric Research Participants: Thoughts from an 
Institute of Medicine Committee Report, 149 J. PEDIATRICS S15, S16–S18 (2006). 
 192. See Ramsey, supra note 191, at S16–S18; IOM, supra note 8, at 122, 134, 213; text 
accompanying notes 338–40; infra notes 357–60 and accompanying text (discussing the IOM 
report’s analysis of the benefits issue in these respects). 
 193. See, e.g., Partners Human Research Comm., Partners Healthcare Sys., Remuneration 
for Research Subjects, http://healthcare.partners.org/phsirb/remun.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 
2007) (discussing these tensions). As described in this article: 
Most often healthy volunteers who will derive no medical benefit from their 
participation in the research study are compensated reasonably for the time they 
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of money or kind of gift or service so that it is an appropriate token of 
appreciation, but no more: fifty dollars for participating in a vaccine 
study might be a token for a middle-to-high income parent and child 
who might imagine spending the money on a new video game. The 
same sum might be quite significant for a low-income parent and 
child who might imagine spending it on groceries or clothing.194 
These are extremely important issues that ought to continue to 
receive substantial attention from ethicists, researchers, and their 
regulators. On the other hand, the law of child protection is only 
concerned with the debates to the extent that a research-related harm 
or risk qualifies as maltreatment. When it does, the law requires a 
direct benefit; more specifically, the case law indicates that the harm 
or risk must itself be therapeutic. A relevant analogy to non-research-
related interventions would be to the provision of medicine or a 
surgical procedure intended to benefit the child by, for example, 
regulating a dysfunction or repairing an injury.195 Thus, because the 
 
devote to research projects. Monetary compensation is not intended to be the only 
motivating force to induce subjects to participate. The goal of IRB oversight of 
research subject compensation is to ensure that stipends paid to research subjects 
provide fair compensation without undue pressure (coercion) to participate. 
Excessive monetary compensation may cause subjects to undertake risks or 
discomforts that they otherwise would not assume. This unfairly targets subjects of 
lower socioeconomic groups and places more of the “risk burden” of medical 
research on these groups. In the case of healthy volunteer studies, the IRB is often in 
the position of suggesting decreased compensation over that suggested by 
investigators, in an effort to decrease the element of financial coercion. 
Id. 
 194. Interview with Catherine Fisk, Professor of Law, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, in Durham, 
N.C. (Mar. 1, 2007) (noting that this sum was offered to her and her son in connection with a 
meningitis vaccine study at Duke University); Telephone Interview with Jennifer Li, supra note 
8 (noting that this is a common sum in the context of vaccine studies at Duke University). 
 195. For a discussion of this exception and the Grimes court’s application of the rule, see 
supra notes 146–49 and infra text accompanying note 257. Cf. Kopelman, Pediatric Research 
Regulations Under Legal Scrutiny, supra note 35, at 44 (contrasting the Grimes researchers’ 
assessment of benefits with that of the court, which “understood direct benefit to subjects in 
terms of their individual best interest and discounted social utility”). Legal analysis is based in 
large part on the use of relevant analogies. Some commentators operating within a bioethics 
rather than legal paradigm have suggested that the harms and risks inherent in a research-
related blood draw, lumbar puncture, or pharmaceutical study might properly be analogized to 
the harms and risks inherent in driving across town or in playing football. HOLDER, supra note 
10, at 152 (analogizing some research risks to the risks inherent in Little League football); Shah 
et al., supra note 5, at 479 (analogizing some research risks to the risks inherent in “a single car 
trip across town during rush hour”). Depending on the facts, this may be correct, because both 
categories of harm and risk might be more-or-less equivalent. Unlike the first clause of the 
minimal risk rule, however, the legal method encourages if not demands more precise analogies, 
especially when they are available. See supra text accompanying note 75 (setting out the 
language of the minimal risk rule). Thus, as a practical matter, it is difficult to get around case 
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use of healthy children as research subjects does not contemplate a 
therapeutic offset—indeed, by definition, this research is 
nontherapeutic—it probably cannot be fit within this doctrinal 
exception.196 
Some commentators have resisted this conclusion, arguing, for 
example, that psychological, developmental, and educational benefits 
are sufficiently direct so that they are the equivalent of more 
conventional (physical) therapeutic benefits. The development of an 
altruistic personality or of altruism as a character trait is often 
discussed in this regard, although there are others.197 (For example, 
researchers at one prominent research institution gave child subjects 
laptops which were loaded with an educational program concerning 
their condition; they were permitted to keep the laptops when the 
study was complete.)198 This is not an implausible position given the 
fact that parents sometimes place their children at risk of harm when 
 
law dealing directly with the scope of parental consent authority in the medical setting as one 
considers such procedures as blood draws, lumbar punctures, and the provision of drugs that are 
otherwise intended to be diagnostic or therapeutic. This is why I believe that if harmful and 
risky research-related interventions and procedures are to avoid child protection law’s 
strictures, it is not likely to be within this exception. 
 196. The fact that healthy children may be ill in the future, and thus that the development of 
certain pharmaceuticals may eventually be therapeutic for them, does not alter this analysis. Cf. 
Rosato, supra note 35, at 366–67 (describing the view of the FDA’s Pediatric Advisory 
Subcommittee that because healthy children benefit personally and therapeutically from 
relevant drug development, they are appropriately included in related drug trials). 
 197. See, e.g., HOLDER, supra note 10, at 152 (taking the position that pediatric research 
benefits child subjects because they “may be learning something about altruism and empathy”); 
see also Kimberly et al., supra note 191 (documenting results of study of “variation in standards 
of research compensation,” which showed wide variation among IRBs overseeing three 
multicenter pediatric clinical trials); Shah et al., supra note 5, at 478 (noting that 60 percent of 
IRB chairs polled “considered added psychological counseling not necessary for research 
purposes to offer a prospect of direct benefit to the participating children,” that 51 percent of 
IRB chairs polled considered “[a]dded medical examinations and medicines not necessary for 
research purposes . . . to offer a prospect of direct benefit,” and that 10 percent of IRB chairs 
polled considered “payment for participation . . . to offer a prospect of direct benefit to the 
participating children”); cf. Cara Cheyette, Note, Organ Harvests from the Legally Incompetent: 
An Argument Against Compelled Altruism, 41 B.C. L. REV. 465, 482–83 (2000) (describing the 
donor’s “euphoria of having done something utterly selfless and good”); Jennifer K. 
Robbennolt, Victoria Weisz & Craig M. Lawson, Advancing the Rights of Children and 
Adolescents to Be Altruistic: Bone Marrow Donation by Minors, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 213, 245 
(1995) (discussing psychological benefits to a child donor). 
 198. Telephone Interview with Jennifer Li, supra note 8 (describing a hypertension study at 
Duke University). 
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it is thought that they will learn valuable lessons from the 
experience.199 
The problem is that courts have traditionally resisted the use of 
psychological, developmental, or educational benefits to offset what 
would otherwise be abusive interventions and procedures.200 Indeed, 
the notion that an important physical injury or risk is justified only by 
an offsetting physical benefit is very much ingrained in the law, which 
generally privileges protection against physical intrusions and is also 
otherwise disinclined toward arguments about emotional welfare.201 
Moreover, although some parents may act for altruistic reasons, the 
sense among clinicians and researchers is that parents of such children 
are more often motivated by the indirect benefits at issue, that is, by 
the money, gifts, or in-kind services offered by researchers to induce 
participation in the study. This may be particularly true when the 
indirect inducements are important.202 What this means is that even if 
the courts were to become amenable to the view that physical injuries 
and risks could be offset by psychological, developmental, or 
educational benefit—a move which would make sense at least in 
certain circumstances203—available evidence tends to negate the view 
that most healthy children enrolled in harmful or risky research will 
benefit from the experience in one or more of these respects.204 If 
their parents are not enrolling them for this reason, it is unlikely that 
 
 199. For example, parents have enrolled their children in boarding schools and camps that 
mimic boot camp and/or that involve deprivations that either border on or else cross the line of 
abuse. See, e.g., Scott Thomsen, Boy, 14, Dies at Boot Camp Amid Abuse Allegations, ATLANTA 
J.-CONST., July 4, 2001, at A3. 
 200. See supra note 146 and accompanying text for a discussion of this point. The de facto 
exceptions to the maltreatment rules are uniquely different in this respect. For a discussion of 
the prospects for including nontherapeutic research within the exceptions, see supra notes 154–
65 and accompanying text and infra notes 206–11 and accompanying text. 
 201. See DOBBS, supra note 14, at 821–24 (describing the general hesitation of courts to 
accept stand-alone claims of emotional distress and harm in relation to more traditional claims 
relating to physical injuries). 
 202. Telephone Interview with Jennifer Li, supra note 8; Interview with Phil Rosoff, 
Director of Clinical Ethics, Duke Hosp., in Durham, N.C. (Feb. 18, 2007); see also infra note 360 
and accompanying text (describing empirical evidence on this point); cf. Partners Human 
Research Comm., supra note 193 (explaining concern that remuneration may particularly 
encourage individuals from “lower socioeconomic groups” and “place[] more of the ‘risk 
burden’ of medical research on these groups”). 
 203. See, e.g., Bradley & Coleman, supra note 154 (arguing that in some specific cases, 
serious physical injury may be justified by psychological and/or developmental benefit to the 
child in issue). Some of the de facto exceptions to the maltreatment rules demonstrate a similar 
equation. See supra notes 154–65 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
01__COLEMAN.DOC 12/20/2007  10:08:49 AM 
2007] PEDIATRIC RESEARCH 571 
this will be the take-home message from the child’s perspective. In 
any event, such benefit is particularly unlikely when the healthy child 
subject is developmentally unripe for lessons of this kind.205 
4. On Research as a “De Facto Exception” to Maltreatment.  To 
the extent that a research-related intervention or procedure falls 
within child protection law’s prohibitions but fails to be excepted 
under the traditional benefit standard, it may still pass muster within 
that scheme if it can be brought within the de facto exceptions to the 
maltreatment rules.206 The issues that arise in this context are also 
familiar to the research community: On the harms side, the question 
is the extent to which research-related interventions are like ear 
piercing, male circumcision, sibling transplants, and gender 
reassignment surgery, so that they might properly be considered 
alongside these procedures as normative exceptions to laws 
proscribing child abuse. On the risks side, the question is the extent to 
which research-related interventions and procedures are like 
engaging in physically stressful and contact sports, or—assuming one 
accepts the view that these are “accidents waiting to happen”—like 
playing on a trampoline or riding a Razor scooter. Bioethicists and 
researchers have discussed both sets of analogies, although they are 
probably most comfortable with those relating to risk.207 
Thus, for example, it has been argued that typical research-
related interventions such as pharmacokinetic or toxicity studies are 
likely no more risky than activities “ordinarily encountered in 
[children’s] daily life” such as playing football,208 driving across town  
 
 
 205. Within the bioethics community, the issue of when children are developmentally 
capable of altruism is frequently tied to the issue of when children are developmentally capable 
of assent, and it is hotly contested. See, e.g., Nelson & Reynolds, supra note 53, at 12 (arguing 
that the capacity for altruism is closely linked with the capacity for empathy, and that some 
children under the age of ten and as young as two or three appear to be capable of altruism); 
Wendler & Shah, supra note 84, at 2–6 (suggesting that fourteen is the age at which researchers 
can be comfortable that children are capable of altruism). 
 206. See supra notes 154–65 and accompanying text. 
 207. Because they do not tend to think about research-related interventions and procedures 
as harms in and of themselves, their practice is to think in terms of risk from the outset. This is 
both inherent in and reinforced by the minimal risk rule, which defines permissible study 
designs according to the risks they pose. See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
 208. For a description of Angela Holder’s original use of this analogy, see HOLDER, supra 
note 10, at 152. 
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during rush hour,209 or playing in traffic,210 none of which (it has been 
suggested) are outside parents’ consent authority. Although the 
comparability of these risks to typical research-related interventions 
and procedures is not entirely clear, because researchers often do not 
know or else may only be able to make an educated guess about those 
risks,211 it is certainly true that children are harmed in the context of 
these “everyday activities” to an extent and in ways that may not be 
an issue in many research designs. In other words, if (as the minimal 
risk rule suggests) what matters most to the de facto exceptions 
analysis is the equivalence of risk, there is arguably a strong case to be 
made for the authority of parents to consent to their children’s 
participation in at least some higher-risk research designs. 
It has also been argued that parents should have the right to 
consent to their healthy children’s participation in nontherapeutic 
research because the law allows parents to consent to the use of their 
healthy children as organ donors for their ill siblings.212 The notion 
underlying this view is that both interventions or procedures are 
nontherapeutic, that research is mostly less harmful and less risky 
than organ transplant surgery, and that both can be justified on 
altruistic grounds.213 I would add that both are at least to some extent 
ordinary, in that within the spheres in which they are engaged there 
seems to be a general consensus that they are acceptable; in the 
transplant setting, this is particularly true of bone marrow transplants, 
but less so of kidney and other similarly invasive and impacting 
transplants.214 
 
 209. See Shah et al., supra note 5, at 479 (developing this analogy). 
 210. Kopelman, Children as Research Subjects, supra note 35, at 598 (describing a study in 
which the infusion of insulin into healthy children was justified on the basis that it was “safer 
than the everyday risk of playing in traffic”). 
 211. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text. 
 212. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 853–55 (Md. 2001) (discussing the 
relevance of the sibling transplant cases to nontherapeutic research); ANNAS, GLANTZ & KATZ, 
supra note 10, at 1 (describing a very early donation decision as involving “experimentation in 
the nontherapeutic setting”); id. at 76–87 (describing this same decision as a “nontherapeutic 
procedure,” and setting out the scholarly debate about the significance of the sibling transplant 
cases to the research setting). 
 213. Cf. ANNAS, GLANTZ & KATZ, supra note 10, at 86–87 (arguing that parents are better 
able to make a voluntary decision to consent to nontherapeutic research than to a transplant 
because parents are generally under duress in the sibling transplant context). 
 214. I derive this position from three facts: First, many hospitals publicly advertise their 
bone marrow transplant services, including in the pediatric context. E.g., Pediatric Bone 
Marrow Transplant, Duke Comprehensive Cancer Center, http://www.cancer.duke.edu/pbmt 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2007); Pediatric Bone Marrow Transplant, Seattle Cancer Care Alliance, 
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Whether or not these analogies are apposite, the bioethics and 
research communities can argue that research-related interventions 
and procedures ought to be brought within the de facto exceptions to 
the maltreatment rules because they have the potential to be of 
tremendous benefit both to society in general and to children in 
particular. For example, unless some harmful and higher-risk research 
involving healthy children is permitted, well-intentioned studies 
cannot be conducted to assure that children benefit along with adults 
from advances in knowledge and medicine in particular.215 The fact 
that the federal government has signed on to this project speaks to its 
acceptability, to the related point that many in the society do not 
conceive of pediatric research as abuse, and otherwise at least in 
general to its significance as a public policy matter.216 Given this 
landscape, it is plausible to argue that, to the extent it is flexible, the 
law of parents’ consent authority ought not to be read so as to thwart 
the success of this critical project. 
The argument on the other side rests both in its general outline 
and in its particulars on the view that the bioethics and research 
communities have misunderstood the law of parents’ consent 
authority, including the social norms that underlie the existing de 
facto exceptions to the maltreatment rules. Thus, contrary to the view 
formally embedded in the minimal risk rule—that equivalence of risk 
is what matters in assessing the lawfulness of higher-risk research—
child protection law considers risk along with whether parents are 
harming or risking their child’s welfare intentionally or incidentally. 
And otherwise abusive interventions or procedures are only excepted 
if they provide a direct, therapeutic benefit to the particular child in 
question, or if they are generally accepted in the society as 
worthwhile for the child, or the child’s family or cultural subgroup. 
 
Mar. 2007, http://www.seattlecca.org/patientsandfamilies/pediatricCare/pediatricBoneMarrow 
Transplant. Second, at least one state has specifically legislated in favor of permitting children to 
donate bone marrow but not other organs. E.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-9 (LexisNexis 2006) 
(allowing minors, fourteen and older, to consent to a bone marrow transplant). Finally, although 
healthy children are used as organ donors in contexts not involving bone marrow, data on these 
practices appear to be either nonexistent or at least publicly unavailable. See Living Donors 
Recovered in the U.S. By Donor Age, The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 
http://www.optn.org/latestData/viewDataReports.asp (follow “National Data”; then select 
“Donor” in “Choose Category”; then follow “Living Donors by Age) (report based on OPTN 
data as of Nov. 23, 2007, printout on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 215. See supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra notes 102–11 and accompanying text. 
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Sports and recreational activities pass muster, although research 
that poses an equivalent risk may not, because they fit the parameters 
of the de facto exception in this regard. Notwithstanding older federal 
regulations authorizing some higher-risk research involving healthy 
children,217 and legislative and regulatory activity since that proposes 
to increase researchers’ access to healthy children for this category of 
research,218 this practice still lacks the level of general societal 
acceptance that typifies sports and recreational activities. Moreover, 
participation in sports and recreational activities is generally held to 
be a good thing for the individual children at issue: It helps them to 
stay fit or to gain fitness. It provides them with an inclusive peer 
group. It teaches them discipline and in many cases also the value of 
teamwork. And in most instances, they benefit from the strong 
positive connotations that flow from their association with these 
activities. For better or worse, the same cannot be said of 
participation in research. Although some parents may include their 
children in harmful or risky research as a way to teach them the value 
of altruism, the most prevalent rationale is access to indirect benefits 
such as monetary compensation, gifts, or in-kind services.219 
For child protection law, driving across town during rush hour 
requires a different analysis because it poses an incidental rather than 
an intentional risk of harm; only the latter carries with it the 
possibility of a child abuse charge.220 Whereas parents act 
intentionally and are conscious of their choice when they sign a 
consent form permitting their child’s participation in a tackle football 
league, they act only incidentally, more often than not without real 
choice, when they bring their child along for the car ride across town 
during rush hour. Relatedly, unlike higher-risk research using healthy 
children as subjects which might (depending upon the study) be 
deemed important, this activity is widely accepted as necessary in a 
largely commuter society. The same cannot be said of participation in 
high-risk sports, recreational activities, or research. 
 
 217. See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra notes 102–11. 
 219. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text. 
 220. Elsewhere in this Article, I emphasize that child abuse requires intentional action to 
hurt or risk injury to a child. See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text; infra note 267 and 
accompanying text. Depending on the risk, neglect rather than abuse charges might be 
appropriate for incidentally caused injuries or risks. For a discussion of the problem of allowing 
children to play in traffic, see infra notes 221–23 and accompanying text. 
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Playing in traffic is a bad analogy in general because neither the 
law of parents’ consent authority nor the minimal risk rule 
legitimately encompasses the activity within the category of permitted 
conduct. A child who plays in traffic can easily be characterized as 
neglected, and based on this, the state can intervene in the family to 
provide protection. This is particuarly true if the child is found doing 
so on more than one occasion.221 And one would be hard pressed to 
characterize playing in traffic as an activity ordinarily encountered in 
the daily life of children as required by the minimal risk rule. The fact 
that this analogy was used by at least one set of researchers and their 
IRB regulators to justify infusing healthy children with insulin222 as 
part of a “pediatric study on the causes of obesity” reflects the 
inherent malleability of the minimal risk rule, and the relatively free 
reign the community has within its regulatory structure to define the 
boundaries of permissible research.223 
Finally, despite the surface appeal of the analogy, comparing 
nontherapeutic research using healthy children to using healthy 
children as organ donors for their ill siblings is also unhelpful. Both 
do involve the use of healthy children in interventions and procedures 
that are harmful and risky. Both are accepted as ordinary, at least 
 
 221. Cf. In re Stumbo, 582 S.E.2d 255, 261 (N.C. 2003) (holding that an anonymous “report 
of a naked, unsupervised two-year-old in the driveway of her home does not trigger” a 
mandatory investigation, and suggesting that it is not a “report” of maltreatment but that 
multiple reports of a similar sort could meet the standard). 
 222. Kopelman, Children as Research Subjects, supra note 35, at 598. 
 223. Id. at 596. Kopelman criticizes this use of the “‘everyday risk’ part of the [minimal risk] 
definition” on the ground that “it allows too high a level of risk,” and she uses this playing in 
traffic analogy to illustrate her point. Id. at 598–99. In this same context, she argues that “even if 
we know the probability and magnitude of the daily risks all of us encounter (which can include 
drive-by shootings, SARS, and terrorism) well enough to establish the ‘minimal risk’ standard 
for research, it is unclear why everyday risks are morally relevant or justified.” Id. at 598. I 
would add that these would not withstand child protection law’s strictures, in that parents could 
not intentionally subject their child to such risks and stay within the bounds of legitimate 
parental authority. For a discussion of the law’s inherent risk averseness, and its different 
treatment of intentional and incidental exposures, see supra notes 137, 178–81 and 
accompanying text, and infra note 267 and accompanying text. Also, infra note 311 and 
accompanying text discuss Kopelman’s suggestion that the minimal risk rule ought to be 
restricted to the terms of its second clause—that is, “the probability and magnitude of harm or 
discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily 
encountered . . . during the performance of routine physical and psychological examinations or 
tests.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i). Kopelman explains that the NIH’s Office of Human Research 
Protection stopped this study midcourse on the ground that it involved more than minimal risk, 
and thus that it could not proceed without “special federal approval.” Kopelman, supra note 17, 
at 596. 
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within the clinical and research communities, although the 
acceptability of using healthy children as donors of organs other than 
bone marrow may be relatively low.224 And both are sometimes 
justified on altruistic grounds.225 Yet research is unlike sibling 
transplants in their most important aspect, namely research cannot 
satisfy the law’s requirement that the procedure be either in the best 
interests of the healthy child226 or, when that standard is impossible to 
meet, in the best interests of the family on balance.227 Relatedly, the 
courts have required a transplant recipient to be a member of the 
donor child’s immediate family. The courts have not permitted 
parents to require their children to be altruistic outside of that unit.228 
The social norms underlying the sibling transplant decisions center on 
the sanctity of the family unit, and on the view that when the family is 
faced with the prospect of a preventable death, parents ought to be 
permitted to do what they can to keep all of their children alive.229 
The research community’s best argument for inclusion of 
nontherapeutic pediatric research among the de facto exceptions to 
the maltreatment rules is not based in these analogies, but in a more 
general appeal to the principles underlying the exceptions. It is based 
in the notion that pediatric research is accepted by many as 
 
 224. See supra notes 156, 214 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra note 197 and accompanying text for a description of the original analogy. 
 226. See Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674, slip op. at 3 (Mass. Nov. 20, 1957) (on file with the 
author) (requiring donation to be in best interest of donor child, and finding that this standard 
was met because he would suffer severe emotional and developmental harm as a result of the 
loss of his treasured ill sibling and of being unable to contribute to saving his life); Huskey v. 
Harrison, No. 68666, slip op. at 2 (Mass. Aug. 30, 1957) (on file with the author) (same); Masden 
v. Harrison, No. 68651, slip op. at 4 (Mass. June 12, 1957) (on file with the author) (same). 
 227. See Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 391 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (using a best interests of 
the family test and finding that the surgery was acceptable on balance, taking into consideration 
the interests of the ill child, the healthy child, and the parents); Nathan v. Farinelli, No. 74-87, 
slip op. at 11 (Mass. July 3, 1974) (on file with the author) (rejecting best interests of the child 
standard in favor of a best interest of the family approach, which requires parents to weigh 
competing interests within the family, and finding that the surgery was acceptable according to 
this analysis). 
 228. See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1344–45 (Ill. 1990) (denying father’s right to 
force testing of twins for purposes of determining their compatibility with ill half-brother in 
need of a bone marrow transplant); cf. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 91 (Com. Pl. 1978) 
(holding that the court had no authority to require a cousin of a person suffering from bone 
marrow disease to donate bone marrow because “[t]he common law has consistently held to a 
rule which provides that one human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take 
action to save another human being or to rescue”). 
 229. Bradley & Coleman, supra note 154 (discussing the social norms underlying the sibling 
transplant cases). 
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worthwhile and even important for children in general; and thus, 
although some protocols may formally qualify as abusive, they are not 
viewed as such, at least within the relevant communities.230 This 
argument is not without significant problems, however. 
For example, whereas the other de facto exceptions all involve 
an intervention or procedure that is designed to inure to the benefit 
of the child or to the child’s family, nontherapeutic pediatric research 
only possibly inures to the benefit of children as a class.231 Most 
important, harmful and risky nontherapeutic pediatric research 
involving healthy children is still not generally accepted within the 
society—as the other de facto exceptions are—as beneficial, 
innocuous, or at least a good idea on balance; indeed, many in society 
do associate research with abuse of human subjects.232 In this respect, 
the researchers, bioethicists, regulators, and others within the federal 
government who have come to embrace the project to include healthy 
children in potentially harmful and risky pediatric protocols are in a 
different place than the community at large. This is reflected in the 
parallel legislative concern that this project not jeopardize child 
protection,233 the tendency of those with means—that is, those who 
cannot be induced by indirect benefits such as money, gifts, or in-kind 
services such as free medical care—not to include their own children 
in such research,234 and the sense of some important observers of the 
research enterprise that however well-intentioned researchers may 
 
 230. See, e.g., Rosato, supra note 35, at 363 (explaining that “[t]he positive results of 
research in [the AIDS] context . . . translated into a more positive view of research overall”). 
For a description of both these general principles and the argument based on them in favor of 
including research among the de facto exceptions, see supra notes 215–16 and accompanying 
text. 
 231. I say “possibly” here because a lot of research fails to yield any benefit and some 
research yields benefits for groups other than the study populations. 
 232. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 815 n.6 (Md. 2001) (describing this 
phenomenon as “replete” within “the literature on the law and ethics of human 
experimentation” and providing support for this view (quoting R. Alta Charo, Protecting Us to 
Death: Women, Pregnancy, and Clinical Research Trials, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 135, 135 (1993))); 
Rosato, supra note 35, at 364 (“Increased access to research facilitated by breakthroughs in 
AIDS treatments has been tempered in the last few years by evidence of research abuses in 
other contexts.”). 
 233. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 234. Interview with Philip Rosoff, supra note 202. Indirect benefits that might amount to 
compensation for participation in research are inherently problematic. See supra notes 191–94 
and accompanying text. 
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be, the community is not well suited by nature to police itself.235 
Perhaps the best evidence of this view, however, is the Maryland 
Court of Appeals’s decision in Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute. 
5. The Significance of the Grimes Decision.  As described in the 
Introduction, the study at issue in Grimes had as its ultimate goals an 
increase in the number of low-income housing units in Baltimore and 
restoration of some of the city’s most blighted areas.236 The dearth of 
such housing had been tied to strict federal lead abatement standards 
designed to protect the health (particularly the neurological 
development) of young children. Specifically, it was believed that 
property owners were abandoning their units when the costs of lead 
abatement were greater than the value of the properties.237 Based on 
this belief, the study sought to determine whether the government 
could require less lead abatement (and thus less costly renovations) 
and still protect children’s health.238 To these ends, the researchers 
solicited a group of property owners who agreed to permit the 
researchers to conform their units to one of five levels of lead 
abatement and to rent them only to families with young children.239 
The study contemplated that the children living in these units would 
be enrolled as research participants, with their parents’ informed 
consent.240 
The researchers and study sponsors understood that the study by 
design would subject some healthy young children to presumptively 
 
 235. See supra notes 98–101, infra notes 274, 276–78 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of this concern, including as applied to pediatric research. 
 236. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 815 n.6. 
 237. Id. at 821; see also Brief of Appellee at 21, Higgins v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., No. 129 
(Md. Feb. 27, 2001), vacated sub nom. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 
2001) (“[T]he purpose of the study is to answer the very question of whether different 
remediation levels can be an effective means of limiting the potential for harm.”). 
 238. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 815 n.6, 819. Specifically, 
[t]he purpose of this research study was to characterize and compare the short and 
long-term efficacy of comprehensive lead-paint abatement and less costly and 
potentially more cost-effective Repair and Maintenance interventions for reducing 
levels of lead in residential house dust which in turn should reduce lead levels in 
children’s blood. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 239. Id. at 821–23. 
 240. Id. at 820, 823. In addition to finding that researchers have a special relationships–
based duty to aid their subjects who are endangered as a result of the study, id. at 851, and that 
parents cannot consent to involve their children in potentially harmful research, id. at 857–58, 
the court also found deficient the consent forms that parents were asked to sign in connection 
with their children’s participation in the study, id. at 844. 
01__COLEMAN.DOC 12/20/2007  10:08:49 AM 
2007] PEDIATRIC RESEARCH 579 
harmful levels of lead exposure.241 As Dr. Lainie Friedman Ross 
explained, “[t]he researchers encouraged landlords to rent the 
repaired premises to families with children despite the fact that [they] 
(1) suspected that some of these programs would not fully eradicate 
the problem; and (2) knew that the continued lead exposure was 
dangerous for the children.”242 Thus, the 
purpose of the study was manifestly not to reduce the level of lead in 
the blood of the children that were the subjects of the study, but to 
create a controlled research environment focusing on abatement of 
lead dust. The success of the various abatement procedures would 
be measured, in significant part, not by reducing the levels of lead in 
the children’s blood, but by periodic measurements of the level of 
lead in their blood.243 
Nevertheless, the researchers (and their IRB) concluded that this was 
not problematic: First, the children or at least other similarly situated 
children were already subject to the same risks by virtue of their 
impoverished circumstances,244 so “the probability and magnitude of 
harm or discomfort anticipated in the research [were] not greater in 
and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in [these 
disadvantaged children’s] daily li[ves].”245 Second, whatever harms 
and risks could be attributed to the research would be offset by the 
“direct” benefits of participation, including at least partially lead-
abated housing—no small thing in a city that was alleged to be in 
crisis in this respect—and periodic testing for risky lead levels in their 
 
 241. Id. at 812, 820 n.13. The researchers at least tacitly acknowledged this in the consent 
form. Id. at 819. Nevertheless, the principal investigator in Grimes claimed on appeal that the 
Institute was merely engaged in “passive data collection” regarding “risks that otherwise exist in 
the subjects’ lives,” and that it did not “subject[] [the children] to dangerous conditions.” Brief 
of Appellee, supra note 237, at 23–24; see also id. at 14 ( “The relationship [Kennedy Krieger 
Institute] had with Appellants was solely that of an observer. [Kennedy Krieger Institute] 
sought and received permission to collect information about an existing and evolving condition 
which [it] neither created nor controlled.”); Brief of Appellee at 19–20, Grimes v. Kennedy 
Krieger Inst., No. 128 (Md. Feb. 27, 2001) (arguing that the principal investigator was not 
responsible for the creation of the lead hazards in the homes). 
 242. ROSS, supra note 34, at 207. 
 243. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 819 n.11. 
 244. As proponents of the study argued, “participation in this study did not involve any 
increase in risk of lead exposure over that experienced by other residents of similar housing in 
Baltimore City.” Brief of Amicus Curiae, The National Center for Lead-Safe Housing at 8, 
Higgins v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., No. 129 (Md. May 8, 2001). 
 245. Katerberg, supra note 84, at 555 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i)). 
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blood.246 For children placed in lead-free or relatively low-lead units, 
there was the added benefit of healthier housing than their parents or 
guardians might otherwise have been able to afford.247 Finally, the 
researchers also believed that the harms and risks inherent in the 
study would be offset by the contribution their participation would 
make to the regeneration of their communities.248 
The study in these respects was both well-intentioned and 
arguably ethical according to prevailing standards in the research 
community.249 In the view of at least some commentators in the 
bioethics literature, because the federal regulations governing 
pediatric research codify those standards, the study was also lawful. 
For example, Dr. Ross has argued that because they provide for 
parental consent, the federal regulations at least implicitly authorize 
parents to enroll their healthy children in otherwise ethical pediatric 
research.250 Ross has also argued that the research involved either 
minimal risk because (according to a relative interpretation of that 
rule) exposure to lead is an ordinary event in the lives of the children 
at issue, or else no more than a minor increase over minimal risk, in 
which case the children were lawfully enrolled because they could be 
characterized as having a “condition”—being at high risk of serious 
injury or illness in the future—justifying this increase.251 The fact that 
 
 246. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 824. The latter involved subjecting each child to five 
venipunctures, including to test for baseline lead levels, and then again at two, six, twelve, and 
eighteen months into the study period. Id. at 820. 
 247. Supp. Brief of Appellee at 9, Higgins v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., No. 129 (Md. May 21, 
2001) (arguing that the Kennedy Krieger Institute “improved the health of the participants by 
ridding their homes of lead hazards and providing blood lead screenings”). 
 248. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 237, at 20 (explaining the value of the research to 
“infants and young children in Baltimore City”); Brief of Appellee, supra note 241, at 21 
(same). The appellees also argued more broadly that imposing additional obligations on 
researchers like them to protect research subjects from research-related harms would “deal[] a 
crippling, if not fatal, blow to [research to] the detriment of our society.” Brief of Appellee, 
supra note 237, at 22; see also Brief of the University of Maryland at Baltimore as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Motion for Reconsideration at 3, Grimes, 782 A.2d 807 (arguing that the 
court’s original articulation of the boundaries of parents’ consent authority jeopardizes a lot of 
“research that is vital to the promotion of children’s health”). 
 249. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 853 (noting that the “motives of all concerned . . . were, for the 
most part, proper”). 
 250. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 251. See ROSS, supra note 34, at 208–09 (suggesting that children were more properly 
classified as “at risk” than as “healthy”). Interestingly, Loretta Kopelman, who initially 
proposed this progressive interpretation of the minor increase over minimal risk rule, 
Kopelman, supra note 17, at 752–53, disagrees that it would have been appropriate to use it to 
justify the increased risk at issue in Grimes, see Kopelman, Pediatric Research Regulations 
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disadvantaged children and their families residing in Baltimore were 
statistically likely to suffer from exposure to lead was the basis for this 
latter conclusion, as well as the more general sense among many in 
the research community that the study involved merely passive 
observation of existing conditions, rather than the establishment of 
study conditions to which these individuals were subsequently 
exposed.252 Finally, in the context of her initial discussion of Grimes, 
Professor Loretta Kopelman has argued that the law of child 
protection ought to be read to reflect the view common in the 
research and bioethics communities, that to protect the best interests 
of the child in the long run, it is sometimes necessary to act in the best 
interests of children generally.253 
Reversing the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment 
to the defendant, the Maryland Court of Appeals ultimately rejected 
their version of these arguments. Specifically, it held as a matter of 
law that the parent of a healthy child “cannot consent to the 
participation of [that] child . . . in nontherapeutic research or studies 
in which there is any risk of injury or damage to the health of the 
subject.”254 (The court later explained that “by ‘any risk,’ [it] meant 
any articulable risk beyond the minimal kind of risk that is inherent in 
any endeavor.”)255 As applied to the facts of Grimes, it was not 
 
Under Legal Scrutiny, supra note 35, at 45 (arguing that to permit approval of the research 
under this rule “because some of the children are at risk . . . . undercuts the intention of [the 
rule] if its goal is to allow certain exceptions when there is an opportunity to learn about a 
child’s actual disorder or condition”). 
 252. See ROSS, supra note 34, at 211 (describing the relevance of these circumstances); 
Gandhi, supra note 35, at 286–89 (discussing Grimes including in this respect). 
 253. See Kopelman, supra note 17, at 756. Two years after this initial discussion, in 2006, 
Kopelman offered a quite useful reconciliation of Grimes and the federal rules governing 
pediatric research, which suggests among other things that aspects of the research design in 
Grimes were insufficiently protective of the child subjects. See Kopelman, Children as Research 
Subjects, supra note 35, at 603; cf. Gandhi, supra note 35, at 286–89 (critiquing the Grimes 
opinion in part on the basis that the court improperly interpreted the federal regulations). 
 254. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 858. 
 255. Id. at 862 (per curiam). This explanation was in response to vigorous argument by the 
appellees in the context of their motion for reconsideration. See Appellee’s Motion for Partial 
Reconsideration and Modification of Opinion, supra note 25, at 4 (“The ‘not any risk’ rule 
formulated by the Opinion is extraordinary because of its categorical nature and because it is 
unprecedented. The formulation is extreme because it does not tolerate or contemplate even 
minimal or normal everyday risks.”). Although some have suggested this was a clarification or 
retreat from the court’s original “any risk” formulation, see, e.g., ROSS, supra note 34 at 208, the 
court itself believed that it was merely restating the obvious, see Grimes, 782 A.2d at 862 (“As 
we think is clear from Section VI of the Opinion, by ‘any risk,’ we meant any articulable risk 
beyond the minimal kind of risk that is inherent in any endeavor.”). 
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“legally acceptable” intentionally to “expose otherwise healthy 
children . . . to a nontherapeutic research environment that . . . might 
cause the children to ingest lead dust . . . that . . . can, in sufficient 
amounts, . . . cause serious or long term adverse health effects.”256 In 
the court’s view, “parents, whether improperly enticed by trinkets, 
food stamps, money or other items, have no more right to 
intentionally and unnecessarily place children in potentially 
hazardous nontherapeutic research surroundings, than do 
researchers. In such cases, parental consent, no matter how informed, 
is insufficient.”257 Implicit in this ruling is that according to the law of 
child protection and parents’ decisional authority—as well as the 
norms underlying that law, which are otherwise prevalent in the 
culture—parents cannot act intentionally to cause or risk serious 
harm to their children unless the harm is offset by a benefit that is 
recognized as sufficiently direct and weighty.258 Thus, “[w]hatever the 
interests of a parent, and whatever the interests of the general public 
in fostering research that might, according to a researcher’s 
hypothesis, be for the good of all children, [the law’s] concern for the 
particular child and particular case, overarches all other interests.”259 
In this case, which involved healthy children, the “balance between 
risk and benefit is necessarily negative.”260 
Much to the dismay of the researchers and of some 
commentators,261 the court also analogized the research in Grimes to 
historical cases of experimental abuse of vulnerable human subjects: 
The research project at issue here, and its apparent protocols, differs 
in large degree from, but presents similar problems as those in the 
 
 256. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 853 (majority opinion). 
 257. Id. at 814. 
 258. For a discussion of this aspect of the doctrine, see supra notes 145–49 and 
accompanying text. For a discussion of the cultural exception, see supra notes 154–65 and 
accompanying text. 
 259. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 853. 
 260. Id. at 862 (per curiam). 
 261. See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 34, at 214 (expressing concern about the court’s analogy of 
the lead abatement research to the “experiments at Tuskegee”); Barbara A. Noah, Bioethical 
Malpractice: Risk and Responsibility in Human Research, 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 175, 
217 (2004) (arguing that “[c]ommentators have correctly criticized the court for its overbroad 
approach to the legal questions presented and for its extreme rhetoric in comparing the lead 
paint research protocol with historical research atrocities such as the Nazi experiments and the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study”); infra note 282 and accompanying text (noting this basis for the 
researchers’ failed motion to reconsider); cf. Kopelman, Pediatric Research Regulations Under 
Legal Scrutiny, supra note 35, at 39 (describing as “stinging” the court’s opinion in this respect). 
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Tuskegee Syphilis Study conducted from 1932 until 1972 . . . the 
intentional exposure of soldiers to radiation in the 1940s and 50s . . . 
the tests involving the exposure of Navajo miners to radiation . . . 
and the secret administration of LSD to soldiers by the CIA and the 
Army in the 1950s and 60s . . . . [These] were also prior instances of 
research subject being intentionally exposed to infectious or 
poisonous substances in the name of scientific research. . . . These 
programs were somewhat alike in the vulnerability of the 
subjects . . . . In the present case, children, especially young children, 
living in lower socioeconomic circumstances, albeit not as vulnerable 
as the other examples, are nonetheless, vulnerable as well.262 
Based on this analogy the court found it “clear . . . that the scientific 
and medical communities cannot be permitted to assume sole 
authority to determine ultimately what is right and appropriate in 
respect to research projects involving young children free of the 
limitations and consequences of the application of Maryland law.”263 
Viewing the decision purely from the perspective of doctrine, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals got it mostly right. There is nothing in the 
federal rules that indicates that they preempt otherwise applicable 
state law relating to research. In this case both negligence law and the 
law of parents’ consent authority were at issue. And the court’s 
articulation and application of that law was “textbook.” Specifically 
with respect to parents’ consent authority, the court was correct that 
parents generally do not have authority to consent to harming and 
endangering their children to the extent contemplated by the research 
design.264 (I take this position for the same reasons I assume the court 
itself did, namely that the researchers intentionally exposed the 
 
 262. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 816–17 (majority opinion). 
 263. Id. at 817; see also id. at 835–36 (discussing “the atrocities performed in the name of 
science during the Holocaust”; the fact that the Nuremberg Code “at least in significant part, 
was the result of legal thought and principles . . . and thus should be the preferred standard for 
assessing the legality of scientific research on human subjects”; the reasons why the Code was 
not adopted as the standard to govern researchers in the United States, including that “the Nazi 
experiments were considered so extreme as to be seen as irrelevant to” researchers in this 
country, even when they were engaged in “the testing of new polio vaccines on institutionalized 
mentally retarded children”; and “[u]tilitarianism was the ethic of the day”). 
 264. For a discussion of these standards and their applicability to pediatric research, see 
supra notes 132–39 and accompanying text and Part II.C.1. One might argue that because of the 
procedural posture of the case, there is no way to tell whether the children were in fact harmed. 
This is correct if one assumes that the relevant harm is only consequential, that is, future 
developmental impairments. On the other hand, if—as the court apparently assumed—the harm 
was exposure to presumptively dangerous levels of lead, this fact was established by virtue of its 
inclusion in the research design. 
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children to presumptively harmful levels of lead, a known poison for 
young children.) It was correct about the exception to that rule, that 
parents’ consent authority only extends to harming and endangering 
children to such an extent when “the balance between risk and 
benefit” is positive on the benefit side.265 It was also correct that 
indirect benefits—from “trinkets, food stamps, money or other items” 
to “the good of all children”—cannot be recharacterized as “direct” 
and do not count toward this balance.266 And it was correct to reject 
both the characterization of the study as involving mere passive 
observance of existing conditions,267 and the effort to discriminate 
among children with respect to the risks to which they are properly 
subjected by their parents and researchers.268 Finally, and perhaps 
most important, the court was correct that the law of parents’ consent 
authority (as it is defined by child protection law) concerns itself 
exclusively with the best interests of “the particular child in the 
particular case.”269 
 
 265. See supra notes 145–49, 191–205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the benefits 
rule and its applicability to pediatric research. 
 266. For discussion of the benefits rule and its applicability to pediatric research, see supra 
notes 145–49, 191–205 and accompanying text. 
 267. Children will inevitably suffer incidental harms and risks as a result of their parents’ 
choices and circumstances. For example, a young child may accidentally burn a hand on a hot 
stove reaching for the fire while his or her parent is doing laundry in another room. So long as it 
is not the result of neglect, such an accident incident to the parent’s circumstances will not run 
afoul of the law. But of course it is another matter entirely when the parent intentionally places 
the child’s hand in the fire. This distinction appeared to perplex the research community and 
bioethicists commenting in the aftermath of the decision. They struggled with the notion that 
the law would seek to punish the careful creation of conditions for study purposes that 
otherwise might or even likely would exist naturally for the same or similar individuals. The 
distinction is nothing new, however, either for the law or for pediatric ethicists. Maltreatment 
law, like criminal and tort law, distinguishes both in theory and in practice among levels of 
fault—that is, among intentionally, negligently, and incidentally-caused harms—and attaches 
significantly more moral opprobrium to (and exacts higher degrees of punishment for) higher 
degrees of fault. 
 268. For a discussion of the law’s antidiscrimination theme, see supra note 182 and 
accompanying text. For a critique of the research community’s overuse of healthy poor and 
minority children as research subjects in nontherapeutic protocols, see infra notes 357–60 and 
accompanying text. 
 269. See supra notes 117–26 and accompanying text for a description of the law’s focus on 
the individual child and the best interests of that child. A few commentators have sought either 
to develop an interpretation of Grimes that can be reconciled with the federal regulations or to 
argue that Grimes was based not on common law principles but on a misunderstanding or 
misinterpretation of the federal rules. See, e.g., Gandhi, supra note 35, at 286–89 (arguing that 
the court misapplied the federal regulations); Kopelman, Pediatric Research Regulations Under 
Legal Scrutiny, supra note 35, at 40–47 (describing the court’s ruling and “seeming departures 
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To the extent the court may have been wrong on the doctrine, it 
was in its articulation of the level of allowable risk. Specifically, the 
court’s holding that parents “cannot consent to the participation of 
[their] child . . . in nontherapeutic research or studies in which there is 
any risk of injury or damage to the health of the subject”270 does not 
comport with even the relatively risk-averse provisions of child 
protection law.271 The court’s further explanation set out in response 
to the defendant’s motion for reconsideration that “by ‘any risk,’ [it] 
meant any articulable risk beyond the minimal kind of risk that is 
inherent in any endeavor,”272 did little to move its position closer to 
the standard—or if it did, its language was so ambiguous (particularly 
in light of the fact that the term “minimal risk” is laden with specific 
meaning in this context) that it left the matter entirely unclear. 
Although this does not alter the correctness of the rule as applied in 
the case—that parents cannot consent to the level of harm and risk 
implicated by the lead abatement study’s design—it is problematic in 
terms of its potential to mislead those who would seek to apply its 
terms in the future. 
The Grimes decision also has meaning beyond doctrine. 
Primarily this concerns the strong sense of the court that the research 
community’s history of past abuses of individual human subjects—
specifically notwithstanding the benevolent intent underlying much of 
this history—deprives it of any legitimate claim to trustworthiness or 
independence in establishing the boundaries of ethical and legal 
research.273 And the decision concerns the equally strong sense that 
courts in this situation have an especially important role to play in 
monitoring the research community’s work to assure the protection of 
human subjects.274 As a practical matter, these views, together with 
 
from the federal regulations,” and offering interpretations of the ruling that would minimize the 
collision between the regulations and the law as relied on by the court). 
 270. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001) (emphasis added). 
 271. In Part II.B, I discuss the reasons why parents are permitted, even intentionally and 
without transgressing the boundaries established by traditional child abuse laws, to expose their 
children to harm and risks of injury greater than those “inherent in any endeavor.” See supra 
notes 140–43, 169–90 and accompanying text. The discussion includes an application of this rule 
to pediatric research. Id. 
 272. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 862 (per curiam). 
 273. See id. at 855 (majority opinion) (suggesting that because of this history, “[s]cience 
cannot be permitted to be the sole judge of the appropriateness of such research methods on 
human subjects, especially in respect to children”). 
 274. See id. at 853 (suggesting that courts are important as an institution to check the 
scientific community’s perspective on “human and legal ethical concerns,” and that this 
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the facts in the case, made it impossible for the court to imagine that 
research in general, or even this study in particular, might qualify as a 
de facto exception to the maltreatment rules.275 Theoretically, they 
exposed a continuing disjunction between the law and the research 
enterprise concerning the appropriate conception and treatment of 
individuals who would be research subjects. 
These issues are not new. The role and power of the law to 
regulate science has historically been rejected by what has been called 
the “republic of science.”276 At the same time, courts have not 
 
community must be carefully monitored to ensure that researchers do not “embark[] on slippery 
slopes, that all to [sic] often in the past, here and elsewhere, have resulted in practices we, or any 
community, should be ever unwilling to accept”). 
 275. By definition, the exception cannot apply if an intervention or procedure is generally 
believed to be abusive. See supra notes 154–65 and accompanying text. 
 276. See SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN 
AMERICA 93 (1995) (using this expression to denote the belief of the scientific community in its 
independence from the law). Charles McCarthy describes its particular prevalence in the period 
preceding the development of the federal regulations, among those who held on to the 
“enlightenment view that human progress was inextricably linked to advances in science and 
technology.” Charles R. McCarthy, The Evolving Story of Justice in Federal Research Policy, in 
BEYOND CONSENT: SEEKING JUSTICE IN RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 11, 14. Thus, 
[m]any persons, particularly those involved in medicine or medical research, held fast 
to the view that the moral integrity of each research investigator was both necessary 
and sufficient to provide safeguards for the rights and well-being of research subjects 
and for the well-being of science itself. Many of those in the research establishment 
held that “. . . a basic tenet of the philosophy upon which the scientific method rests 
[is]: the integrity and independence of the research worker and his freedom from 
control, direction, regimentation, and outside interference.” Persons who held this 
view feared that attempts to regulate research would hobble scientific progress. 
Id. (quoting C.J. Van Slyke, New Horizons in Medical Research, 104 SCIENCE 559 (1946)). The 
federal regulations were ultimately promulgated despite them, of course, and as McCarthy 
notes, “[g]radually there was an erosion of the view that the integrity of research investigators 
and reliance on remote peer review of the scientific merit of research protocols provided 
sufficient protections for research subjects.” Id. at 15. In other words, researchers came to 
accept the inevitability and even the validity and merit of regulatory standards and the IRB as 
an institution. To the extent the scientific community has truly embraced regulation of its 
enterprise, however, it appears to be limited to a measure of self-regulation. The federal 
regulations governing human subjects research are a perfect illustration of this point because 
they are, in effect, the embodiment of the scientific (including the bioethics) community’s own 
views about how it ought to go about its business. The federal regulations largely codify the 
right of the scientific community to govern itself within the boundaries established by their 
terms. For example, the “[p]rocesses that are crucial to [the] governing of the ‘republic of 
science,’ such as peer review, funding, teaching, publication, or the day-to-day administration of 
research projects and laboratories, ordinarily (and scientists would say properly) remain outside 
the purview of the courts.” JASANOFF, supra, at 93. Regulation according to these rules permits 
the scientific community to operate to a great extent outside of or at least side-by-side with the 
law writ large. Indeed, as Jasanoff has written, “[s]cientists . . . actively patrol their boundaries 
against incursions by the law, citing the efficacy of their [modern] self-regulatory mechanisms.” 
Id. at 111; see also Sharona Hoffman & Jessica Wilen Berg, The Suitability of IRB Liability, 67 
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hesitated to scrutinize that community’s self-regulatory mechanisms 
when human subjects research is alleged to have violated 
fundamental legal norms ensconced in state or other federal law.277 
Indeed, courts may be particularly likely to intervene when, as in 
Grimes, they are faced with alleged mistreatment of child subjects.278 
Ultimately, the critical policy question that arises out of Grimes 
is whether this inherent distrust of researchers and their enterprise is 
unfairly anachronistic, that is, unfairly based in a history that no 
longer has relevance in this new era of sensitivity toward and respect 
for individual human subjects, formal regulation, and previously 
unimaginable scientific and medical promise, including for children. 
Things have changed. Grimes itself acknowledges this when it 
describes as imperfect its analogy of the facts in the case to past 
research-related abuses.279 And there are ample other indicia: the 
development and vitality of the field of bioethics in the wake of those 
abuses; the important compromises inherent in the pediatric research 
regulations between the pursuit of scientific knowledge and the 
protection of individuals who would be subjects; the reluctance within 
 
U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 412–26 (2005) (arguing that because they are disruptive of research, civil 
lawsuits filed against IRBs and their members should first undergo mandatory administrative 
review by HHS or the FDA to screen out frivolous lawsuits and to expedite resolution of others, 
and that when lawsuits are considered by courts, IRB members should have qualified immunity 
so long as they acted in good faith and in accordance with federal regulatory review 
requirements). 
 277. JASANOFF, supra note 276, at 112 (noting, for example, that “courts will insist on full 
observance of informed-consent requirements when asked to intervene, demanding if anything 
a higher standard of disclosure from researchers than from treating physicians. Moreover . . . the 
perception that a patient is being used for commercial gain may tilt the balance of judicial 
sympathy against researchers, even if the work itself promises to alleviate human misery”); id. at 
93 (“Legal inquiries into research relationships promise special insights . . . because here 
perhaps more than in any other setting courts have to confront the discrepancies between 
science’s idealized claims to special status and its actual social practices.”). 
 278. According to one source, 
The State is concerned to protect the interests of children in most circumstances. This 
concern is the greater when another intends to invade the physical integrity of a child, 
or to expose the child to the risk of harm. Indeed, the interests of children in such 
circumstances are taken so seriously that it is thought proper to use the law as the 
appropriate means of protecting them. By having recourse to law, the State is 
indicating that it is not content to leave provisions for the protection and welfare of 
the child to less formal social regulation, whether by agreement among the medical 
profession or among any other professional group or, a fortiori, by agreement 
between parents or between parents and doctors. 
MEDICAL RESEARCH WITH CHILDREN: ETHICS, LAW, AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 125. 
 279. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 816 (“The research project at issue here . . . differs in large degree 
from, but presents similar problems as those in” the historical cases.). For a discussion of this 
analogy, see supra notes 261–63 and accompanying text. 
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the community to open the doors to harmful and risky research 
involving healthy children without concomitant assurances that they 
will continue to be protected even as these doors are opened; and the 
very real concern for some children that if this balance is not struck 
right, they will inevitably lose out as science and medicine distribute 
their rewards. The Grimes researchers and commentators in the 
aftermath of the decision were frustrated that the court saw the 
researchers in that case as one (almost) with their historical 
counterparts, and that it did not either know of or acknowledge the 
paradigm shifts that are represented by these changes.280 
To some extent this frustration is understandable. But it is 
understandable in the same way as the frustration of those who say 
that charges of discrimination are unfairly anachronistic, and who 
offer as proof of the disconnect that society has come a long way since 
the time of women’s disenfranchisement or Jim Crow: Enormous 
progress has been made and there have been real paradigm shifts, but 
the problems also cannot be described as merely historical. In the 
case of research, and of research involving healthy children in 
particular, the inherent tensions between doing good by the group 
and doing right by the individual remain fundamentally unresolved, 
as does the basic point that benevolence of intent does not guarantee 
justice. The Grimes court may have been unfair to the research 
community in its failure expressly to couple its critique of the lead 
abatement study with a recognition of the very real differences that 
exist between its older and modern incarnations. And it may have 
been unfair in its relentless insistence—over fifty pages of opinion—
that the researchers and their IRB had done only wrong. The court 
was not unfair, however, in its bottom line that the ties that bind 
modern researchers to their historical counterparts are ties that justify 
the law’s continued oversight role.281 
The best support for this point is surprisingly missing from the 
Grimes opinion—that is, how closely analogous the lead abatement 
study was to the almost universally condemned hepatitis experiments 
at the Willowbrook State School: the researchers in both cases were 
well-respected pediatric experts who were undoubtedly also well-
 
 280. For citations to the researchers’ failed motion to reconsider, see infra note 282, and see 
supra note 261 for citations to commentators after-the-fact. 
 281. See Gandhi, supra note 35, at 266–67 (arguing that “examples of unethical research 
involving children are not limited to the distant past,” and that these demonstrate the need for 
improvements in the regulatory structure). 
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intentioned in their desire to solve an important public health crisis. 
At issue at Willowbrook was a longstanding institutional hepatitis 
infestation, and in Grimes a city-wide problem with lead-dust. In both 
cases, there were alternatives to solving the crises that did not involve 
using healthy children as research subjects. At Willowbrook, it was an 
existing hepatitis remedy, and in Grimes it was lead abatement, as the 
government already had mandated. The families in both cases were 
from vulnerable subpopulations. That is, the Willowbrook families 
had children in need of scarce institutional space, and the Grimes 
families had children in need of scarce safe housing. In both cases the 
parents were afforded access to these scarce resources because their 
children were the targets of researchers. The children in both cases 
were otherwise healthy before the researchers intervened. The 
researchers deliberately exposed some children in both cases to 
poisons with their parents’ uninformed consent, monitored the effects 
on their bodies, and partially or totally deprived them of available 
information or treatment to preserve the integrity of the research. 
Finally, the researchers in both cases justified the research on the 
grounds that, because of their vulnerabilities, the children would 
likely have been harmed even without the intervention; it was 
potentially good for the child subjects—if the intervention was milder 
than what they would have suffered had they been left alone—and for 
children more generally because the body of scientific knowledge 
pertaining to their circumstances might be advanced; and their 
supervising agencies had approved the study designs.282 
There are differences between the two studies, but these are 
differences in degree rather than substance, and in any event they are 
far fewer than their similarities. Thus, whereas the researchers at 
Willowbrook forced institutionalized and sequestered children to eat 
hepatitis-infested feces, the researchers in Grimes merely established 
the otherwise relatively good conditions in which at least some 
children would be exposed to presumptively harmful levels of lead 
dust. And whereas the Willowbrook researchers were almost entirely 
free from regulation, the Grimes researchers were more (although 
arguably not better) constrained. 
 
 282. These similarities support the Grimes court’s decision to reject the request to excise 
those portions of its original opinion reflecting on the research community’s history. Grimes, 
782 A.2d at 861–62 (per curiam); Appellee’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration and 
Modification of Opinion, supra note 25, at 9–12. 
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Given these similarities, critics of Grimes are not likely to be 
successful in defeating the analogy to Willowbrook. Some, however, 
are likely to continue resisting the basic notion—underlying both 
Grimes and the condemnations of Willowbrook—that it is wrong for 
a researcher to manipulate an existing environment to ensure 
controlled study conditions when the study subjects are either at risk 
of or statistically likely to be exposed to those conditions in any 
event.283 From the perspective of the research community, which 
constantly seeks to balance the imperative to gain useful knowledge 
against the protection of human subjects, proceeding in this way in 
these circumstances may be a good place to strike the balance; at least 
statistically, one can say that subjects are probably not going to be 
harmed or put at risk as a result of the research. It should be plain 
that this analysis is also irretrievably flawed from the different 
perspective of child protection law. This law has as its exclusive 
mandate the protection of “the particular child,” who might well be 
the statistical anomaly, and as such, it is utterly unconcerned with 
most “‘for the greater good’ projects” to the extent they would 
require harming that child to achieve their ends.284 
*          *          * 
It is not known how typical the research at issue in Grimes is in 
any of its respects, because there is no central database that describes 
the nature and numbers of protocols involving healthy children.285 
One could surmise that the case is likely not representative of typical 
protocols because, in the years since the Belmont Report, researchers 
and their institutions have learned to err on the side of excluding 
rather than including healthy children in pediatric research, and then 
to include them only in circumstances of truly minimal risk as this 
term might be interpreted colloquially. There are good anecdotal 
indicia that this atmosphere of caution still prevails in many places, 
including that Grimes as litigation is anomalous. On the other hand, 
 
 283. See supra note 241 and accompanying text for a discussion of this concern. 
 284. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 815, 853 (majority opinion). The states’ mandatory vaccination 
programs are the primary exception to this general rule. See supra notes 147–48 and 
accompanying text. 
 285. Telephone Interview with Jennifer Li, supra note 8. According to Dr. Li, to get this 
information, one would have to survey either each institution engaged in pediatric research or 
else a representative sample of such institutions. Id. Given the significance of the issues at stake, 
this would be a valuable empirical project. 
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one could surmise that it is likely to be increasingly representative of 
typical protocols because of the push—reflected in federal legislation 
and liberal reinterpretations of older regulatory standards—to 
include healthy children in higher-risk research, and because of the 
corresponding rise both in spending on pediatric research and in the 
numbers of new pediatric research trials. There are also good 
anecdotal indicia to support this view, including that prominent 
bioethicists have simultaneously urged reconsideration of the merits 
of the research in Grimes and provided a basis in the regulations to 
support its propriety as part of their project to increase researchers’ 
access to healthy children for higher-risk research. The truth with 
respect to the typicality of the research in Grimes is likely to be a 
composite of both views, as local control of the research community’s 
regulatory structure continues to prevail.286 
In any event, Grimes’s significance is independent of its 
typicality, one way or the other. The case is significant because it 
demonstrates the linguistic, doctrinal, and theoretical disjunctions 
that separate the ethics of the research community from the law of 
child protection and parents’ decisional authority as this law is 
implicated in the project to include healthy children in harmful or 
risky research.287 In this respect, even though it is anomalous as 
litigation, it is not at all unique in its statement of the relevant law or 
of the principles that will govern future judicial examinations of this 
issue. Finally, it is representative of the courts’ willingness to exercise 
their authority to check the research community’s perspective on 
“human and legal ethical concerns,” perhaps especially as these relate 
to the proper treatment of children.288 
 
 286. See Gandhi, supra note 35 at 266–67 (noting that “[t]he current system relies heavily on 
IRBs to function appropriately and interpret the federal regulations with careful deliberation,” 
that “reasonable people can and do disagree over how the regulations should be interpreted and 
what types of research protocols are ethically permissible,” and that these “definitional 
ambiguities leave an incredible amount of power in the hands of the IRBs”); Telephone 
Interview with Michael Waitzkin, supra note 175 (explaining that private sponsors of research, 
for example drug manufacturers, gravitate toward institutions and IRBs that are less restrictive 
in their interpretations of the federal regulations). 
 287. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 852–53. 
 288. Id. Others have focused on Grimes’s significance in different respects. See, e.g., 
Kopelman, Pediatric Research Regulations Under Legal Scrutiny, supra note 35, at 40–48 
(describing the ways in which the opinion may impact decisionmaking within the research 
community); id. at 40 (describing “an impressive array of critics [who suggest that] the research 
and treatment gap between adults and children will widen significantly if the Grimes holding 
prevails”). For further discussion of the state’s special interest in the protection of children, and 
thus the courts’ special role in assuring their protection, see supra notes 277–78. 
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III.  AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF  
A LEGAL ETHICS OF PEDIATRIC RESEARCH 
To the extent that the research community was unaware of the 
problem before, the Maryland Court of Appeals’s decision in Grimes 
put it on notice that the ethics of pediatric research is on a collision 
course with the law of child protection and parents’ decisional 
authority. On the surface, this collision is most clearly reflected in an 
apparent incompatibility of language: the notion of “more than a 
minor increase over minimal risk,” for example, being foreign to the 
law of parents’ consent authority notwithstanding that the federal 
regulations at least implicitly contemplate their compatibility. 
Beneath the surface, the collision reveals important differences in 
orientation and objectives: whereas the law of parents’ consent 
authority privileges individual rights and interests by seeking to 
balance a respect for parental autonomy against a commitment to 
protect the individual child from harm, the ethics of pediatric 
research privileges a combination of group-based interests and child 
protection by seeking to balance the progressive goals of the scientific 
enterprise against a commitment to protecting children as a 
vulnerable subpopulation. 
Because both approaches privilege child protection to some 
extent, these differences do not signify a complete disconnect in 
outcomes between what might be permitted according to research 
ethics and what might be permitted according to the law of parents’ 
consent authority and child protection. As I described in Part II, there 
is substantial overlap between the two. At the same time, because 
they also privilege competing goods—individual rights and interests 
versus group-based interests—the overlap is not complete: there will 
be instances in which pediatric ethics will permit research-related 
interventions and procedures that are unlawful according to the law 
of parents’ consent authority and child protection, and vice versa.289 
To avoid this collision in all of its respects, the research 
community has three options: It can continue to litigate individual 
cases as they arise in the judicial context in hopes of influencing the 
eventual development of a common and constitutional law that is 
 
 289. For example, the ethics of pediatric research may be more protective with respect to 
nonphysical forms of harm and risk than the laws of child protection and parent’s consent 
authority. See infra note 367 and accompanying text. 
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favorable to its enterprise.290 It can work with state and federal 
officials to try legislatively to minimize the conflict.291 Or, it can work 
with federal regulators to harmonize the ethics of pediatric research 
with the law of child protection and parents’ consent authority. This 
Part argues in favor of this third option.292 This argument is based in 
the view that the normative priors of and relationships within the 
research community make this community ill suited to resolving the 
inherent tension between protection and access, in the view that the 
law of child protection and parents’ consent authority is itself well 
suited to do this difficult work, and in a normative preference for 
rules governing child protection that both privilege respect for the 
child as an individual and emphasize antidiscrimination principles. 
A. The Problem with “Balancing Protection and Access”293 
Part I of this Article explains that the ethics of pediatric research 
has undergone a fundamental shift away from a commitment to treat 
children, particularly healthy children, as a vulnerable subpopulation 
deserving of almost absolute protection from exploitation in the 
experimental setting to a commitment whenever possible to include 
both healthy and ill children in relevant human subjects research. The 
stated objective of the new ethics of pediatric research is not, 
however, a full pendulum swing away from protection to access; that 
 
 290. For example, the research community can work to convince courts in the future to 
reject the analysis in Grimes and instead to base decisions squarely in the federal regulations, or 
to interpret Grimes so that it is consistent with those regulations. See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 34, 
at 206–14 (arguing on behalf of the primacy of the federal regulations including as they concern 
parents’ consent authority); Kopelman, Pediatric Research Regulations Under Legal Scrutiny, 
supra note 35, at 47 (proposing interpretations of Grimes and the regulations that would avoid 
much of the collision). 
 291. For example, the research community could replicate the work done in Maryland in the 
aftermath of the decision to develop state law rejecting Grimes and aligning with the federal 
regulations. See supra note 25; see also IOM, supra note 8, at app. B (suggesting the 
development of “uniform state guidelines” and adoption of those guidelines by states wishing to 
regulate aspects of pediatric research in ways consistent with the federal guidelines and research 
ethics). 
 292. These options do not preclude additional reforms, for example of the existing 
regulatory structure. For an interesting discussion and proposal along these lines, see Gandhi, 
supra note 35, at 299–311 (arguing that the system of local control by IRBs has largely 
precluded the development of effective ethical standards to govern pediatric research, and 
proposing revision of the existing regulatory structure that would provide for oversight of local 
IRBs analogous to the structure of the federal courts). 
 293. This expression comes directly from Lainie Friedman Ross. Ross, supra note 21; see 
also Nelson, supra note 44, at 47–49 (understanding this as the goal of the new ethics of 
pediatric research). 
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is, it is not the mere reverse of the prior “children last” rule.294 Rather, 
recognizing that “[a] system that rejects an exclusive focus on the 
person most affected must include a method to prevent itself from 
becoming a way to legitimate imposition on underdogs,”295 what is 
sought by the proponents of the new pediatric research ethics is an 
effective balance between protection and access.296 
Thus, as the authors of the critical book Beyond Consent: Seeking 
Justice in Research wrote in 1998, the scientific community can and 
should “creat[e] opportunities for fair access to research and its 
potential benefits, while simultaneously developing mechanisms of 
protecting subjects from exploitation.”297 Among others, Dr. Robert 
Nelson (also writing in Beyond Consent) has applied this principle 
specifically to the pediatric context, arguing that because children 
have suffered both from experimental abuse and from the dearth of 
relevant medical and pharmaceutical development, it is essential to 
develop an ethics of pediatric research that would allow children to 
access the benefits and burdens of research in a context that assures 
their protection from the kinds of exploitation to which they were 
vulnerable prior to the promulgation of the federal rules.298 
 
 294. Lainie Friedman Ross can be credited with both the pendulum metaphor, which works 
so well in this context, and the description of the standard (older) ethics as involving a “children 
last” rule. See Ross, supra note 21, at 519, 528; see also supra note 89 and accompanying text 
(providing citations to her work in this regard). 
 295. Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy Age, 68 IND. L.J. 
727, 738 (1993). 
 296. See Rosato, supra note 35, at 368 (“[T]he paradigm for children has shifted from 
protectionism to access.”). This approach is entirely consistent with the broader goals of 
bioethics as a field, which seeks to study and then whenever possible to reconcile tensions 
between scientific and medical progress and—in this context—the protection of human research 
subjects. See, e.g., Alexander M. Capron, Dir., Dep’t of Ethics, Trade, Human Rights, & Health 
Law, World Health Org., Fifth Rabbi Seymour Siegel Memorial Lecture in Medical-Legal 
Ethics: The Difficulties of ‘Doing Bioethics’ Globally: Ethics, Law and Human Rights in the UN 
System (Jan. 19, 2006) (PowerPoint slides on file with the author) (arguing that it is inaccurate 
to describe bioethics as “a branch of human rights” because unlike human rights, bioethics is 
informed by a combination of “[r]ights-based theories” and “principilist, consequential/ 
utilitarian & feminist theories.”). 
 297. Jeffrey P. Kahn, Anna C. Mastroianni & Jeremy Sugarman, Changing Claims About 
Justice in Research: An Introduction and Overview, in BEYOND CONSENT: SEEKING JUSTICE IN 
RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 1, 2–3. 
 298. See Nelson, supra note 44, at 47 (explaining that the inability under older 
interpretations of the federal regulations to conduct research on children means that children do 
not have equal access to the fruits of scientific and medical progress); id. at 49–52 (describing 
some of the history of the exploitation of children by researchers); id. at 52 (noting that “the 
current federal regulations governing research are designed to prevent” research like that which 
occurred in the past, including the Willowbrook experiments); id. at 57–59 (discussing accepted 
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This Article’s argument in favor of harmonizing the ethics of 
pediatric research with the law of child protection and parents’ 
consent authority rejects the view at the core of this new ethics that 
access to healthy children for harmful and higher-risk research is 
necessary and that it is possible within the prevailing regulatory and 
ethical scheme successfully to balance protection and access. 
There is much that society would like to know about children 
that it does not know because it has been reluctant to involve healthy 
children in risky research.299 There is also probably little doubt that 
some of this information could be quite useful as researchers and 
others think, for example, about new approaches to particular 
pediatric conditions. It is true that pediatricians would benefit, and 
thus presumably their pediatric patients would benefit, from the 
existence and availability of information about how children might 
respond to drugs designed for and tested exclusively in the adult 
population.300 Because pediatricians share their experiences, much of 
this information is available for drugs that have been on the market 
for some time.301 For newer drugs, however, there is a dearth of 
 
conceptual and applications problems with the minimal risk standards); id. at 57, 62 (suggesting 
ways to include healthy children in more than minimal risk research while at the same time 
safeguarding their interests in autonomy and respect). 
 299. See supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text. 
 300. I distinguish between the existence and availability of this information because there is 
some empirical evidence that suggests that permitting the use of pediatric subjects in 
pharmaceutical studies has resulted in new knowledge, but not necessarily in the public 
availability of that knowledge. In other words, it appears that in some situations, some 
pharmaceutical companies may be choosing not to disclose the results of their research, 
particularly when the findings are adverse. See Daniel K. Benjamin, Jr. et al., Peer-Reviewed 
Publication of Clinical Trials Completed for Pediatric Exclusivity, 296 JAMA 1266, 1269–70 
(2006). 
 301. It has been argued that this information was obtained in the context of what were 
effectively Phase III drug trials—that is, as pediatricians experimented with their ill pediatric 
patients. See, e.g., HOLDER, supra note 10, at 162. This is a legitimate critique. It is not obvious, 
however, that it provides good support for the argument to expose healthy children to risk that 
is unnecessary from their individual perspectives. One might argue, for example, that it is 
legitimate to take a chance with an ill child, because that child might well benefit, that is, the 
child might be healed of an illness or condition; but that it is entirely illegitimate to take this 
same risk with a healthy child because there is no such prospect. (Indeed, this is the argument 
bioethicists generally use to support the conventional interpretation of the federal regulations, 
that ill children can be subjected to higher risks in the research setting than healthy children). 
The fact that good research may not be feasible with the relatively small number of ill subjects 
that might be available in any given context does not necessarily fix this problem if one of the 
relevant perspectives is that of the healthy child. 
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relevant data.302 Nevertheless, decisionmakers continue to be free, just 
as they were at the time of the drafting of the Belmont Report, to 
choose to forego the formal collection of some of this information on 
the basis that the costs of obtaining it are (from a normative 
perspective) too high. This gets to the crux of the matter: The costs 
are not too high, and thus it may be a good idea to permit the use of 
healthy children in higher-risk research settings, if there is a way also 
to protect those children from research-related abuse and 
exploitation. On the other hand, the costs will remain prohibitive if 
the project to “balance protection and access” cannot be 
accomplished. 
This project has received significant attention from many 
thoughtful people. Nevertheless, it has largely failed because of the 
irreconcilable tension between access and protection: unless one 
defines child protection to mean the protection of children as a group, 
it is impossible simultaneously to harm and risk injury to individual 
child subjects and also to protect them against these same 
circumstances.303 The efforts of the Institute of Medicine and of some 
prominent pediatric bioethicists (a few of whom are also members of 
the IOM) to reconcile increased access with continued child 
protection exemplify this quandary and emphasize the need for a new 
approach to determining when, if ever, it is permissible for 
researchers to use healthy children as subjects in harmful and higher-
risk research. 
For example, Dr. Nelson has proposed solving the problem of 
balancing protection with access to healthy children by tying “the 
level of allowable risk . . . to the assent of the child” and by providing 
that “parental permission can suffice for a child [incapable of assent] 
to participate in greater than minimal risk research provided that the 
research has been reviewed and approved by a representative panel 
of older children and their parents who are members of the intended 
research population.”304 In his view, this would allow researchers 
increased access to healthy children for higher-risk research and 
 
 302. The federal government has provided extended patent protection for pharmaceuticals 
that are tested on children precisely to address this problem. See supra note 104 and 
accompanying text. 
 303. This does not mean that the bioethics project in general is flawed, only that in some 
cases it may not be possible to reconcile the tensions at issue, and choices that privilege one or 
another side of the balance have to be made. 
 304. Nelson, supra note 44, at 62. 
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protect them at the same time—the latter because, in addition to the 
various adult decisionmakers in the equation, the child (or child 
proxies) also would be consulted. The assumption is that children are 
protected from exploitation and abuse in the research setting if their 
views generally are heard, and they are still inclined to participate. 
Consistent with his related work on assent, Nelson’s proposal 
demonstrates real respect for what children have to say about their 
own circumstances, which is rarely a bad thing.305 But defining 
protection in this way is enormously problematic because it ignores 
the substantial empirical, neurological, and anecdotal evidence that 
children (including adolescents) tend to make poor decisions 
regarding risk,306 which is one of the principal rationales underlying 
the longstanding public policy to protect them with adult proxy 
decisionmakers.307 As Professor Terrence Ackerman has noted, “We 
 
 305. See, e.g., Nelson & Reynolds, supra note 53, at 13 (“We should not privilege research 
enrollment over moral harm to children but rather should solicit a child’s ‘yes’ to research 
participation and respect both a child’s dissent and silence.”). 
 306. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Adolescence and the Regulation of Youth Crime, 
Keynote Address at the Temple Law Review Symposium: Law and Adolescence: The Legal 
Status, Rights, and Responsibilities of Adolescents in the Child Welfare, Juvenile, and Criminal 
Justice Systems (Mar. 18, 2006), in 79 TEMP. L. REV. 337 (2006) (summarizing this evidence); 
see also id. at 339 (“The capacities for reasoning and understanding improve significantly from 
late childhood into adolescence, and by mid-adolescence, most teens are close to adults in their 
ability to reason and to understand information—what you might call ‘pure’ cognitive 
capacities—at least in the abstract. The reality, however, is that they are likely less capable than 
are adults in using these capacities in making real-world choices, partly because of lack of 
experience and partly because teens are less efficient than adults in processing information.”); 
id. at 340 (“[A]s compared to adults, adolescents are more likely to focus on the here and now 
and less likely to think about the long-term consequences of their choices or actions, and when 
they do, they are inclined to assign less weight to future consequences than to immediate risks 
and benefits.”); id. at 343 (“[I]n calculating the risk-reward ratio that guides decision making, 
adolescents may discount risks and assign greater weight to the rewards of a choice than do 
adults. . . . What distinguishes adolescents from adults in this regard, then, is not the fact that 
teens are less knowledgeable about risks, but, rather, that they attach different value to the 
rewards that risk taking provides.”). But see Rosato, supra note 35, at 369 (arguing in 2000 that 
“[t]he general consensus in the psychological literature is that most children over fourteen years 
can consent to their own treatment or to their participation in research”). 
 307. See supra notes 116–25 and accompanying text; see also ROSS, supra note 34, at 92 
(arguing that “respect for children entails some respect for their current autonomy, but also 
respect for the persons they are becoming . . . . parents and researchers show respect by deciding 
what activities are appropriate for a child”); Kopelman, supra note 17, at 754–55 (asserting that 
a child’s “agreement lacks full authorization because minors generally lack capacity to assess the 
consequences of their actions. For the same reason, we do not allow minors to be soldiers, 
firefighters, or police, despite what the minors want”). See generally HOLLY BREWER, BY 
BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, & THE ANGLO-AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN 
AUTHORITY (2005) (describing the evolution in the law of children’s consent authority, from 
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fool ourselves if we think we fulfill our moral duties by standing aside 
and asking the child to decide.”308 Regardless of one’s views on this 
moral question, the relevant adults will not have fulfilled their legal 
duty to the child unless they have at least mediated that decision.309 
Professor Loretta Kopelman’s proposal to balance protection 
and access contains a number of new approaches to the federal 
regulations governing pediatric research. Specifically, she has 
proposed that the use of healthy children as research subjects be 
limited to circumstances that involve only minimal risk;310 that 
minimal risk be defined simply according to “the probability and 
magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not 
greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily 
encountered . . . during the performance of routine physical and 
psychological examinations or tests”;311 that relative interpretations of 
this standard be rejected;312 that children who are presently healthy 
but who are at high risk of developing serious problems in the future 
be characterized as having a “condition” justifying enrollment in 
higher-risk research;313 that group-based stereotypes be rejected as a 
basis for establishing the existence of a “condition”;314 and that the 
best interests of the child standard be defined to include a focus on 
the best interests of children as a group.315 Kopelman’s proposals have 
been developed in a number of contexts, including in her discussions 
of the Grimes case. In those discussions, she strongly disagrees with 
 
the view that it emanated from inherited status to the view that it emanates from experience and 
the capacity to reason). 
 308. T.F. Ackerman, Fooling Ourselves with Child Autonomy and Assent in Nontherapeutic 
Clinical Research, 27 CLINICAL RES. 345, 346 (1979). 
 309. See supra notes 116–25 and accompanying text for a discussion of parents’ legal 
responsibilities and of the circumstances in which children are permitted to be autonomous 
decisionmakers. 
 310. Kopelman, supra note 17, at 755–56. 
 311. Kopelman, Children as Research Subjects, supra note 35, at 597–99 (modifying the 
definition slightly by deleting the first prong but embracing the second, in contrast to the 
prevailing definition of minimal risk: “the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort 
anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily 
encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical and psychological 
examinations or tests” (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2005))); see Kopelman, Minimal Risk, 
supra note 35, at 361–68. 
 312. Kopelman, supra note 17, at 751–52. 
 313. Id. at 752–56. The IOM’s proposal in this regard is discussed infra notes 335–37, 344–46 
and accompanying text. 
 314. Kopelman, supra note 17, at 751–53. 
 315. Id. at 756. 
01__COLEMAN.DOC 12/20/2007  10:08:49 AM 
2007] PEDIATRIC RESEARCH 599 
the Grimes court’s characterization of the children in the case as 
healthy on the basis that, given the dearth of lead-free or properly 
lead-abated affordable housing in Baltimore, they were at risk of 
sustaining lead-related injuries. And she argues that it was therefore 
appropriate to characterize them as having a “condition” justifying 
their inclusion in the higher-risk lead abatement study.316 
Professor Kopelman has been a leading voice for children within 
bioethics community, providing, among other things, accurate 
information about relevant legal rules, solid analysis of several issues 
arising under those rules, and provocative arguments about how the 
law might be interpreted or pushed to accommodate research-related 
interventions and procedures that may not pass legal muster.317 She is 
particularly notable for her longstanding, thorough, and incisive 
critique of the definition of minimal risk, which—as subsequent 
empirical work has reinforced—affords individual IRBs altogether 
too much discretion in risk classification and thus continually begs 
arbitrary outcomes.318 Her solution to this problem—to restrict the 
definition of minimal risk—should receive substantial attention 
because it would go far toward harmonizing the ethics of pediatric 
research involving healthy child subjects with the law of parents’ 
consent authority and child protection.319 
On the other hand, Professor Kopelman’s solution to the 
problem of balancing child protection and increased access to healthy 
children for higher-risk research is troubling because it requires the 
reclassification of some healthy children as ill for purposes of 
 
 316. Id. at 751. 
 317. See, e.g., Kopelman, Children as Research Subjects, supra note 35, at 598 (arguing that 
the “everyday risk” standard of minimal risk in section 404 should be dropped because it is too 
open-ended and can be abused); Kopelman, supra note 17, at 751 (contending that dividing 
children into discrete categories as sick or healthy is not realistic and ignores the concerns of 
those at risk of developing a condition). See generally Loretta Kopelman, Health Care and 
Research Issues, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 387 (Stephen G. Post ed., 3d ed. 2004) 
[hereinafter Kopelman, Health Care and Research Issues] (surveying the development of 
children’s rights and providing an analytical framework for determining when research should 
be done on children). 
 318. Kopelman, Health Care and Research Issues, supra note 317, at 362; see also Jeffrey 
Janofsky & Barbara Starfield, Assessment of Risk and Research on Children, 98 J. PEDIATRICS 
842, 843 (1981) (noting that data used by IRBs to assess “risk inherent in many pediatric 
procedures are limited to listings of complications and case reports, neither of which provide the 
frequency of morbidity and mortality associated with the procedures”); Shah et al., supra note 5, 
at 478 (providing empirical data on this point). 
 319. See supra note 167 and accompanying text for this point in the context of my analysis of 
the legality of harmful and risky research. 
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developing an adequate pool of pediatric research subjects.320 It is 
plausible to challenge the merits of the traditional healthy/ill 
dichotomy and to reimagine health as being a continuum along which 
many people, who are otherwise considered healthy, might be 
reclassified, for example, as being at risk or as already having a 
possibly latent illness. Indeed, as a scientific or medical matter, a 
continuum theory of health may be closer to the truth than the 
traditional dichotomy. And it is not unprecedented to distinguish 
between “normal,” “at risk,” and “troubled” children as society 
develops relevant public policy.321 But to use the intermediate “at 
risk” category to justify additional harms and risks rather than 
additional safeguards (as other programs for “at risk” children do) is 
counterintuitive to the extent that one of the goals is child 
protection.322 This defect cannot be cured, as Kopelman would have it, 
by redefining the best interests of the child standard at the core of 
child protection law to include the best interests of all children. Aside 
from the fact that such an interpretation of the best interests standard 
is fundamentally at odds with its objectives, and thus unlikely to gain 
any traction in the law,323 on its face there is nothing protective about 
an approach that would subject healthy individuals to risky research 
because that may benefit others in the future.324 The fact that under 
Kopelman’s approach some healthy children would be culled from 
the universe of prospective research subjects because they could not 
 
 320. Kopelman denies that healthy children would be subject to risky research under her 
approach. See, e.g., Kopelman, supra note 17, at 756. But this requires a sleight of hand: She 
argues that “healthy” in some circumstances can mean “unhealthy” for research purposes. Id. at 
751–54 (contending that a sliding scale based on likelihood of developing an illness would be 
more realistic than a healthy or unhealthy dichotomy). She suggests that society’s moral duty to 
protect them would be met nevertheless because (as she conceives it) children “collectively” are 
protected. Id. at 756. Once again, however, it is only by redefining the essential terms of the 
debate that Kopelman can claim to have accomplished her objective. 
 321. Here I am thinking of special educational programs and opportunities that target at risk 
but otherwise healthy children, such as “pre-k” classes for at-risk four-year-olds. 
 322. Kopelman is correct that these differences might justify disparate treatment of the 
individuals at issue according to basic principles of antidiscrimination law. See Kopelman, supra 
note 17, at 755–56. Thus, for example, it justifies state funding of pre-k programs for at risk four-
year-olds, funding that would not need to be provided on an equal basis to four-year-olds who 
were not at risk. As I argue, however, the notion that this principle would be used to justify 
additional harms rather than additional benefits is anathema to its foundations. 
 323. See discussion Part III.B.2. 
 324. To her credit, Professor Kopelman has recognized that this view is firmly entrenched in 
the law. Her suggestion that the best interests of the child standard be reimagined as a best 
interests of children standard is a response to this law. See supra text accompanying note 315. 
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be characterized as having a condition, or because researchers 
initially described the study group too generally, yields no additional 
protection for the individual healthy children who do make the cut. 
Dr. Lainie Friedman Ross has sought to “ensure appropriate 
safeguards without compromising access unnecessarily”325 by 
proposing that researchers be permitted to use both healthy and ill 
children in research that poses a minor increase over a minimal risk of 
harm;326 that the concepts of minimal risk and minor increase over 
minimal risk be merged;327 that permissible research—including what 
currently is characterized as minimal risk or as posing a minor 
increase over minimal risk—be redefined as Professor Terrence 
Ackerman earlier proposed, as when “the probability of [physical and 
psychological] harm is no more than that to which it is appropriate to 
intentionally expose a child for education purposes in family life 
situations”;328 and that the authorities restrict researchers’ ability to 
conduct studies involving more than a minor increase over minimal 
risk.329 Assuming that Ross intends for this to be an integrated 
approach,330 this would mean that no child would be subject to 
discrimination based on his or her circumstances in terms of the 
acceptable amount of harm and risk, and that the amount of harm or 
risk to which any child could be exposed would be limited according 
to the terms set by Ackerman. 
At first blush, this would seem to accomplish both a good 
measure of protection and also some access. Indeed, Dr. Ross 
generally appears to be more inclined than some of her colleagues to 
 
 325. ROSS, supra note 34, at 32. 
 326. Id. at 78–81. 
 327. Id. at 83. 
 328. Id. As Dr. Ross explains, this “allows children to participate in novel experiences 
compatible with their development; and it provides the greatest parental latitude that is 
consistent with a liberal community’s respect for parental autonomy.” Id.; see also id. at 96–97 
(explaining that parents can legitimately override a child’s dissent so long as the proposed 
research does not involve abuse or neglect because they have the right to inculcate their values 
within these parameters). But see id. at 98 (suggesting that parents and researchers should not 
be permitted to override an adolescent’s dissent). 
 329. See supra notes 73–74, 109 and accompanying text for a description of section 407 and 
its process, and its increased use. Dr. Ross does not propose eliminating the possibility that such 
studies might be approved by the Ethics Advisory Board, but she does appear to be concerned 
that this exception not become the vehicle to avoid the restrictions inherent in the regulations 
otherwise. See Ross, supra note 21, at 531–32. 
 330. I have derived Dr. Ross’s approach from an examination of her different works. 
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sacrifice access when this is necessary to achieve protection.331 
Researchers would be able to use both healthy and ill children in their 
research, but on equivalent terms, and only so long as the harms and 
risks involved did not transgress commonly accepted boundaries, 
including those informed by the antidiscrimination principle and 
fiduciary theory.332 (Ackerman’s proposed parameters for permissible 
pediatric research can be read as incorporating these concepts.) This 
picture is complicated, however, by Ross’s conclusion that the 
research in Grimes was both legal and ethical.333 It may be the case 
that this particular analysis should be examined independent of her 
other views; it may reflect a fealty to the independence of the 
scientific enterprise and to the associated notion that the federal 
regulations governing pediatric research provide necessary immunity 
to researchers who might transgress other aspects of the law.334 But if 
 
 331. For example, she is concerned about the new and increased use of section 407 panels, 
and she questions whether the pendulum has swung too far away from protection. See, e.g., 
supra note 109. Dr. Ross’s approach appears to preclude the possibility of any research under  
section 407—that is, of any research that would pose what is now classified as “more than a 
minor increase over minimal risk.” 
 332. Dr. Ross explains that she disagrees with the strictures of fiduciary theory, and so 
presumably would disagree with this characterization of her views. See ROSS, supra note 34, at 
22. Fiduciary theory as it is used in this Article, however, is not nearly so restrictive. See supra 
notes 50–51 and accompanying text; infra notes 396–400 and accompanying text. This is because 
its articulation in the law is based not only on responsible adults’ obligation to care for the 
welfare of the individual child, but also on the understanding that those adults have quite a lot 
of liberty to make decisions about how they will maximize that welfare in the context of their 
own lives. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text; infra notes 396–400 and accompanying 
text. At least on the surface, this view of fiduciary theory is consistent with Ross’s approach. 
See, however, infra note 333 and accompanying text for discussion of Ross’s approval of the 
research in Grimes despite its violation of even the law’s more relaxed version of the fiduciary 
principle. 
 333. In Dr. Ross’s view, “the research was ethically permissible because (1) it offered the 
prospect of direct benefit to the children who lived in the homes with lead paint; and (2) albeit 
nontherapeutic for the children in the control arm, it entailed no more than minimal risk.” 
ROSS, supra note 34, at 212. The former proposition is difficult to accept given the researchers’ 
position that the results of the periodic testing for lead poisoning should not be released to the 
families. The latter is disturbing in light of the fact that the lead plaintiff in Grimes, eighteen-
month-old Ericka Grimes, was located in a unit designated as a control but nevertheless was 
exposed to sufficient lead dust allegedly to cause learning disabilities and cognitive impairments. 
See Manuel Roig-Franzia & Rick Weiss, Md. Appeals Court Slams Researchers, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 21, 2001, at B1. Ross also took the position that if the research did not qualify as “minimal 
risk,” it could still be lawful according to a modern interpretation of the federal regulation that 
permits the use of healthy children in riskier research when these children can be said to have a 
“condition” worthy of study and “condition” is defined as being at risk. See ROSS, supra note 34, 
at 211. 
 334. Ross’s initial reaction to the Grimes decision lends some credence to this possibility, as 
it was her view that the court was wrong to find that parents could not give lawful consent to 
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Ross’s approach would permit the research rejected in Grimes, her 
conception of permissible harm and risk—“the probability of 
[physical and psychological harm] is no more than that to which it is 
appropriate to intentionally expose a child for education purposes in 
family life situations”—includes situations that likely few outside of 
the research community would defend. At the end of the day, this 
would bring society back full circle to quite a lot of access to healthy 
children for the benefit of others in the future, but little meaningful 
protection for the children actually enrolled in the research. 
Finally, in its 2004 report entitled Ethical Conduct of Clinical 
Research Involving Children, the IOM implicitly proposed expanding 
access to healthy children for higher-risk research along the lines 
proposed by Professor Kopelman—that is, when the children can be 
described as having a “condition” that is useful for researchers to 
study.335 In adopting this position, it rejected a narrow definition of 
the concept that would limit researchers to children with “an illness, 
disease, injury, or defect.”336 At the same time, it also rejected a 
broader definition that would allow researchers access to children 
according to an unlimited number of “social, developmental, or other 
characteristic[s].”337 According to Dr. Ross, the IOM also 
recommended that payment be part of the consent process, although 
it should not be emphasized as a benefit of participating. While most 
have argued against payments that might be undue inducements, the 
IOM justified permitting payments “to reduce certain barriers to 
research participation” reflecting the change in focus from 
protecting children from research risks to promoting greater access 
to research participation. It rejected payments to parents beyond 
direct reimbursement . . . but supported the provision of reasonable 
 
their children’s involvement in the research because the federal regulations (in her view) say 
they can. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 335. IOM, supra note 8, at 130. The IOM proposal in this respect largely mirrors Loretta 
Kopelman’s. For a description and critique of Professor Kopelman’s proposal pertaining to 
what she calls “risky ‘no benefit’” research, see supra notes 320–24 and accompanying text. 
Kopelman is a member of the IOM’s Committee on Clinical Research Involving Children, 
which was responsible for drafting the IOM Report. See IOM, supra note 8, at v. The regulatory 
provision, 45 C.F.R. § 46.406 (2007), permits researchers to expose children with “disorders” 
and “conditions” to research that poses a minor increase over minimal risk. IOM, supra note 8, 
at 134–36 (discussing this provision and the definitional quandaries it poses). 
 336. IOM, supra note 8, at 129. 
 337. Id. 
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age-appropriate compensation for children based on time involved 
when the research does not offer the prospect of direct benefit.338 
The IOM report itself qualifies this recommendation with the caveat 
that 
no payment [for participation in research] should be so large or be 
timed in such a way as to unduly influence parents’ or children’s 
decisions about research participation. . . . Payments should not 
influence parents’ or children’s decisions to participate in research 
when such participation is not in a child’s best interest.339 
But as Ross notes, “If the IOM recommendations are adopted, then 
only in the U.S. would children involved in nontherapeutic research 
be eligible for an incentive payment beyond a token gesture.”340 
The IOM report contains an extremely thorough treatment of 
the history, ethics, and regulation of pediatric research. Its 
examination of the important issues raised by the prospect of 
increasing access to children for this research is equally thorough. 
Most important, its recommendations reflect its authors’ commitment 
to balancing protection and access. Thus, alongside its proposals to 
justify and incentivize increased access to the pediatric population are 
proposals that would make an important contribution to child 
protection. For example, it proposes that access to healthy children 
continue to be limited to research posing no more than minimal risk; 
that “the interpretation of the concept [of minimal risk] should be 
‘indexed’ to the experiences of the ‘normal, healthy, average child’”;341 
that “direct benefit” for purposes of permitting higher than minimal 
risk research be defined as “a tangible positive outcome (for example, 
cure of disease, relief of pain, and increased mobility) that may be 
experienced by an individual,” and correspondingly that “collateral, 
indirect, or side benefits” be defined as benefits “that are not related 
to the research objectives”;342 and that “[r]esearch organizations and 
 
 338. ROSS, supra note 34, at 133 (citations omitted). 
 339. IOM, supra note 8, at 213. Note that there is no question that payment for participation 
is intended to influence parents’ and children’s decisions about research participation. Thus, 
what the IOM report seeks to avoid is undue influence. 
 340. ROSS, supra note 34, at 134. 
 341. IOM, supra note 8, at 122 (quoting the National Human Research Protections 
Advisory Committee interpretation of minimal risk). 
 342. Id. at 132. The IOM report provides as examples of such “collateral, indirect, or side 
benefits . . . the opportunity to learn more about their condition or develop social relationships 
with others in similar circumstances.” Id. It also specifically notes that “although research 
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sponsors . . . pay the medical and rehabilitation costs for children 
injured as a direct result of research participation, without regard to 
fault.”343 
Even though the IOM report makes important contributions in 
these respects, it also potentially creates new problems in its 
recharacterization of healthy but at-risk children as having a 
condition so that they might be included as subjects in higher-risk, no-
benefit research, and in its suggestion that children might be paid 
more than token sums when their parents agree to enroll them in such 
research. As noted in the earlier discussion of Loretta Kopelman’s 
proposal to include some healthy children in higher-risk, no-benefit 
research, it is counterintuitive from the child protection perspective to 
expose at-risk children to an increased risk of harm—rather than, for 
example, a decreased risk of harm or additional protections—on the 
basis that they are at risk.344 Moreover, although the IOM report 
restricts its approval of more than mere token payments to payments 
that would not “unduly influence” parents to enroll their children, it 
appears likely that the effect of its proposal would be to increase the 
use of relatively poor children in pediatric research.345 As described, 
this population is already overrepresented in pediatric research 
involving healthy child subjects.346 
Most important, however, the IOM report fails to propose or 
adopt a solution to the problem of how to define minimal risk and its 
variants.347 Indeed, aside from its rejection of a relative interpretation 
of minimal risk, it is silent on the subject of uniform standards that 
would govern the definition of those rules. This is critical because the 
rules are the locus of the federal regulations’ protections for 
 
participants may view gifts or payments for research participation as benefits, federal guidance 
makes clear that such payments should not be included by investigators or IRBs in their risk-
benefit assessments.” Id. 
 343. Id. at 21. 
 344. See supra notes 320–24 and accompanying text. 
 345. Part II.C.3 discusses the benefits issue. 
 346. See infra notes 357–60 and accompanying text for a discussion of this phenomenon. 
 347. This is in contrast with, for example, Loretta Kopelman and Lainie Ross Friedman, 
both of whom propose solutions to this critical problem. See supra notes 311, 328 and 
accompanying text. 
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children,348 and they are effectively standardless.349 (As Loretta 
Kopelman has noted, “the apparent consensus that children may 
participate in nontherapeutic research ‘if the study is not too risky is 
illusory if we mean different things by “not too risky.”’”350) Because 
the research community’s regulatory structure is decentralized to a 
large extent, the rules at the core of the solution thus continue to be 
malleable according to the needs, interests, predispositions, and 
expertise of individual IRBs and researchers; individual children who 
are subject to a particularly conservative IRB review process will get 
more protection than those who are subject to a particularly liberal 
one; sponsors of pediatric research (including the drug sector) are 
likely to favor the latter over the former in their grant-making 
processes; and parents (in their ability to withhold consent) remain 
the only predictable source of protection for individual children who 
are of interest to researchers. 
 
 348. See supra notes 68–89 and accompanying text for a description of these rules and their 
purpose in the federal scheme. Cf. Celia B. Fisher, Susan Z. Kornetsky & Ernest D. Prentice, 
Determining Risk in Pediatric Research with No Prospect of Direct Benefit: Time for a National 
Consensus on the Interpretation of Federal Regulations, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar. 2007, at 5, 5 
(“During the 25 years since their adoption, [the minimal risk rules] have helped IRBs balance 
subject protections with the pursuit of scientific knowledge to advance children’s welfare.”). 
 349. See IOM, supra note 8, at 18, 117, 121, 134–36 (acknowledging this problem and 
recommending, inter alia, that HHS and the FDA “cooperate to develop and disseminate 
guidance and examples for investigators and [IRBs] to clarify important regulatory concepts and 
definitions (including definitions of minimal risk, minor increase over minimal risk, condition, 
and prospect of direct benefit)”); Fisher, Kornetsky & Prentice, supra note 348, at 5 
(emphasizing that the “inconsistency in IRB application of [minimal risk rules and definitions] 
to pediatric protocols has been widespread, in part because of the ambiguity of the regulatory 
language,” and calling for “a national consensus on recommended criteria”); see also Nelson, 
supra note 44, at 58 (describing the different ways one might interpret the minimal risk rule’s 
“risks of everyday life” and arguing that “the apparent consensus that children may participate 
in nontherapeutic research ‘if the study is not too risky is illusory if we mean different things by 
“not too risky.”’” (quoting Kopelman, Health Care and Research Issues, supra note 317, at 
362)). See generally Janofsky & Starfield, supra note 318, at 844–45 (finding considerable 
differences among pediatric department chairs and pediatric research center directors on 
estimates about whether the procedures such as venipuncture, arterial puncture, and gastric and 
intestinal intubation were regarded as risky); Shah et al., supra note 5 (describing a 2002 study 
of 188 IRB chairpersons whose views as to the procedures and interventions that constitute 
minimum risk and a minor increase over minimum risk varied widely). Both the Janofsky & 
Starfield and Shah et al. studies are described and the Shah et al. study is critiqued by the IOM. 
IOM, supra note 8, at 120. Despite its critiques of the Shah et al. study, however, the authors of 
this report conclude that “the results still point to the considerable subjectivity of risk 
assessments.” Id. 
 350. Nelson, supra note 44, at 58 (quoting Kopelman, Health Care and Research Issues, 
supra note 317, at 362). 
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In theory, IRBs are intended to act as important barriers to 
inappropriate human subjects research by assuring the safety and 
integrity of studies conducted under their auspices.351 And thus, in the 
context of pediatric research, they should effectively function as 
parents’ adjuncts in the business that is child protection. There is no 
reason to doubt that IRBs in general do their jobs as defined by the 
federal rules and pediatric research ethics.352 Nevertheless, the 
regulatory structure’s failure to demand uniformity among IRBs with 
respect to what it means to do child protection,353 coupled with its 
failure to require these institutions to evaluate the merits of particular 
research proposals before they permit researchers to begin their 
work,354 assures that they are not necessarily effective partners in this 
respect.355 This problem may be exacerbated when IRBs are 
inappropriately invested in the grant-related successes of their 
institutions.356 
This situation is especially troubling because in the United States 
the pool of healthy children from which researchers most easily draw 
is characterized by their parents’ low socioeconomic and minority 
status.357 Whereas ill children of low socioeconomic and minority 
 
 351. See Interview with Philip Rosoff, supra note 202 (arguing IRBs probably prevent gross 
abuses but otherwise are ineffective at protecting subjects). 
 352. See id. (explaining IRBs’ focus on ensuring consent, not the merits of the research). 
 353. See supra notes 5, 75, 83, 347–50, and accompanying text. In addition, Jennifer Rosato 
explains that “when IRBs and others are seeking ethical guidance on children as research 
subjects, they must look to a patchwork of authorities that does not adequately address 
children’s interests. . . . Reliance on these authorities creates some fundamental weaknesses in 
any resulting ethical framework.” Rosato, supra note 35, at 365. 
 354. For example, IRBs are not required to ask whether there are other ways to arrive at the 
same information that do not involve risking the welfare of healthy child subjects. Their role is 
limited to ascertaining whether the federal rules governing pediatric research are being 
followed, including especially its consent provisions. Interview with Philip Rosoff, supra note 
202. 
 355. There is a vast literature on the subject of IRBs, their deficiencies, and ways in which 
these could be remedied. For a sampling of this literature as it focuses on pediatric research 
issues, see generally Fisher, Kornetsky & Prentice, supra note 348 (describing inconsistency in 
IRB interpretations of minimal risk rules, and ethical issues that have arisen out of that 
inconsistency); Gandhi, supra note 35 (proposing structural reforms to address concerns about 
arbitrary decisionmaking with respect to the application of the minimal risk definitions); 
Rosato, supra note 35, at 362 (describing problems with the IRB system that diminish its 
reliability as adequate protectors of child research subjects). 
 356. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text for discussion of this as an issue in the 
context of the oversight authorities’ review of Johns Hopkins’s IRB processes. 
 357. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 815 n.6 (Md. 2001) (describing how 
“the literature on the law and ethics of human experimentation is replete with warnings that all 
subjects, but especially vulnerable subjects, are at risk of abuse by inclusion [as research 
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status are typically underrepresented in both therapeutic and 
nontherapeutic clinical trials, healthy children with these backgrounds 
are typically overrepresented in nontherapeutic research.358 Dr. Lainie 
Friedman Ross has offered the view that the overuse of poorer, 
mostly African-American children in U.S.-based research involving 
healthy children may be attributable to the fact that “many academic 
medical centers [are located] in poor urban sites with a large minority 
 
subjects],” that among the vulnerable are “children and the elderly . . . and racial minorities, 
ethnic minorities, and women . . . whom history shows to be the most frequent victims of abuses 
in human experimentation,” and that “[t]he failures in the informed consent process lead to 
serious inequities in research, specifically for the poor and less educated who bear most of the 
research burden” (citations omitted)); id. at 815–16 n.6 (enrolling primarily poor black children 
in lead abatement study); David D. Kirkpatrick, E.P.A. Halts Florida Test on Pesticides, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 9, 2005, at A15 (federally- and industry-funded study put on hold and ultimately 
cancelled because researchers in pesticide exposure study allegedly avoided families from 
educated communities while seeking to enroll healthy infants and children to age three by 
offering their parents $970, a camcorder, and other incentives for their consent and 
cooperation); Deanna Fene, Pesticide and Infant Study Halted, FIRST COAST NEWS, Nov. 9, 
2004, http://www.firstcoastnews.com/news/news-article.aspx?storyid=27370 (citing the “many 
parents, doctors and environmental groups who feel [the compensation] incentive targeted poor 
people”); News4Jax.com, Environmental Group Calls Local Pesticide Study ‘Racist,’ Nov. 8, 
2004, http://www.news4jax.com/print/3900662/detail.html. This problem is exacerbated in the 
context of research conducted by U.S.-based institutions abroad. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 
Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8118 (WHP), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436, at *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2002) 
(involving the injury and death of numerous Nigerian children who were recipients of an 
experimental antibiotic shown by prior animal testing to involve a risk of “significant side effects 
in children such as joint disease, abnormal cartilage growth . . . and liver damage”), vacated as 
improvidently granting motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, 77 F. App’x 48 (2d 
Cir. 2003). U.S.-based researchers may choose to conduct some aspects of their research in 
foreign settings as a way to get around relatively stricter U.S. rules concerning risk, benefit, and 
consent. Telephone Interview with Jennifer Li, supra note 8. 
 358. See ROSS, supra note 34, at 48 (noting based on empirical analysis of recent pediatric 
research data that “[b]lacks are overrepresented in the research compared to their proportion in 
the census”); id. (“Black children are overrepresented and Hispanic children are 
underrepresented in all studies and in each subcategory [of research, including in clinical trials, 
therapeutic research, and potentially stigmatizing research] when compared with the census 
data.”); id. at 50 (“The most significant difference occurs in potentially stigmatizing research . . . 
where White subjects are significantly underrepresented, but Black and Hispanic subjects are 
significantly overrepresented.”); see also Catherine Walsh & Lainie F. Ross, Are Minority 
Children Under- or Overrepresented in Pediatric Research?, 12 PEDIATRICS 890, 891–94 (2003) 
(reporting on an empirical study of minority children in pediatric research). Studies seeking to 
explain the dearth of low income and minority subjects in therapeutic and nontherapeutic 
research involving ill children tend to conclude that relatively wealthier families have greater 
access to clinicians who would enroll their ill children in this research, and that because of the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, educated African-American parents continue to distrust 
researchers’ motives when their children are ill. See, e.g., Giselle Corbie-Smith et al., Attitudes 
and Beliefs of African Americans Toward Participation in Medical Research, 14 J. GEN. 
INTERNAL MED. 537, 543–44 (1999). 
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population.”359 Consistent with the general understanding in the 
research community, however, she also acknowledges that “the 
limited research data that exist suggest that the main reason healthy 
subjects volunteer for research is the monetary incentive” and that 
this incentive is particularly “problematic for research on children 
because it may lead to the exploitation of some children by well-
meaning but less educated parents who do not understand the 
purpose of the activity.”360 
Thus, in the end, although the proposals to balance protection 
and access share a deep commitment to assuring that children will 
benefit when science doles out the fruits of its endeavors, all fail to 
protect some healthy children from the more harmful and risky 
research they would permit. The common solution in all of the 
proposals is implicitly to leave to individual researchers and their 
IRBs the authority to choose the research that is worth doing, to 
decide how much harm and risk is too much, and to define child 
protection to mean protection of children as a group. So long as this 
group is respected, not exploited for its inherent vulnerabilities, and 
not used for “over the top” harmful or risky research, “children” are 
being protected, and an acceptable balance between protection and 
access has been struck. From the child protection perspective, the 
problems with this situation are evident: it potentially exposes healthy 
children—particularly poor and minority children—to too much harm 
and risk, and it eliminates almost entirely concern for the individual 
child.361 
B. The Merits of Harmonizing the Ethics of Pediatric Research with 
the Law of Child Protection and Parents’ Consent Authority 
This Section argues that the ethics of pediatric research should 
be harmonized with the law of child protection and parents consent 
authority. Despite numerous well-intentioned efforts, the research 
community has not arrived at an appropriate and effective balance 
 
 359. ROSS, supra note 34, at 51–53. 
 360. Id. at 81. Notes 202–04 and accompanying text discuss this point in the context of the 
discussion about benefits in general. 
 361. In its admonition that researchers respect the assent of the older child and only permit 
proxy consent to suffice for younger children, Robert Nelson’s proposal is a partial exception to 
this point. See supra notes 304–05 and accompanying text; see also Nelson & Reynolds, supra 
note 53, at 12 (separately discussing the value of respect for children’s assent). 
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between protection and access.362 On the other hand, the law of child 
protection and parents’ consent authority is both applicable to and 
capable of resolving these tensions. In addition, because this law 
codifies progressive social norms about the child and his or her 
relationship to adults and the society, both the research community 
and children who would be research subjects would benefit from its 
use to set the standards also for the research enterprise. 
1. Resolving the Dilemma of Protection and Access.  The 
research and bioethics communities have long sought to balance their 
interest in increasing access to child subjects for higher-risk research 
against their interest in protecting children from the harms and risks 
inherent in research.363 The pendulum swings that Dr. Lainie 
Friedman Ross describes so well in her related work—between the 
completely unregulated use of healthy children as research subjects in 
the period preceding the Belmont Report, to their almost complete 
exclusion in the following period, to their inclusion in increasing 
numbers and in increasingly risky research designs—exemplify the 
competing positions and the resulting quandaries at issue in this 
project.364 As I argued in Section A, these quandaries remain 
unresolved in significant respects, particularly from the child 
protection perspective. The result is that although the project to 
access healthy children for increasingly risky research is well 
underway, the parallel project to assure the protection of these 
children as they are being used as research subjects has effectively 
stalled.365 
On the other hand, the law of child protection and parents’ 
consent authority is premised on the fact that children’s interests will 
sometimes diverge from those of their parents and other relevant 
 
 362. See supra Part III.A. This point is generally well understood within that community, 
which appears to be receptive to solutions to the problem. 
 363. See supra notes 294–98 and accompanying text for a description of this project. 
 364. See supra note 21. 
 365. See supra Part I and Part III.A for an examination of this disparity. As Jennifer Rosato 
has noted in the context of the modern push to increase the use of children in drug trials, 
[i]n promulgating the new FDA regulations, the FDA was aware of the myriad of 
serious ethical issues raised when children are research subjects. [Thus, it] initially . . . 
noted that ‘because pediatric patients represent a vulnerable population, special 
protections are needed to protect their rights and to shield them from undue risk.’ 
Nevertheless, it ultimately declined to adopt regulations that would guide a resolution 
of these issues. 
Rosato, supra note 35, at 365 (citation omitted). 
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adults. This law is thus designed to identify the circumstances—both 
traditional and novel—that may result in a conflict of interest 
between children and adults, the institutions responsible for 
addressing conflicts, and the rules and procedures according to which 
they will be resolved. In addition, these rules and procedures 
specifically contemplate the existence of tensions between child 
protection and competing norms, including especially parental 
autonomy and the states’ interest in the overall welfare of society.366 
Because of this, the law of child protection and parents’ consent 
authority is both applicable to and capable of resolving the related 
tensions between the research community’s child protection and 
scientific progress goals. 
This law is applicable to the resolution of this problem because 
according to the federal regulations, among other things, parental 
consent is an essential—if not the essential—requirement of ethical 
research and because parents’ ability to give lawful consent in all 
contexts is defined by its terms. Indeed, given this situation, it is 
difficult to understand why the research and bioethics communities 
have over the years sought to reinvent this wheel. Harmonization of 
research ethics with this body of law would go far toward relieving the 
research community of its Grimes-related concerns. 
Importantly, the law of child protection and parents’ consent 
authority is also capable of resolving the related tensions because this 
is precisely its business; it is designed to determine whose interests—
children’s or adults’—prevail on any given set of facts, and in 
particular when adults’ choices and actions cross the line into 
prohibited territory. This framework contemplates two sets of 
circumstances: those in which children’s and adults’ interests are 
coterminous (either in fact or as a result of the legal fiction that 
parents act in the best interests of their children so long as they do not 
transgress the boundaries of maltreatment law) and those in which 
their interests diverge (because the adults at issue have or 
contemplate transgressing those boundaries). And it provides the 
tools—the maltreatment definitions and their exceptions—necessary 
properly to sort adult decisions and actions according to whether they 
are permissible or prohibited. 
 
 366. See supra notes 116–31 and accompanying text for a description of the doctrine of 
parental autonomy; and see infra notes 391–92 and accompanying text for a description of the 
states’ interest in children as future citizens of the society. 
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These tools are not perfect. For example, I have criticized them 
in another context for their failure adequately to address nonphysical 
forms of abuse and neglect.367 And in some cases, individuals 
responsible for implementing the rules take advantage of the breadth 
and vagueness built into the definitions to intrude on the privacy of 
the family in unhelpful and even harmful ways.368 Finally, while the 
law of child protection has developed in tandem with the 
constitutional doctrine of parental autonomy, the included right to 
consent on behalf of the child has developed primarily in the tort law 
context as a defense to battery and in the context of medical neglect 
cases.369 Given the history of pediatric research, it is no real stretch to 
imagine that certain study designs might qualify as child abuse.370 
Nevertheless, there would be some work to do to establish the sorts 
of research-related procedures and interventions that would qualify 
as abusive in the modern context.371 
Although these are important flaws, they need not be obstacles 
to harmonization. Because the law of child protection and parents’ 
consent authority merely establishes the minimum level of care and 
respect adults owe children, the research and bioethics communities 
are free and should continue to exercise leadership in recognizing 
emotional harms and risks as boundaries to permissible research.372 
Moreover, exposure to inappropriately broad definitions of abuse can 
be minimized, if not avoided entirely, through exclusive reliance on 
officials responsible for standardizing those definitions at the state 
rather than local level.373 And because of their experience applying 
child protection law to diverse scenarios, for example to foreign and 
 
 367. DORIANE LAMBELET COLEMAN, FIXING COLUMBINE: THE CHALLENGE TO 
AMERICAN LIBERALISM 131–32 (2002); cf. Taylor, supra note 154, at 339–40 (noting that 
emotional abuse is not always included in the states’ definition of maltreatment, in part because 
of “its elusive and intangible nature”). 
 368. Legal definitions of maltreatment are crafted in this way 
to assure that the state can exercise wide discretion in treating targeted parental 
conduct as maltreatment; and [to] ensure[] that the state is not precluded from 
addressing such conduct by the failure of the legislature or administrative officials to 
include all conceivable forms of abuse or neglect in its laws. 
Coleman, supra note 142, at 428. 
 369. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 370. See supra Part I for a description of some of this history. 
 371. I propose the beginnings of this analysis in Part II.C. 
 372. See, e.g., IOM, supra note 8, at 246–50 (discussing this issue); Shah et al., supra note 5, 
at 478 (same). 
 373. See infra note 379 and accompanying text. 
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novel parenting practices,374 these officials have the expertise to 
partner with the research community to develop protocols specifically 
appropriate to this setting.375 
Harmonizing the ethics of pediatric research with the law of child 
protection and parents’ consent authority would, at a minimum, 
require revising the federal regulations governing pediatric research 
to reflect the law’s definitions of permissible harm and risk.376 The 
language of “minimal risk” could be retained—this might be 
important for many reasons, including that it is commonly used in the 
global context—so long as its content is fully consistent with those 
definitions.377 The regulations should also be made to reflect the legal 
boundaries of parents’ decisional authority. Although these 
boundaries are already implicit in the regulations, it must be made 
clear that parental consent is not the same as respect for the child. 
Parents as proxies have authority to consent to their children’s 
inclusion in research only when this exercise is consistent with the 
fulfillment of their legally defined fiduciary obligations. Incorporating 
these boundaries would also ensure the inclusion of any eventually 
applicable exceptions to the maltreatment rules should these be at 
issue.378 Finally, the regulations should require review of pediatric 
study designs to ensure that they do not violate maltreatment law. 
This review might be conducted as part of or following the IRB 
process by an independent expert in the field of child protection—for 
example, the state agency responsible for supervising locally 
administered child welfare programs. This work could be done by a 
local child welfare agency. The research community, however, is more 
 
 374. See Coleman, supra note 165, at 290–93 (discussing the law’s applicability to these 
settings). 
 375. See Coleman, supra note 142, at 428–29 (explaining that the definitions of maltreatment 
are usually purposefully broad so that officials on the ground can adapt them to novel situations 
that may involve abuse or neglect). 
 376. See supra Part II.C for a description of those rules and their application in the research 
setting. Because these rules are inherently nondiscriminatory, revising the ethics of pediatric 
research consistent with their terms would also solve the ongoing debate among bioethicists and 
regulators over the issue of an absolute versus relative interpretation of the harms and 
discomforts “ordinarily encountered in daily life” in favor of the consensus position. See supra 
notes 76–83 and accompanying text for a description of this debate. Within HHS, the easiest 
way to accomplish this harmonization would be to revise the federal rules governing pediatric 
research with its own maltreatment definitions. Notes 133–35 and accompanying text set out 
these definitions in relevant part. 
 377. See Kopelman, supra note 17, at 749–50 (describing this global context). 
 378. Parts II.A and II.B discuss this body of law. 
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likely this way to get correct and consistent interpretations of the 
relevant laws.379 
Adopting these changes would strike the balance between 
protection and access somewhere between the conservative ethics of 
Paul Ramsey and his disciples and the progressive ethics of those who 
have reinvigorated this debate by calling for increasing the risk to 
which healthy children are properly exposed.380 This particular 
balance or middle ground is probably consistent with the approach of 
many within the research community who would thus benefit from its 
formal adoption as the governing standard in the research setting. 
Even those who would approach the matter differently, however, 
would be getting a good measure of what they say they want: respect 
for individual child subjects in a form that is acceptable to those who 
would judge its terms, and respect for the scientific enterprise as an 
important countervailing concern. They would, of course, also lose 
something in the trade: the ability lawfully to expose healthy children 
to some higher-risk research, and any scientific progress that could be 
achieved only in this way. On the other hand, what they would gain 
would be immeasurable in the long run. Contrary to the skeptical 
views expressed by the Grimes court and by other unconvinced 
observers of the research enterprise, the society would come to know 
and trust in the research community as an institution that shares its 
particular commitment to child protection.381 
2. A Consistent Commitment to Child Protection.  A consistent 
commitment to the progressive view of child protection ensconced in 
the law of child protection and parents’ consent authority is 
ultimately the most important reason to harmonize the ethics of 
 
 379. The general point that “IRBs should include experts on children, either as members or 
consultants,” is not a new one. E.g., Rosato, supra note 35, at 369 (making this argument); id. at 
367 (noting that this recommendation comes also from the American Academy of Pediatrics). 
The difference between these proposals and the one I make here relates to the expert’s 
qualifications and orientation. Thus, although Rosato and others have recommended the use of 
an expert “knowledgeable in ‘pediatric ethical, clinical, and psychosocial issues,’” id. at 372, I 
am recommending someone with specific expertise in the law of child protection and parents’ 
consent authority. The two are not the same. 
 380. See supra Part I, which sets out these competing positions. 
 381. See supra notes 254–63 and accompanying text for a description of the Grimes court’s 
views in this respect. Cf. IOM, supra note 8, at 251 (discussing the concern that the research 
community not be perceived as insensitive to concerns about discrimination in the selection of 
research subjects). For a description of other skeptical views of the pediatric research 
enterprise, see supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
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pediatric research with this law. Child protection as a concept and 
social commitment is on the ascendancy, entirely apart from the 
world of science and research. Much remains to be done—and also 
undone—to secure children’s general welfare and the safety of 
individual children: nevertheless, American society stands at a high 
point in the history of the child. 
In concept, the child is no longer as she was throughout much of 
Western history—the equivalent of property or else a mere extension 
of her parents who could do with her as they wished.382 She is no 
longer “cheaper than a calf”383 or otherwise of lesser value.384 Rather, 
the child today is an individual, albeit a preautonomous one, to whom 
her parents and society owe basic obligations of nurture and 
respect.385 An important aspect of this modern vision is that the child’s 
body and mind are ultimately her own, not to be used to her 
detriment by the adults who are responsible for her care and 
development.386 To the contrary, her parents’ right to exercise 
 
 382. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 
2407 (1995) (noting that “[u]ntil the social reform movement at the beginning of this century . . . 
[a] parent’s right to the custody of his children so approximated property ownership that it 
could be transferred by contract, and lost only by abandonment or unfitness”); Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 5 
GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 313, 313–15 (1998) [hereinafter Woodhouse, From Property to 
Personhood] (describing the evolving concept of the child in this respect); Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse, “Who Owns The Child?” Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 995, 997 (1992) (explaining the Supreme Court’s early cases involving children as 
moves to “constitutionalize[] a narrow, tradition-bound vision of the child as essentially private 
property”). 
 383. See supra text accompanying note 41 for an example of this expression’s use in the 
early 1900s to explain why children were particularly useful as research subjects. 
 384. See Keith-Spiegel, supra note 56, at 182 (explaining that the “[l]ack of legal status and 
the high mortality rate of minors also contributed to their lower perceived value and interest”). 
 385. See Scott & Scott, supra note 382, at 2402–03 (describing a modified fiduciary approach 
to the parent-child relationship and a conception of the child based in that approach); Barbara 
Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parent’s Rights, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1855–58 (1993) (describing a child-centered view of parents’ rights as 
emanating from the responsibility to nurture and respect the child, specifically from the 
formation of an attachment to the child based in the fulfillment of this responsibility). Arguably, 
the most developed articulation of this vision is found in the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNCRC), which describes an individual with evolving capacities to whom 
parents and the state owe duties of care commensurate with those capacities. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. Even though the United States has failed to 
ratify this treaty, its fingerprints are evident throughout the document as a result of the integral 
involvement of State Department officials and U.S.-based NGOs in its development. See 
Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood, supra note 382, at 313–18 (discussing the UNCRC). 
 386. See Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955, 
975–76 (1993) (noting that “[f]rom th[e] liberal belief in ‘the intrinsic and ultimate value of the 
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discretion in the ways they guide her along the path to adulthood is 
directly tied to the fulfillment of their fiduciary obligations of nurture 
and respect,387 including to the development of a relationship with her 
that honors these commitments.388 As a result, although liberalism 
(with its almost singular focus on the rights of adults) often inures to 
the detriment of children,389 describing the child and her relationship 
to her parents in this way accords her one of this ideology’s central 
benefits: the protection of the harm principle.390 
The modern relationship between parents and the state reflects 
this evolution in the concept of the child. Thus, although a relatively 
narrow sense of parens patriae caused the state mostly to stay out of 
the affairs of the family through the late 1800s to mid-1900s,391 a much 
more expansive view of the state’s role has since made it a forced, but 
also often embraced, junior partner with parents to guide the child’s 
development and welfare. Mandatory school attendance 
requirements, child labor laws, civil and criminal maltreatment laws, 
the foster care system, and immunization requirements are at once 
 
human individual’ comes the view that ‘the concept of privacy embodies the moral fact that a 
person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole’” (citations omitted)); see 
also supra notes 126–31 and accompanying text (applying this idea to child welfare law). 
 387. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Parents generally ‘have the right, coupled 
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obligations.’” 
(quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 
(1925))); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 297–98 
(1988) (describing the traditional view of “parenthood as exchange”). 
 388. See Bartlett, supra note 387, at 295 (describing a new construction of the relationship 
between parent and child, away from parents’ rights toward parents’ responsibility for 
constructing a nurturing relationship with their child). 
 389. See COLEMAN, supra note 367, at 93–138 (describing some of the important ways in 
which liberalism has harmed children); Coleman, supra note 142, at 421 (noting the ways in 
which “children are ‘the Achilles heel of liberalism’”); Dailey, supra note 386, at 987 (“By 
vesting parents with authority over their children, liberalism must find a way to resolve the 
apparent violation of its competing principle of individual sovereignty. Parental authority, in the 
form of family privacy, confronts the will of the individual child.”). 
 390. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1912), reprinted in 2 THE GREAT POLITICAL 
THEORIES 186, 186 (Michael Curtis ed., Avon Books 1981) (“The only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others. . . . He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be 
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to 
do so would be wise, or even right.”). 
 391. See Scott & Scott, supra note 382, at 2407 (explaining that “[u]ntil the social reform 
movement at the beginning of th[e twentieth century], the state took little interest in family 
governance”). 
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the most prominent aspects of this partnership and the most reflective 
of the modern concept of the child.392 
The institutions that have developed to support the modern 
concept of the child and the related relationship between parents and 
the state are now well entrenched in American society. Of particular 
relevance to this Article are the maltreatment laws and government 
agencies—the federal and state departments of health and human 
services, social services, and child protection—that enforce them.393 
Their overarching goal is the protection of the individual child from 
harm suffered either intentionally or as a result of neglect by parents 
or guardians.394 To be sure, there is no dearth of criticism of these 
institutions, from those who believe they are not doing enough to 
those who believe they are doing too much.395 But in general, their 
goals are widely accepted, as are the structures and protocols they 
have developed to achieve them. 
The impact of these progressive developments on the lives of 
individual children has been stark. Although the fiduciary theory of 
parental authority and the modern view of parens patriae share 
common ground with the theological ethics of Paul Ramsey and his 
disciples, unlike that ethics, neither requires selfless dedication to the 
ideal best interests of the child. Both parents and the state have 
legitimate competing interests to balance and reality-driven 
circumstances to contend with, and thus, inevitably and lawfully will 
fall short of that ideal. This does not mean that the ideal can be 
ignored or discounted, however,396 because it has been enormously 
 
 392. See generally DAVIS ET AL., supra note 27 (describing these incursions into the parent-
child relationship). 
 393. HHS describes minimum requirements for the states’ child maltreatment laws and 
conditions related federal funding on compliance with those requirements. Child Abuse 
Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 5101–5116 (2000)); see also Wadlington, supra note 118, at 322–23 (describing how 
child maltreatment reporting statutes were “well received” despite the society’s general 
aversion to “informer laws,” reflecting “society’s overwhelming concern with shielding 
children” from harm). The CPS function is administered at the state level by state departments 
of social services. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.90 (2006) (conditioning federal funding of state welfare for 
low-income families on adequate child maltreatment provision). 
 394. See supra notes 132–43 and accompanying text for a description of these rules. 
 395. See Coleman, supra note 142, at 416–20 (providing an analysis of this spectrum of 
criticism). 
 396. Some pediatric bioethicists have seized on this, and the unremedied, relatively poor life 
circumstances of many underprivileged children, to suggest that the best interests standard is a 
weak restraint on both parents’ consent authority and (derivatively) researchers’ ability to use 
healthy children in harmful or risky experiments. See, e.g., Kopelman, supra note 17, at 755. 
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influential in establishing the boundaries of parental authority at a 
point that ensures continued respect for the child as a person: for 
example, not only can parents no longer lawfully beat a child to death 
for disrespecting them,397 in most places they can no longer cause 
them more than transient pain or temporary bruising.398 The view that 
spanking is an affront to the child’s human dignity has even caused 
some jurisdictions legally to restrict this traditional parenting 
practice.399 Possibly the most important impact of the best interests of 
the child ideal on the law is that, on its face and with only a few still 
very narrow exceptions, child maltreatment law in general no longer 
cares about a parent’s reasons for causing harm. As a result, although 
the law in many states prior to the 1960s focused on parental 
motivation in defining abuse, its modern focus is on harm to the 
child.400 
The fact that child maltreatment law formally does not take into 
account wealth or poverty, or whether the child is a member of a 
traditionally disenfranchised minority group, further promises that 
every child in this new tradition will be respected as a person on 
equivalent terms. Significant disparities continue to exist among these 
groups with respect to their circumstances and how they are treated 
by public and private institutions. Nevertheless, the 
antidiscrimination principle—which “guarantees that similar 
individuals will be dealt with in a similar manner by the 
 
 397. See Coleman, supra note 142, at 509 n.286 (explaining the absolute paternal ownership 
theory in history). 
 398. See supra text accompanying notes 136–37 for a description of this standard. 
 399. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 2006) (excepting from California’s 
definition of physical abuse only “age-appropriate spanking to the buttocks”); Op. Cal. Att’y 
Gen. No. 97-416 (July 21, 1997) (interpreting this exception narrowly to require that parents 
also demonstrate that a spanking was necessary and proportional); see also CBCNews Online, 
To Spank or Not To Spank?, CBCNEWS, Feb. 2, 2004, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/span 
king (reporting on the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision to ban the spanking by parents of 
teenagers and children under the age of two). 
 400. See Monrad G. Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. 
REV. 679, 681–86 (1966) (describing “cruelty to children” statutes). Compare supra notes 132–
65 and accompanying text (providing illustrative definitions of abuse, explaining that in general, 
parental motivation is irrelevant to a finding of maltreatment, and setting out the exceptions to 
this policy), with MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 42 (LexisNexis 1932), repealed by An Act 
Relative to the Care and Protection of Children, and Relative to the Advisory Board of the 
Department of Public Welfare, ch. 646, § 1, 1954 Mass. Acts 648, 648 (defining maltreatment 
according to the “vice of its parents”). 
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government”401 and which requires strict scrutiny of arguments that 
would rely upon distinctions made on the basis of suspect 
classifications402—works toward assuring that this promise eventually 
will be kept. 
The movement to increase access to healthy children for higher-
risk research poses a direct challenge to this theoretical, institutional, 
and real-world progress because it focuses on the interests of children 
as a group rather than on the individual child, overincludes healthy 
low-income and minority children in nontherapeutic research, and 
fails to require researchers to prove the merits of their proposals. 
Although others may disagree, in my view it is not worth 
compromising this progress so that other children in the future might 
possibly benefit. 
This is a basic Kantian claim, but also an empirical one: each 
child, no matter his or her external circumstances, should be treated 
with the care and respect due to an individual in this society. In 
particular, no child’s health and welfare should be discounted relative 
to the interests of others. The fact that some ill children will be 
harmed if drugs designed for adults are not also tested for safety and 
efficacy on children does not itself justify risking the well-being of the 
healthy child who would be used for this purpose. Risking a child’s 
well-being so that scientists can test their theories in other respects—
for example, about the level of lead abatement or pesticide use that is 
necessary to minimize the likelihood of related disabilities—is 
particularly unjustified when there are alternative ways to arrive at 
the same ends.403 
Moreover, even assuming the cynics are wrong and that the push 
to increase access to healthy children for higher-risk research is only 
benevolently motivated,404 overall children are more likely to be 
 
 401. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 682 (7th ed. 2004). 
The antidiscrimination principle was initially developed in response to official racist policies 
including slavery and the black codes of the late 1800s, Doriane Lambelet Coleman, 
Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals’ Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 
1093, 1129–33 (1996), and is most often applied to critique race- and gender-based differences in 
treatment or outcomes. It applies equally, however, to other circumstances in which institutions 
take advantage of the inherent vulnerabilities of certain human conditions to subject those who 
bear the burdens of those conditions to relatively poor opportunities. 
 402. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 694–96. 
 403. See supra note 357 for a description of these study designs. 
 404. For a discussion of the contrary view, see supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text, 
which explore the suggestion that calls for increased access to children for pediatric research are 
at least partly driven by economic, rather than altruistic, concerns. Cf. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 
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better off under a system with strong maltreatment laws that require 
parents and the society to respect their personhood and equality than 
under a system that sacrifices these for the general good that science 
can do, or even for the specific good of more and better 
pharmaceuticals tailored to the needs of the pediatric population. 
There is no doubt that children continue to benefit tremendously 
from drug development and other research-related advances. There 
also appears to be a general consensus that if individual healthy 
children are not included in higher-risk pediatric trials, children in 
general will continue to be deprived of some measure of these 
advances in relation to adults.405 There is no minimizing this 
consequence. Nevertheless, a policy that sanctions some perfectly 
legitimate research, but also some of what is otherwise known to be 
child abuse, cannot be justified on these grounds. In this regard, very 
little has changed since the 1970s, when the nation was horrified to 
learn that emotionally disturbed but otherwise healthy 
institutionalized children were used as research subjects by ostensibly 
well-intentioned pediatricians seeking a better hepatitis vaccine.406 
Finally, although not all pediatric research is connected to the 
pharmaceutical industry, this sector is clearly associated with the 





No. 01 Civ. 8118 (WHP), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436, at *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2002) 
(describing Pfizer study of new antibiotic alleged to have resulted in the injury and death of 
numerous Nigerian children; the company is alleged to have pursued the study for financial 
reasons, despite that the drug previously had been tested only on animals and had been shown 
in that context to involve a significant risk of harm), vacated as improvidently granting motion to 
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, 77 F. App’x 48 (2d Cir. 2003); Benjamin et al., supra 
note 300, at 1266 (noting that incentives created to encourage pediatric drug trials have resulted 
in a substantial increase in such trials, but that publication of their results in peer-reviewed 
journals is “limited”; as a result, some of the benefits the society and children were expected to 
gain from these incentives are not being realized); Kirkpatrick, supra note 357 (describing 
proposed EPA study of the effects of pesticides on children, which was to have been funded in 
part by the pesticides industry); Jennifer S. Li et al., Economic Return of Clinical Trials 
Performed Under Pediatric Exclusivity Program, 297 JAMA 480, 480 (2007) (concluding that 
the pediatric exclusivity program has resulted, among other things, in a disproportionate return 
for pharmaceutical companies that have agreed to conduct pediatric research concerning the 
safety and efficacy of their blockbuster drugs). 
 405. See supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text for an explanation of this view. 
 406. See supra notes 46–52 and accompanying text for a description of the experiments at 
Willowbrook and the outcry in the aftermath of their discovery. 
01__COLEMAN.DOC 12/20/2007  10:08:49 AM 
2007] PEDIATRIC RESEARCH 621 
research,407 and with the growth in spending on pediatric research.408 
Thus, in comparing the merits of the competing arguments for 
increased access to healthy children for higher-risk research and for 
child protection law–based curbs on such access, it is worth noting 
that children are not actually “therapeutic orphans” as is claimed by 
some critics of particularly protectionist ethical rules.409 Indeed, as any 
parent in the United States who can afford good health care for his or 
her child knows, this is hyperbole. Pediatricians do not always have a 
ready answer to every medical problem or precise information about 
how a child will respond to a particular drug they are interested in 
prescribing. Nevertheless, compared with parents who cannot afford 
good health care, parents in many other countries, and parents in 
other historical periods, parents in this era suffer from an 
embarrassment of treatment riches. 
To the extent that there is still a disparity between children and 
adults in this respect, it deserves attention. But if justice is what 
motivates those who would seek a solution, the answer cannot be 
even a partial return to the time when society ignored the fact of 
children’s infancy and attendant vulnerability. Indeed, the disparity 
exists in part because in 1978, the drafters of the Belmont Report 
decided that protecting children from research-related abuse was 
more important than assuring them parity with adults in the search 
for ever better treatment options.410 Although it may be useful from 
time to time to challenge this conclusion, there is no compelling 
reason to believe in this period that anything has changed, and thus 
that this decision was or is wrong. 
If there does come a time when it is more important to do science 
than child protection—for example, in the case of a national medical 
emergency—justice requires that the burdens of this choice be 
distributed across the society. The solution cannot be as it stands: the 
disproportionate use of poor and minority children as research 
 
 407. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text for a description of these arguments. 
 408. Telephone Interview with Jennifer Li, supra note 8 (describing recent trials conducted 
under the pediatric exclusivity rule that included healthy child subjects); see supra notes 8–9 and 
accompanying text. 
 409. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
 410. See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text. The distributive justice argument for 
increasing access to healthy children for higher-risk research was part of the discussions 
surrounding the development of the Belmont Report and the earlier-published report by the 
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research entitled Research Involving Children. See supra notes 66–68. 
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subjects.411 Regardless of whether this use is intentional or incidental 
as some have claimed,412 there is no justice in a system in which those 
who primarily bear the burdens of research are most likely to come 
from especially vulnerable subpopulations which are also least likely 
to benefit from its successes.413 
CONCLUSION 
The question whether it is ever appropriate to involve healthy 
children in risky research is a hard one. It has perplexed philosophers, 
bioethicists, researchers, and others, at least since Nuremberg. On the 
one hand, if healthy children are off-limits for such research, there is 
much that society cannot learn about children in general, including 
how to improve their lives and prospects. On the other hand, 
permitting researchers to use healthy children in this context risks 
their health and welfare, in some cases to a point that otherwise 
would be considered intolerable. It also risks the perpetration of 
distributive injustices both domestically and internationally as 
researchers and institutions encounter difficulties in their effort to 
enlist sufficient subjects for their work: history and modern practice 
demonstrate that it is much easier to enlist children of vulnerable 
parents in risky research—particularly parents who are financially or 
 
 411. For a description of this disparity, see supra notes 357–60 and accompanying text. The 
movement to increase access to healthy children is motivated in large part by arguments about 
distributive justice. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
 412. For example, see supra notes 359–60 and accompanying text, discussing Dr. Ross’s 
theory that the disparity may be due to the location of some research institutions in poor, urban 
settings. 
 413. Existing data show important “disparities in health outcomes between minority 
children and their Caucasian counterparts, and between children of lower and higher-family 
socioeconomic status.” ROSS, supra note 34, at 56 (“[T]here are serious and significant heath 
care disparities in medicine, including pediatric medicine, based on race and ethnicity . . . .”); id. 
at 51 (“Our data found that Black children are overrepresented in medical research overall. The 
overrepresentation of Black children in pediatric research stands in acute contrast with their 
decreased access to pediatric health services, even when they have the same health care 
insurance.”); id. at 55–56 (suggesting that although “Black children do have fair access to the 
potential benefits that may accrue from participation in clinical trials,” the same is not true of 
“therapeutic research more generally”); see also IOM, supra note 8, at 122 (“Allowing a relative 
interpretation of minimal risk . . . violate[s] the ethical principle of justice, which requires that 
the burdens and benefits of research be distributed equitably. As a political and practical 
matter, it could also create social dissension if those in disadvantaged communities or 
populations understood that their children would be exposed to a higher risk in research than 
better off children.”). 
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medically needy, or who are relatively uneducated—than it is to 
assure that its burdens are spread fairly across the population. 
The federal rules governing pediatric research largely ensconce 
prevailing ethical standards. Thus, as the ethical tide shifts, so too do 
permissible interpretations of those rules. Until the mid- to late 1990s, 
prevailing interpretations reflected the generally held view that it was 
inappropriate to involve healthy children in risky research. The 
notion was that whatever disparity existed between adults and 
children in terms of their access to the benefits of research was 
acceptable given the moral issues associated with the use of healthy 
children in this controversial setting. Since then, however, bioethicists 
have renewed the call to involve healthy children in risky research, 
relying primarily on the argument that increasing reliance on 
pharmaceuticals to treat illness and disease has caused the disparity in 
benefits between children and adults to grow to a point at which it is 
no longer acceptable. This argument has been largely successful. The 
use of healthy children in risky research settings is once again 
prevalent, as is the research community’s recourse to particularly 
vulnerable subgroups within the pediatric population to fill out their 
protocols. Notably, although the argument in support of this result 
was built on the promise of new and better pharmaceuticals, the use 
of healthy children in this setting has not been limited to drug trials. 
As it proceeds in this direction, society must not forget the 
lessons of the past that caused it to regulate pediatric research in the 
first place. These lessons taught that the research setting is fruitful 
ground for abuse and exploitation of pediatric subjects, 
notwithstanding the good intentions of researchers and regulators. It 
is thus essential to establish a boundary between permissible and 
impermissible uses of children that reflects the common 
understanding of what it means to abuse a child and to exploit a 
group of vulnerable individuals. 
Prominent members of the research community have worked 
hard to develop just such a boundary. But they have largely failed for 
reasons that have nothing to do with their integrity or creativity and 
everything to do with their competing priorities. Indeed, the difficulty 
of crafting a rule that simultaneously includes a healthy child in, and 
protects a healthy child from, a high-risk study cannot be overstated. 
The research community has a long history of self-regulation. It 
is therefore not surprising that its members would wish to solve this 
problem themselves, according to their own normative priors and 
without outside interference. But, in fact, a boundary between 
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permissible and impermissible uses of children already exists in the 
law of child protection and parents’ consent authority: research is 
unethical and thus, according to the federal regulations, cannot 
proceed without legally effective parental consent. And parents 
cannot give legally effective consent when the research design would 
subject the child to the equivalent of maltreatment as defined by the 
governing state’s law. Consistent with the antidiscrimination 
principle, this law does not distinguish among children in the measure 
of protection they are due. 
This Article argues that the ethics of pediatric research should be 
harmonized with the law of child protection and parents’ consent 
authority for both practical and normative reasons. 
Practically, it makes sense for researchers and regulators to 
comply with the terms of the law that will ultimately govern their 
enterprise. Although law is sometimes malleable, so that those who 
resist often influence its contours, this is not likely to be the case with 
the law of child protection and parents’ consent authority. It is firmly 
entrenched in the jurisprudence precisely because of the strength of 
social norms about protecting children from unnecessary harm and 
risk. 
Normatively, it makes sense for researchers and regulators to 
conduct their work consistent with the law of child protection and 
parents’ consent authority because this law draws the line of 
permissible harm and risk consistently, and in all cases, at child abuse. 
Although this would prohibit some (but not all) uses of healthy 
children as research subjects, it would do ample compensating good: 
children would be protected in the research setting to the same extent 
they are protected in other settings. And the research community 
would engender enormous goodwill in the larger society. This will be 
indispensable going forward, as the success of its enterprise is 
ultimately dependent upon the public’s confidence that it is truly 
committed to the protection of its research subjects. 
